Tbh, I don't get your analogy, why should the miners be looked at as bodyguards? While I agree the miners are responsible for protecting the network, I don't think you can draw a distinction that easily between an eth holder vs a miner, because anyone can become a miner and anyone can become a holder and an entity can be both a miner and a holder. Everyone who participates in the eth network should have the power to vote in this blockchain, if its actually decentralized.
The problem here is with the design of eth, eth was a rushed blockchain from the start, now vitalik is trying to rush the release all of a sudden because the people managing his network are not happy with the up coming changes?
What the hell kind of decentralization is this if vitalik can escalate major decisions about network? Eth is not a decentralized project if one individual(or a few) can decide to go against 51% of the stakeholders of the network.
The rules of the ETH network allow for this regulatory capture to happen as well. Decentralized governance means you may not get your way when the majority think differently.
Decentralized blockchains are entirely opt-in. If you are a participant in a blockchain that isn't serving your needs, you can opt out of that blockchain and into a new blockchain.
A hard fork is essentially a large coordinated migration from one blockchain to a new blockchain, generally with a shared history.
Vitalik does not have the sole power to go against the stakeholders of the network and make massive changes to Ethereum. The power that Vitalik has is one of leadership. If he attempts to coordinate a mass migration from one blockchain (old Eth) to another (new Eth), Vitalik actually needs to convince everyone that this is a good idea. He can't force it to happen if people disagree that it's the right thing to do. If Vitalik launches a hardfork and 80% of the network upgrades, that definitionally means that Vitalik had the support of 80% of the network, otherwise they wouldn't have followed the upgrade.
Blockchains are about consent. If you don't like what's happening on a blockchain, make a change. A single person making a change in isolation isn't interesting, but a large group of people making a change together IS interesting, and can be successful even if that group is just a minority. You end up with two different networks, each capable of thriving on their own.
Miners depend on the users of a blockchain for revenue. If a blockchain has no users, there will be no fees, and no revenue. The reverse is not true. If the users determine that they are better off selecting a different set of miners to build and preserve consensus, they can fork the network in a way that changes who is able to mine effectively, but does not otherwise impact daily use of the blockchain.
> In a PoW chain, Vitalik Buterin can talk, propose, and make patches to an Etherum client, but it means nothing unless miners approve the changes by running the updated client. He is the most important voice in that coin's ecosystem, but miners are the ones who decided to approve the fork.
No, it means nothing unless users use, buy, and sell the coin. The miners' are subservient to them, assuming the miners are trying to make money. Miners do not decide or approve which set of consensus rules people decide to use, though they can, at a potentially quite significant loss, disrupt the functioning of the network somewhat.
I keep seeing this idea invoked over and over again, and it's starting to bug me. The problem with this idea is that it conflates technical decentralization and the spirit or ideals of decentralization. The latter can be betrayed or degraded even while the former is preserved. Just because the miners aren't compelled by the network architecture to implement a fork doesn't mean that there aren't social dynamics which have the effect of centralizing decisions made by those miners. "Consensus" doesn't have any inherent value or rightness. Consensus is just a majority of a group electing to do something. In the world of the decentralized web, consensus is positive only when network nodes are truly acting autonomously. It's best when this means that each node acts in self-interest, without regard for or in ignorance of the interests or positions of the other nodes. This is not what's happening on the Ethereum network. There's a huge amount of coordination. Ethereum is a network that hasn't individuated itself from a relatively small group of creators/maintainers/community members. As long as the network depends on these people for strength and stability, the miners will be biased to carry out the wishes of those people. Otherwise the miners risk losing whatever value they've accrued through their work. So yes, the fork only happens through a consensus of the miners. But it hasn't been established that the miners are capable of independent action.
Miners in Proof of Work don’t control the rules. There have been multiple attempts to exercise hash power as political control in Bitcoin that have failed. There already exists precedent regarding the political power of running your own node with incredibly low capital requirements relative to mining.
Ethereum is already in a battle over what consensus rules actually exist. Large scale staking enterprises such as exchanges are signaling their intent to follow extra-protocol conventions, and if they control a supermajority of staked ETH, they control the right to slash. The only way to have a voice in it is by acquiring $50,000 in ETH.
I agree with your points. But the miners who actually have a say, if I am not mistaken, are the big ones and the pool owners. These are just a small fraction of all people running mining software.
A soft fork will undeniably require distributed consensus. It is the number of people with the actual right to vote that may be worrisome.
Perhaps the pool owners should extend their voting rights to their pool contributors, pooling votes as they pool mining shares.
(Disclaimer: I hold a small amount of ETH and participate in a mining pool.)
> That is the whole point of decentralization...if one or two large pools (Ethermine and Sparkpool) get too big then they can sway proposals almost single handedly…
If the pool operators don't actually own the mining hardware then their power is limited to what the participants in the pool, who do own the hardware, allow them to do. If as an individual miner you don't like what your pool operator is doing you can always switch to another pool and take your delegated influence with you. Most proposals require supporting votes in many blocks before they take effect, so you have time to choose a more representative operator.
That bodyguard narrative is yours and I think it makes little sense. Hash power is required to form consensus. If anything, non-mining full nodes run by users would be the closest to “body guards”.
Miners would be the ones who settle and publish the lineup.
I'm not saying the basis of ETH consensus is based on inter-personal trust. The conversation started by a complaint of 32 ETH required to run a validator being out of reach of normal people, so I provided multiple other options for how a normal person can take part in this.
Except that it isn't powerful people calling the shots. It's powerful people making suggestions, and then the shots being called by the network participants. There is nothing happening here that is contrary to the ethos of smart contracts or decentralized governance. If any sort of fork is accepted it will be because a majority of miners thought it was a good idea, not because Vitalik said so.
How decentralised and democratic is the steering and decision making in reality?
Nobody elects the mining pool operators, nobody elects the people owning the mining hardware and not enough people elect the people who are steering the various crypto foundation.
If a crypto blows up and becomes essential to a countrys economy the vast ordinary citizens will only participate in it by earning money and spending it for their needs.
For those people you just replaced a somewhat accountable government, with somewhat predictable financial policies and transparency processes with one nobody knows anything about which is perhaps operating far away and in a different culture/country.
For many people in the world that'll mean less influence on the decision making process.
In other words: There is no fundamental reason to trust the Ethereum Foundation more than the ECB or the Fed.
Why the hell should I trust the miners more than the leadership? You say this like the leadership is this big, scary, shadowy group. The Ethereum leadership is one of the main reasons I invested in the coin. I love the leadership, and I trust them to make good decisions for the ecosystem.
It's not that much of a minority opinion, it's shared by all Bitcoin maximalists.
An important ability required to understand Ethereum is to be able to separate the raw technology's properties with the development governance story.
The Ethereum network derives trustlessness from PoW and its miners. The security guarantees these provide can be considered in isolation to politics. It's just numbers, and the git history of the various specs and implementations is public.
Any community can start a new chain, from any version of Ethereum. And they do, many altcoins are more or less 1:1 forks of Ethereum yet reach huge valuations. The Ethereum foundation has 0 power over these networks. That's what decentralization means in this case, even if the development is as centralized as any other FOSS project.
But doesn’t this power dynamic - the fact that there is a miners committee somehow talking to a devs committee -beat the purpose of decentralization (no single decision-maker)?
Won’t this become politicized eventually and we’ll end up with a Central Bank-like structure? Imagine some elected dev going on CNBC to tell us they need to mint more coins.
You should probably read the the whole post not just one part and then assume something I never said.
The power is split between miners and user. A majority from both parties are required to determine where the network goes the rest are somewhat forced to follow. If no such majority can be found the network can fork and both chains can be profitable for miners.
I never said miners are in control, I disagreed with the parent who said users are in control - big difference.
What's happening is people are voting with their feet. Anyone can make any fork they like, and then everyone on the network can choose which one they prefer to use. That is what decentralization means. And both Ethereum and Bitcoin have that property.
The real truth is that both everybody and nobody is in control.
Every participant in the system has a part to play and has a choice, miners choose which chain to mine and in doing so secure that chain from attack and earn a return, people that run nodes pick the nodes to run based on which chain they believe has the most value, or in the case of miners in order to mine the chain they believe has the most value, spv wallet users transact on the chain they value and pay fees to support the upkeep of it, the simple act of conducting trade with a cryptocurrency gives the entire apparatus basic value, so the people that don't give a damn about any given blockchain and just want to use it to move some completely unrelated asset from a to b also still give the system value, and of course the holders and traders of the actual blockchain assets give the system value and play a part in resolving contentious forks, by evaluating what they see as the market value of a given blockchain asset, forked or otherwise, and profiting or losing based on that insight.
Short of outright theft of a private key, nobody may compel even the smallest user of a blockchain to perform an action that they do not freely wish to undertake, not all the devs writing node software, shills pushing political agendas, or even miners mining blocks in the chain can change that fundamental aspect of the system that keeps it actually properly decentralised. The only way around this is to drive the vast majority of transactions off chain and force most end users to operate through third party intermediaries that manage their actual potential transactions in the system.
Like exactly what core are doing with the lightning network, for example.
The problem here is with the design of eth, eth was a rushed blockchain from the start, now vitalik is trying to rush the release all of a sudden because the people managing his network are not happy with the up coming changes?
What the hell kind of decentralization is this if vitalik can escalate major decisions about network? Eth is not a decentralized project if one individual(or a few) can decide to go against 51% of the stakeholders of the network.
reply