"Should" is a pretty strong statement. GoF studies, like social media-based disease surveillance, are one of those things that has a compelling "Just So" story justifying its existence, but has yet to show that it actually does what it's supposed to do.
Also, the alternative is not burying our head in the sand. It's monitoring and studying nature, instead of forcing the issue in a lab, and investing in infrastructure and capacity that work against a broad range of pathogen threats.
I'm a layperson, but AFAIU GoF research in principle is a good thing. It helps us anticipate future viruses, study how they impact humans, and prepare for an eventual outbreak.
It's obviously very risky to do, but we should focus on adopting and enforcing better security practices to minimize the risks, not ban GoF altogether.
Do you actually need GoF research to prevent animal spillovers? Did GoF research help us develop the COVID vaccines? Or does GoF research mostly demonstrate the risks of spillover? Because I think we're now well aware of the risks, and ought to avoid poking the bear any further.
I don’t research viruses, so I can’t tell you if GoF is the right tool to fight a future pandemic or not. What I do know is that if a deadly virus with a 30% CFR is spreading rapidly, I want the experts fighting it to have every tool at their disposal. I don’t want them artificially handcuffed in finding a cure/vaccine by the feelings of some Hacker News posters like me and you. Happy to stipulate that this should be an emergency capability, but frankly I don’t know enough about the value of preemptive GoF research to determine whether that’s a good balance.
Consider the alternative history where we had always decided that GoF research is not worth the risks. There is a very real possibility that in that universe, we wouldn't have had the coronavirus pandemic with (checks) around 6 million casualties (and counting, and countless other negative effects for billions of people). You need A LOT of high quality results from successful GoF research to make up for that. I'm not familiar with the field at all, but I highly doubt you could point at the complete accumulated body of research resulting from all GoF research everywhere and say that it was worth it.
well how about establishing safety procedures, research guidelines and international regulation body governing dangerous GoF research so that such outbreak doesn't happen again.
Your idea sounds nice, but it doesn't really make sense. Consider that terrorists can easily do GoF and release the product - no research necessary. On the other hand, when scientists do GoF research, our virological knowledge may be furthered, possibly with applications to making new vaccines and similar.
Nature has no qualms about performing GOF research if we don't do it. How do we protect ourselves from future viral and biological evolution otherwise? Virus's evolve literally every day, and if we don't find a way to build tools, processes, and countermeasures, we will absolutely be strongly harmed by a future one.
This always feels like the "we can't afford to fix climate change so we just will ignore the problem" take.
TLDR for the paper: GoF is not necessarily the strongest candidate for this flu outbreak. However, all the candidates are man-made due to research efforts.
To me this points out that every study on a pandemic-possible virus should have an extremely high bar to meet in terms of both safety and reason for performing the study in the first place. Effectively the only reason that is needed now to perform such research is that you want to publish a paper. The linked paper points out one possible source of the flu pandemic: vaccine development. This may have been a worthy enough cause but greater safeguards are needed. We should take the money we spend on GoF research and spend it on ensuring better safeguards for existing research.
GoF research has an explicit goal is to make a virus more human transmissible: if it is too successful, you end up with the possibility of a pandemic. We now have a COVID pandemic that might have been caused by GoF research. On the flip side we can't show much benefit from this kind of research.
I wouldn't say that all GOF research is for bioweapons, part of it is to see where the virus is likely to evolve next and protect against that, which is more on the defensive side of that.
Doesn't mean it's less risky, mind you, and this is convincing me that the experts on this need to reassess whether it's worth the risks and if so, what safety precautions are needed. I would think that BSL-2 is just way too low, but I would defer to the scientists on this and only say that I think this shows that anything done to make something more infectious to humans should be treated as though it already was highly infectious to humans.
One real great reason to care one way or the other is that the lab leak vs. natural origins debate heavily informs whether or not GoF research makes sense at all, as in, whether it should be pursued or globally & aggressively banned.
The basis for GoF research (at least, the publicly-espoused thesis, bioweapons research being a likely secondary interest) is that such research can help us stop or reduce the impact of a pandemic. If the natural origin theory turns out to be the truth, then this adds lots of weight to the idea that we SHOULD be aggressively pursuing GoF research in order to fix the next naturally-occuring viral pandemic. However, if sars-cov-2 actually came from a lab leak, then we have evidence that such research is both far more risky than we thought and as well that natural pandemics are less likely than we think, so we should probably not do it at all.
I guess I disagree that (1) would be especially alarming. Mishandling of lab samples occurs all the time (even with good precautions), everyone knows this, and this is actually an excellent reason to be all the more cautious about whether GoF research should be allowed. Zoonotics are also a fact of life. Ultimately, it comes down to what one's priors are re: what actually happened in this case; it doesn't really matter much either way.
GoF on pathogens that couldn't possibly cause a human pandemic (including viruses that don't infect humans, or anything replication-incompetent) seems much less risky to me, and I believe that was excluded from the 2014 restrictions. It may still present some risk, to the extent it would guide later practitioners working in replication-competent human pathogens, with or without malicious intent. I generally dislike the framing of the debate in terms of a "GoF ban", which is why I chose the phrase "high-risk research" and qualified GoF to potential pandemic pathogens. I'm aware that very few people are going to understand this nuance; but that's the reason why practitioners need to competently regulate themselves, instead of leaving this to an uninformed mob.
That said, there's zero question that DEFUSE proposed to collect and enhance replication-competent potential human pandemic pathogens. That proposal wasn't funded, and that proposal indeed anticipated that the GoF work would be done at UNC; but the WIV seems clearly capable of that work too. We don't know what happened next, and I believe we should do everything in our power to find out. If possible, that would occur with China's cooperation; but since that seems impossible for now, it should proceed without. For example, large amounts of raw sequencer reads exist on the servers of American and European research groups and their service providers. Those should be subpoenaed, and searched for evidence of early SARS-CoV-2 genomes as contamination, similar to that found in the Antarctic soil samples. Do you disagree?
I also dislike the framing in terms of "GoF ban" because I agree fully that nature may present a greater risk than anything we could make in a lab. It seems entirely plausible to me that right now, there are viruses deep inside some cave that could end human life as we know it, but that we've simply been lucky enough that the virus has never left the cave. But how could that possibly be a reason to send some grad student into the cave? From pictures and videos of WIV sampling trips, they were sending researchers in with no protection beyond a surgical mask and nitrile gloves. That seems insane to me. If humans will be entering an area regardless--for agriculture, or tourism, or whatever else--then I agree we should be sampling it. But why should we go looking for trouble in areas that no other human is likely to approach?
You keep saying that virology brings potential benefits, and that's obviously true. It also brings potential detriments though, including research-origin pandemics, and it's done so at least once in the past. I see no evidence that you're making anything like a cost/benefit tradeoff here; you're simply disregarding all the costs, somehow classifying deaths quite directly caused by research activities as "natural" and thus unimportant. That's not how anything else in life works--if I'm careless with my campsite, then the resulting wildfire may be indistinguishable from one set by lightning, but the ranger is still going to say it's my fault.
I have no special affection for Ridley, though I still prefer him to the author of the article you linked, who called Alina Chan a "moronic psychopath"[1]. In any case, the messenger shouldn't matter. As to the narrow question of investigating the origin of SARS-CoV-2, I believe Ridley is right and you're dangerously wrong. You've correctly shut down some genuine nonsense here (e.g., Moderna patents on the sequence). You've also posted at least two unequivocal falsehoods yourself though (WIV situated based on diversity of nearby relevant viruses, no prior unnatural pandemic), and presented other evidence in much stronger terms than any scientific consensus (e.g., the two lineages; George Gao[2] thinks they probably evolved in humans, and I presume you're not going to call him a lab leak conspiracist). I don't see how that enhances public knowledge.
I 100% disagree, GoF research produces viruses as natural as selective breeding. The conditions that researchers expose various animals and humanized mice to infect each other would never happen in nature. This type of research only produces did not help predict the current pandemic, nor did it help with the fight against it, but it may have caused it!
Virologists competing with each other on who can produce the most infectious virus does not make us safer. Pursing research to prove that small pox can indeed mutate to be infectious via airborne aerosols is reckless, it creates a super charged version of a virus that never evolved naturally despite being a common disease for millennia.
Yeah, just don't do GoF research. Or don't let it escape from a lab. Or, don't lie about it when it does. Or, contain it if it does. Or shut down travel outside the country if it does. Or, don't cripple Australia with a trade war if they suggest an investigation into the origins of the disease are warranted. Or don't cancel people if they wonder if maybe it didn't come from nature. Or, do the audits to verify the labs doing catastrophic research are doing it safely and properly. Or, don't sneak in funding for something that has already been declared a risk to human existence. Or, don't pay "non-profits" millions of dollars to pay enemy nations to do research into how to turn a virus into a bioweapon. Or value the health of the world over the profits of corporations.
I bet none of these ideas are in the report.
* read article *
Nope.
* reads report *
Oh, I got one: Waive IP rights to vaccines.
Their suggestion: Give the WHO more money. They'll do it better next time apparently.
I guarantee you, if China had said, "A bioweapon we were developing escaped the lab, lock everything down!"
It's a bad idea (regardless of whether it's how COVID originated or not), but there are theoretical benefits. Make a GoF virus, observe how it interacts with humanized nice, see how different therapeutic agents work.
The issue is that it's unlikely that any knowledge gained from the GoF research meaningfully accelerates the delivery of treatments or a vaccine, which is the hypothetical benefit that makes up for the increased risk of escape.
It would not, but it would sure as hell reduce the risk of a lab leak. The whole idea of GoF research was to preempt evolution on bad viruses. If instead, the research is causing the evolution of bad viruses, it should be shut down.
It can be rational to behave as if the event did occur if you don't know that it didn't.
Even if we're 50/50 on the source of the virus, maybe we should still ban or regulate GoF research, and consider banning or regulating some types of wet markets.
You do see the imbalance between the two statements right?
"This virus came from a lab - so we should ban lab research"
and
"You can't prove the virus didn't come from a lab - so we should ban lab research"
Nature is doing far more Gain of Function research than humans are capable of - as evidenced by literally every pandemic in history. I've generally found the people who are the most vocal about banning GoF have literally no idea what it entails and why the way pedestrians talk about is so cringeworthy.
Also, the alternative is not burying our head in the sand. It's monitoring and studying nature, instead of forcing the issue in a lab, and investing in infrastructure and capacity that work against a broad range of pathogen threats.
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