I think what the comment is about is that the system should be built safer with less security with obscurity but more actual measures. You can (partially) scan people getting onto the plane for bombs etc but it's practically very hard to pinpoint a jamming RF transmitter possibly from kilometers away from ground. Security shouldn't rely on those frequencies being clear.
Securing the communication links between the ground and the aircraft -- along with other signals such as GPS -- needs to be properly addressed before such a system can be "hijacker-proof".
I suspect this is overstated: preventing access to the cockpit from the passenger cabin solves a lot of the issues here: if a hijacker can’t use the plane as a cruise missile, the need for security is about equivalent to attacks on metros or passenger trains.
* ... because the coiled, closely packed lines at TSA screening sites are the most dangerous places in airports, completely unprotected from a terrorist attack -- a terrorist attack that would serve the same purpose (shutting down air travel) as an attack on board an aircraft.*
This is a good point, but I don't completely agree with it. If terrorists can smuggle a bomb on board an airplane, they can probably smuggle tools on board that will allow them to break into the cockpit. Then (as we've seen), the plane itself can be used as a very large bomb. (Note that I am not venturing an opinion on whether backscatter imagers are a solution to this problem or whether the invasion of privacy is worth it even if they are.)
It is rather shocking to me that people actually believe these systems to be secure. Flight control systems are old and outdated, and new stuff is bolted on with no regard to security what so ever.
Chris is a friend of mine, and I find it very disheartening how much the security community has taken the FBI's warrant at face value, and condemned Chris when he hasn't even had a chance to respond.
The security community itself knows how vulnerable all these other systems are, so why is it such a surprise that airplanes are also vulnerable?
I'm suggesting that the risk of terrorists blowing up your flight using a method that backscatter machines would prevent, but that previous procedures would not prevent, is indistinguishable from zero. You're trading your civil liberties in exchange for nothing. And that would be fine, except you're also trading my civil liberties in the process.
1- Pilots with guns & keeping the doors closed for the full flight
2- Passengers not willing to allow others on the plane do harm to the plane. If passengers see things happen now, they will stand up and makes attempts to stop them. We won't have a 9/11 style hijacking. Even if someone gets a box cutter in, people will take them down before they'll let them take the plane.
I can't imagine how these body scanners would make us significantly safer.
Amid all the talk of how the door locking system should or should not be modified (eg always rotating another person into the cockpit or whatever), I'm astonished that there's no discussion of having a backup radio system on the plane. One of the saddest things about this whole incident is the idea of the senior pilot futilely banging on the door with no way to get in, and no way to even communicate his predicament to the ground.
Allowing ground takeover of a plane in distress would bring numerous problems of its own and is probably not feasible to implement in the immediate future, but adding an extra radio would be technologically trivial, the protocols would be easy to implement, and it would allow witnesses to (apparent) crimes of this sort to pass information that might save lives or at least give investigators a head start instead of a 3 day delay.
For all the understandable outrage, this seems like a genie that will be very hard to put back in the bottle.
What politician is going to risk canning a security protocol when there's a not-unreasonable chance of a civilian airplane being blown up in the next few years? Who wants to be the politician that has to explain, after several hundred people died, why they canned any device or protocol which may have helped stopped the attack, however remote the likelihood?
I'm not saying it's rational or appropriate, I'm saying it's politically untenable, regardless of the horror stories like the one posted.
Perhaps airlines should offer 'enhanced' or 'standard' security flights, and people can choose whether they fly on a plane where everyone has pat downs or scans, or whether they don't. At least that way there would be a choice...
"All I can do is point to the zero deaths since 2001 caused by passengers smuggling dangerous objects onto planes." - As I noted above, we have recently had a few close calls. It appears the terrorists are adapting. Personally, I'd rather we try to stay ahead of them than wait for your sentence to change to "well we had zero deaths until 2011 when ..."
"Flying is far safer than many other common activities whose risks we gladly accept, and that would remain true even if terrorists blew up a fully loaded 747 every year." - I have used this argument myself (yes I have argued your side as well). However, it does not capture the broader impact - economy etc (this may be why they continue to target planes). Frankly, I think the terrorists could accomplish their goals in many other far easier to accomplish ways but I wont help them here.
I understand your view. I just don't share it. You attacked mine by saying the scanners added zero value. I forwarded a link that while critical of the scanners also noted they were as "effective as a pat down". Unless you think pat downs add zero security, then we are back to security vs personal privacy.
I am not convinced you need more security for aircraft than a bus. As long as there is a solid wall between pilots and passengers, the worst a passenger could do would be to take down an aircraft which is much harder than you might assume.
I think there will certainly be a measure of security with such a system, but it wouldn't need to be at the level of air travel. The danger of someone hijacking a train is finite - it has a definite path and that pathway can be planned to avoid Problem X or Problem Y. That's very unlike a commercial jet.
I think investing in explosives detection is a better approach. It is an irony that there were explosions at the airport while they are screening you completely before boarding a flight.
I sure as heck want everyone else on the plane with me to be compared against their photograph.
Why? I'm sure there's nefarious activity that could be prevented, I'm just struggling to identify activities that would make be feel (let alone actually be) unsafe on an airplane as a practical matter, and without doning a screen writer's hat.
I'm assuming weapons are already adequately checked. And if not I'm not sure how facial recognition would appreciably help in this regard. Sure, maybe 12 bad guys enter the system though 12 airports with lax security, then all board the same flight at a major hub in a manner that circumvents analytics that searches for suspected bad guys flying together. But that already makes some dubious assumptions, such as the degree of efficacy in the system looking for suspected bad guys traveling together.
For most of air travel hijackings and bombings were incredibly common. We all but solved that by the 1980s by physically screening for weapons and suspect material, not by pretending we could predict people's behavior.
I get where you are coming from. I don't think that having x-ray detectors for plane luggage gives the passengers much safety: they could always use whatever weapon/bomb at the security line anyway!
I do, however, think that it's important not to let those people onto planes in contrast to buses, street corners, etc. because otherwise someone might take control of an entire plane, which can do a lot more damage than a bomb/pistol/etc, you know?
The system should not be designed to prevent bombs in planes. This is focusing on the method you will use instead of the result you want.
The idea is to prevent planes from being hijacked or destroyed and passengers and crew to be harmed.
Besides, military planes routinely carry bombs and hardly experience any problem with them
And, to top that (as someone else said before) the only reason he was able to get into the plane was that his bomb was not a functional one - it would be very difficult to take down the plane with it.
Doesn't take much to put you off an idea, does it? You do realize that quite a bit of the security measures one takes to undergo travel by air is "because terrorism", right? And that's also why they scramble jets at the first sign of oddity? Countries have rules that planes must follow if they want to fly in their airspace, and many of them have consequences if those rules are not followed. I can see that being an inconvenience to some, but c'est la vie.
Airport security should be about securing airtravel, not securing the collective asses of TSA or whatever lump of agencies and companies it is these days.
And IMHO, even airtravel doesn't need that much securing. And the collective ass needs even less.
Sealed cockpit doors are definitely a good measure for the decades old hijacking problem and the newer, though much more unlikely, 9/11 copycat situations. Other than that, the passengers can't really do much on a plane.
"I should clarify that I think the TSA wants to prevent airline bombings (that is, loss of a plane) above all else."
I have my doubts about that as well. I would think that the lack of K-9 teams near departure gates is a good sign that bombings are not the concern of the TSA when it comes to airport security. Bombings are probably a concern somewhere, but the security checkpoints do not seem to do much when it comes to stopping a bomb plot.
Keep in mind that private planes are exempt from the security checks. If a terrorist wanted to blow up a commercial plane, what would stop them from chartering a private jet, bringing bombs on board, and then ramming their explosive-laden plane into an airliner mid-flight? Why even bother doing it in flight? A terrorist might just roll their chartered jet into a fully-loaded passenger plane on the runway, and blow up a plane in front of a crowd of people.
Perhaps there is some other procedure in place to ensure that no bombs can make it past the numerous ways that people and vehicles can enter an airport without going through a security checkpoint. If that is the case, what is the purpose of the checkpoint? Why not just apply whatever techniques prevent terrorists from ramming private jets into airliners to the rest of the airport, and let us keep our rights intact?
It is also worth pointing out that there are lots of other bombing targets that are not being bombed, despite a complete lack of security. Anyone can bring large packages onto the NYC subways without any harassment or scanning, yet those trains (which are packed with hundreds of people during the rush hour) have not been blown up. A truck full of explosives could easily drive onto a major bridge. Yet despite these clear vulnerabilities, and despite the fact that other countries see such attacks and more, we rarely have them here. Are airlines really more special targets for bombers than urban transit systems?
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