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The entire point of the law is to prevent you from being able to make those larger adjustments, though.

How often do you replace tenants? And what's your occupancy rate? If you're in a situation where you can reliably raise rent 7% YoY indefinitely without decreasing your occupancy rate, then you were severely underpriced for the market (and you should probably fire that management company for pricing you that absurdly low). 7% YoY after inflation is a big increase that outstrips average wage increases.

If you aren't severely underpriced, then what's going to happen is that when you increase by 7%, the tenants will choose to end the lease because they can find something cheaper (or they emmigrate from the city because nothing is affordable), and you'll struggle to replace them with wealthier tenants willing to pay what you think is market price, so you'll have to lower rent to attract a tenant. Once you get to the point where your price is roughly in line with what the market will bear, you'll only be able to squeeze one or two years of rent increases out of a tenant before the non-monetary costs of moving are outweighed by the cheaper rent, so constantly trying for 7% YoY post inflation will just mean a decrease in your occupancy rate, both because you'll be replacing tenants more frequently and because finding new ones will take longer.



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Have there been leasing periods in your past where rent increases exceeded 7 percent? Is that common?

Also, I assume there is some market pressure to consider, if your increases outpace supply and demand, then tenants would simply move, right?


Landlords who choose to increase rents at the maximum rate permitted each year do so at the risk that they will be undercut by competing property owners who do not do so. Given this, I think that your property management company is offering you bad advice.

Most landlords already increase rents at the maximum rate that the market will bear. Capping annual increases at 7% just ensures that in a year when the market would allow landlords to get away with increasing rents by over 7%, they won't be able to do so.

I do not follow when you say that the strategy of increasing rents by the maximum amount permissible is necessary "because larger adjustments cannot be made if and when necessary due to market conditions". In what scenario would larger adjustments be necessary? If you made a viable investment in a property and are currently renting it out, wouldn't rent increases just need to equal inflation in order for you to maintain the same level of profitability? Sure, increasing by more than inflation allows you to increase profits, but I hardly see why maximizing profits should be seen as a necessity---especially when it comes at the cost of pushing people out onto the streets.


Let's say I'm a different landlord. If the other landlords are raising their rents, I know that by not raising mine, I can attract more tenants and increase my occupancy rate. Maybe I'm at 70%, and I need 80% to cover my costs. I know that if I raised my rents by $1,000/month, I would lose tenants to the landlords who didn't.

As long as demand for housing continues to outstrip supply, especially if demand continues to grow at a rate exceeding the growth in supply, then there will always be money to be made in housing.

This law in California allows for 5% annual increases after inflation. It’s hard to see how this will even hurt landlords. Creating a pretty clear incentive to perform a maximum increase ever year doesn’t seem great for renters though.


And it also costs a landlord when a business moves. How likely would they be to find new tenants if the previous tenants mention that they were forced out by an above-market rent increase? You're tilting at windmills.

But the reality is that landlords aren't going to want to take the risk that they'll have to spend extra time at a below-market rate, and since there's no way to predict what the market is going to do, there's no guarantee that they'll only be missing 4% of that value for only one year. Landlords are thus incentivized to increase rent by the legal maximum each year to keep the risk minimized.

Your hypothetical also assumes that in the next year, the market value will stay the same, when in reality the expectation would be that it would increase another percentage point or two, meaning they'd have to come close to maxing that second year's increase to fully recapture the value.

It also creates an effect where now that there's a legal range, the landlord will still feel like a nice guy by increasing rent "only" 4% each year, for example, and that's worse for tenants overall. It strongly incentivizes small-time landlords to imitate commercial landlords and squeeze the tenant for more each year, which other posters have adequately demonstrated is a significant loss to the tenant over a simple periodic adjustment every 3-5 years.

These policies may be better justified in high-density areas like San Francisco (probably still net negative), but applying them state-wide is crazy. California is a very large state and they just made things substantially more complicated for both tenants and landlords throughout.


If inflation+2% is an acceptable rent change, I don't understand how needing 12 months or more to increase rent is a problem. The only thing a shorter time period allows is a landlord to say "well, over this past 3 months we saw inflation change by +-0% but 0+2 is still 2%, so we're increase rent 2% in the next 3 months period".

And that doesn't seem like a good possibility.


I think the parent's point is that since price increases are capped, landlords cannot increase beyond a certain point in a single bumper year. To compensate, they may increase rents beyond what they would otherwise to be able to maintain a similar average increase. Citation is needed, of course.

This is a weird argument. Would this still happen if rent increases were capped at 10%/year, what about 50%/year? At some point no one is going to rent at the rates you're asking and you're going to have to stop.

the landlord would only increase if they know that the market can bear that price - aka, you cannot find an equivalent (or at least very similar) place for cheaper.

You can still do it that way. But instead of raising the rent 12% in one year, you can just raise it by 7% one year and then by 4% the next year.

The tenant still gets below market rent for 4 years, you and can defer pricing work for as long as you want without penalty or risking a move out during a busy year.

I think you might be overly worried for your situation. Your 12% example is an amortized difference of at most 1.5% compared to the new 7% cap (1.12yroot3 vs 1.07yroot5).


In theory, there is some law that should prevent rent increases too much but you would not get anything like that anymore now. Now you get fixed term contracts and after that rent will increase by whatever amount is possible. The time you describe is over (and only valid for old but still existing contracts)

Your arbitrary figure of $9,000 -> $10,000 causing a 40% drop in occupancy is wholly invented.

You could instead imagine a (still completely fictitious) figure that makes your argument look bad -- e.g., that the raise in rates causes a 0% drop in occupancy. Then the landlords/algorithm win by raising prices.

One reason occupancy rates might remain relatively stable even in the face of rising prices is if consumers have relatively few better options, because e.g. all of your competitors collude to also raise their rates similarly.


It is the case in New York City, and also in this California Bill (I don't know the case in Oregon) that you can charge a tenant less than the "legal" rent by offering incentives and discounts.

In other words, it is totally permissible to increase the legal rent by the officially allowed 7%, but increase the effective rent paid by your tenants by only 2% (or whatever you want). There does not appear to be any restrictions about removing such incentives/concessions/discounts in the future.

It also appears that the California law resets as soon as the tenancy changes hands; so as soon as there is a vacancy the landlord is free to increase the rent by as much as they want. This is not the case for NYC rent stabilization; there the increase in the legal rent is a property of the unit, not of the tenancy.


I don’t think the second condition is even needed. As long as you can raise the rent by over 50%, you can keep 1/3 of units vacant and be better off than last year; that’s probably only possibly if overall vacancies are low.

I have a feeling though that landlords who used to do 5% now think it is acceptable to do 8%. Obviously the market demands will restrict the increases further but the law kind of codifies what is not price gouging. I guess we will see in a few years.

If I recall correctly, sometimes there are laws that put a % cap on yearly rent increases.

They're intended to protect existing tenants, but they also discourage landlords from reducing rent if they think rents will come back up in the future faster than they're aloud to raise them.

So instead you get a one-off discount.


Well, it's not like the rents stay static until death. As the owner you can still find enough reasons to increase the rent for 2.5-3% each year which is above the official inflation rate.

> Every 12 months, tenants will receive a notice of pending rent increase, and that rent increase will be the maximum allowed by law.

I'd suggest having no maximum increase, and having the landlord be liable for moving costs if the tenant chooses to move and the landlord is not able to re-rent the unit within a short time period at the increased rent price.

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