To the point that quite a bit of it can be pretty language-specific... I remember reading some stuff by Bertrand Russell thinking "this reasoning doesn't really work in Italian".

> I suspect much of the appeal isn't so much as an authority as a bridge

The book is very much of his time. One could say the early '70s were when the idealistic rubber of '60s counterculture hit the hard asphalt of reality. It wasn't enough to dream of a world with peace & love anymore, one had to translate those ideals into practical ways in order to survive. The boomers went from being university students to actual employment, so a lot of people started caring about things like Pirsig's Quality.

Žižek has made comments about so many different things, so publicly, that it’s hard to avoid finding something you disagree with. But it’s also hard to avoid finding something you agree with.

I should point out that I did say (with added emphasis):

> Sure, there's a lot of "Continental philosophy" which ends up looking largely indistinguishable from the "critical theory" cant to which you object (although, maybe, it is unfair to tar all of it with that brush)

In other words, a lot of it really is that bad – but not all of it.

I myself have to admit I've always been rather fascinated by Foucault, and I think a lot of what he has to say is rather interesting and of contemporary relevance–especially his viewpoint that sexual orientation is a set of contingent cultural constructs, rather than some essential reality of persons

Žižek too – I've read some of his essays, sometimes he makes some insightful points (to me at least) – although I haven't read his philosophical works, and his essays I've read, I'm not sure if they should be classified as "philosophy" per se

> Why don't we like the alleged 'relativism' of Continental philosophy?

How does it answer the classic objection that relativism is self-defeating?

I don't think "relativism" is the biggest complaint though. The biggest complaint is obscurantism–which risks dressing up the trivial as profound, and hiding falsehoods behind fancy language. And imprecision–analytic philosophy is very much about precise definitions and precise arguments, which makes it easier to judge whether an argument succeeds or fails, and to work out whether the parties to a dispute are actually arguing about the same thing or just talking past each other–Continental philosophy tends to be much more impressionistic in character, making it harder to work out what people are saying, and to judge the quality of their arguments

He is still considered one of the biggest thinkers of philosophy in the 20th century, personal warts and all.

Plus, as a European, I wouldn't trust people with analytical/anglo-saxon philosophical tendencies to know philosophy when they see it (e.g. re D/G and Lacan).

It is able and very good at that, and way better then what continental philosophers have produced.

A few examples: Colin McGinn for Literature: Ethics, Evil, and Fiction, David Benatar for "Existentialism": The Human Predicament, Peter Singer for Politics: The Darwinian Left.

Considering much of continental philosophy is a response to Kant and/or Hegel, I don't know how you're able to convince yourself of this rather reductionist take on the history of that conversation (because this isn't even close to fair) unless you've never read Kant or Hegel, and don't understand why it would follow that the way one writes is implicated by the conclusions of Kant/Hegel.

This goes as far back as Nietzsche, who never stops talking about why form/content divide is completely misleading and a historical artifact itself, some examples off the top of my head, paraphrased, like "The Greeks thought Socrates was refuted by his ugliness"; "Spinoza purposely writes in a style to make you think his argument is mathematically irrefutable, as if it were dipped in bronze", "naming things is the first form of political power", etc, etc. This theme carries threw from his first book to his last.

There's more to this story when you get to the likes of Heiddeger, Derrida, Foucault, etc so I'm condensing for brevity, but its just strange to me that you approach continental philosophy as some arbitrary veering off course when there's a well-vetted history as to why it takes such form over time. You're not actually making some argument from first principles (the conduction of philosophical discourse looks like this...") nor are you demonstrating an exhaustive accounting of European philosophy, you're merely demonstrating you've already made a certain philosophical commitment, and that's that.

Chomsky on Zizek [1]: Posturing. There's no theory in any of this stuff. Try to find in all [Zizek's work] some principles from which you can deduce...empirically testable propositions...beyond the level of something you can explain in 5 minutes to a 12-year old.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AVBOtxCfan0

In fact, this very article is a "review" (in the way NYRB does it) of a new edition of "The Authoritarian Personality" which calls him "a great polymath." Since this article is in some ways advertising the very thing you call "hardly the cornerstone" of his work, the best thing for the top comment to be to inform people of it's flaws. In fact, I think it's irresponsible for NYRB to publish this, and mention his stupid opinions about Jazz, which are not really on topic or important, and not mention criticisms of the re-release that prompted the piece.

The kind of theoritical psychoanalysis Zizek talks about is not really classic psychoanalysis at all. Even Marxism at the lowest level is a theory of psychology.

He is a philosophy popularizer. He writes a lot about some of the greats, himself, like almost all other contempararies not being one himself.

My impression is not that his academic writings are 'pop', in any way comparable to Dan Brown. I have only read a little but he has published. Some of it is essayistic in nature some of it quite heavy.

I get your point. But just because your a not one of the absoulte greatest there ever was, it doesn't him instantly become a superficial literary con-artist the way dan brown has become to be regarded.

Also he seems quite well read and a great analyzer. Not that i agree with all he says, but he is not trying to push agendas as other pop-philosophers are.

A better example of some one being "Dan Brownish"would be sam harris. He is not respected in any way in the acedemia of philoshophy, he doesn't reference the history og the historiagrahy of the field, and simply doesnt seem on-level despite writing a lot of pop-philosophy and being regarded publicy as a true academic.

Zizek is actually a respected academic.

Well respected by some and not others. Lacan as a philosopher has boosters and detractors...much like Zizek (and every other philosopher). I'm with the detractors.

I've read 1.5 of his books (not the one you mentioned) and I tried to watch an academic lecture on youtube. I've read various secondary sources (which are mostly highly critical and I found convincing).

Your argument comes down to "anyone who doesn't think highly of Zizek is dumb/hasn't read him/doesn't understand him". It's so low effort.

> When he engages the public, or whatever you find on youtube which is what I suspect you've seen of him based on your impression, he does indeed joke around a lot. But this has to do with his inherent distaste for 'preaching'.

I have no problem with intellectuals making jokes. Zizek isn't funny.

> But this has to do with his inherent distaste for 'preaching'. He's no fan of climbing on a pedestal and pretending to speak from a position of authority, he's said himself he's always considered that authoritarian.

Most people who "don't like to preach" end up, you know, not preaching.

>Edit: If you disagree with the Zizek statement and have never listened to him speak, you may wish to look him up.

This is extremely uncharitable. Zizek is a serious philosopher, and people take him seriously. Just because you don't understand the points he's making (or don't agree with them), it doesn't mean he's purveying nonsense. Very few (if any) of his critics and fellow philosophers accuse him of being nonsensical. He frequently talks about topics I can't even attempt to understand, but I'm sure high-level physics can sound like nonsense to people too. He has 164,015[0] citations counted by Google Scholar, and along with Althusser considered important in the philosophy of ideology and socialism. He's by no means a hack.

[0] https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?user=qzuup1UAAAAJ&hl=...

There is a plethora of writings of substance in the continental tradition. Writings that we should not ignore. 'Discipline and Punish' is one of them. I recommend 'The Dialectic of Enlightenment' by Adorno as your complement to Popper's writings.

On another note, I don't generally see the value in antagonisms between paradigms or presentation forms. I find value from the analytical perspective and from critical theory, and being able to dance both dances is illuminating. I don't think the empirical process can reveal the entirety of the human experience. Steadfastly stumping for one paradigm over the other is no more useful than being a vim/emacs zealot.

If Deleuze or Foucault don't grok for you, it doesn't mean the authors are _wrong_ or lying to readers to obtain mystic status. Just like someone not caring to study Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory shouldn't write off the entirety of mathematics.

That's pretty hard to distinguish from "just" literature; of course not all literature is fictional or journalistic. But neither criticism nor aesthetics are particularly bounded in their ability to make negative or positive claims due to the flexibility of interpretation of background assumptions that both pancritical + justificationist disciplines rely on. It's inherently subversive of any central and stabilizing intellectual tendency and I think most critical theorists admit their goals as being such.

This is why I doubt the claim that there is a central truth that critical theorists are attempting to discover when their methods are designed to be as disputative or ambiguating as possible. Even if we're in a position where no assumption can be taken for granted in the end, productive operational work (in science in policy or otherwise) always has to maintain some initial set of working goals and assumptions to guide and rationalize action, and perform interventions which can maximally orient the institution towards further action. Subversiveness stalls except in how it wants to prevent such institutions from prolonging themselves.

> Critical theorists are studied and used by philosophers, legal scholars, and sociologists

Are they all trained out of the Frankfurt school by any chance? Yes they're sometimes worth responding to, no they're not worth taking seriously except as a means to an end.

> They wouldn't, because critical theorists can recognize the truth and falsity of claims. Your criticism would be better aimed at the so-called postmodernists (and it'd still be wrong).

I am earnestly interested in learning more about non-postmodern critical theorists. The pragmatists of the freshwater school (Sellars and Brandom mainly) are the only people on the top of my head that sing that note due to the way they deal seriously with the problem of interpretation in foundations and the way they want to internalize Hegel, while still having the aims of scientific inquiry in mind. But that's analytic philosophy assimilating continental philosophy rather than the other way around, which I'm more sympathetic to precisely because analytics tend to want to bound critique rather than produce more critique for its own sake (i.e. subversion as an ends).

Girard was never ridiculed in France (at least, not any more than any other who became a target at this or that point). He remains a very respected figure, and his theories are very deep. That said, they're not suitable for consumption by analytical philosophy types.

Thiel, however, has only ever said trivialities regarding Girard and his theories, that reveal a very shallow understanding (if that), something analogous to "As Einstein said, everything is relative".

That quote is totally moronic as usual.

I would even say I don't want to read anything by anyone who thinks Zizek has anything interesting to say. Instant block or else I may become infected by the stupidity.