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What? No. The reason they got ahead was because their business model got them volume production on a scale that let them tweak and improve their process faster and more efficiently compared to the competition. And Intel shooting themselves in the foot and skipping EUV for their last few nodes was a big factor too.

Also, suggesting people are “weak” or “strong” based on the number of hours they’re willing/able to work is… problematic at best.



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The key thing that caused Intel to be in this situation right now was that their EUV play totally failed. If it had succeeded when they hoped it would, they would be so far ahead of the competition that none of this would matter.

Intel invested lots and lots in novel EUV alternatives and they didn't work out. They took risks, they spent big on R&D, and I think you can certainly blame mismanagement but it's wrong to imply Intel wasn't taking risks.

This is typical of Intel’s weak leadership and focus on short term profits instead of long term success.

Just look at how they dragged their feet in transitioning to EUV because it was too expensive. This contributed to large delays in their 10 and 7 nm processes and a total loss in their process leadership.

And look at how many billions they poured into making a 5G modem only to give up and sell their IP to Apple.

Or how they dragged their feet in getting into mobile, then came out with Atom way too late to be successful in the market. They essentially gave the market to ARM.

Optane is another recent example. Cool technology, but if a product is not a smashing success right away, Intel throws in the towel.

There’s no real long term vision that I can see. No resilience to challenges or ability to solve truly difficult problems.


I saw these first-hand armies of cheap contractors that cannot deliver anything. In the meantime your neglected supporting software/infrastructure slow you down. Intel had enough money to get the best engineers on every level. Lower turnover and better and cheaper to maintain software. Instead, they choose to save money QA they got spectre saga. Intel saved on latest process and not used EUV and could not deliver 10nm at all.

Would you share some insight on why Intel failed at making EUV work? Gelsinger said on a podcast (Decoder) recently that in fact they fought it.

Obviously, they are kind of big enough to do both — make a half hearted attempt and fight it all the same due to some internal politics. However, for something this existential, one would think that the smart people and the leadership would try to put some focus on the field. Was it that bad? Really, looking for some insight on what really went down.


And furthermore they lost most of their best engineers and scientists during the years that the company was run by the useless MBAs. Now each new technology process is a huge struggle. Intel has secured some of the first new gen EUV machines from ASML, but if they'll have the talent to quickly start using them on scale is not yet clear.

Part of the way? I'd say that Intel's success has been entirely due to their ability to stay a step ahead of everybody in fab processes. Losing that ability is going to kill their profitability in the long run. Things are going to get ugly for them.

Losing a product line that drove that fab improvement process isn't going to help.


> unforced errors and mismanaged

No. Managing innovation at the scale of Intel is a challenge. And their customer base (PCs and servers) is shrinking. Also, this is only like 15% of the workforce. Which is only 5% more than a typical culling.


I don't think cost of labor is a big factor here. Intel has no trouble maintaining a large enough workforce. They continually decided not to have parallel teams designing processors for their unproven 10nm and their successful 14nm nodes (or one team making a relatively portable design), even years after it was clear that 10nm was not going to work out as well as needed by their processor design roadmap. That wasn't for lack of staffing or inability to afford enough engineers. It was management hubris.

(On the other hand, I've often pointed out that Intel's attempts to develop two microarchitectures in parallel have always failed in the long run, with one project ending up woefully uncompetitive.)


>They did with Intel Custom Foundry. They tried and they failed.

From what I've heard, they didn't try very hard. Apparently they thought all they had to do was make chips, and that the sheer "technical superiority" of their process meant that they could treat their customers as second-class stakeholders, withhold information about their production timelines, etc.


I’m not denying most of that, but it feels extremely one-sided. I feel like I’m reading Intel investor relations right now. I am not suggesting Intel was not working on cutting edge technology, but so were other companies, and some of them succeeded where Intel failed. Meanwhile, Intel had multiple business units with similar issues, especially their modem business, and I doubt the postmortem said “Oops, we were too ambitious!” Bullshit. They had organizational issues and complacency. I’m sure 10nm was plagued with many problems that weren’t complacency too. That’s part of the table stakes when you are in the business of defying physics.

The financials tell a different story.


Isn't Intel struggling now because their definition of 'pretty well' wasn't good enough and they lost key people to competitors?

Everybody must make some big chooses and commit to development path. Risks are huge. Intel chose not to use EUV and it was the wrong one.

People forget that 2 out of 4 companies failed in this round. It was not just Intel. GF completely quit the race of high-end microprocessor nodes in the middle of development.


It really comes down to the people, and well, Intel doesn't have the best people today. They had a massive brain drain and those people are not coming back anytime soon considering how well their stock is doing at competing companies.

Intel blew EUV, which fair enough, it’s hard as hell. Are there other problems, sure, but when you go from leading-edge process technology to a two node lag, you’re fucked either way.

This article is rambling and over-complicated.

For a much more insightful and compelling view into Intel at its greatest I recommend “The Pentium Chronicles”.


I worked at Intel in 1998 as a young engineer a few years out of college. Back then they were riding high on their CPU monopoly.

I left in about a year and a half and moved to a startup company. My issue with Intel was that, as a monopoly, they had grown fat and complacent.

I am not exaggerating when I say that in 1998-99, engineers were working maybe 4-5 productive hours in a week. Political savvy and alliance-building were the most important things for promotions and influence.

Those who actually produced good work had credit for their work diluted through many layers of management. You could do something amazing and your manager's manager might present it in a powerpoint to the company without mentioning your name at all, and acting like the idea was his all along.

I'm surprised the company has lasted this long. Its a place where mediocre people gather.


> Intel is technologically behind, and it is easier to improve when there is someone to learn from

This is interesting to me, how did they end up like this?


This is an interesting perspective.

"This article does a good job of confirming this reality, from the initial introduction, to the diligence process. It's unfortunate that capital allocation has turned into a popularity contest."

I think you've arrived at the wrong conclusion, allow me to share an anecdote which illustrates why I think that.

I came to Silicon Valley in the 80's and went to work for Intel. Intel at the time joked they were the biggest semiconductor company in the world because they were losing money less fast than everyone else. I had a freshly minted EE degree and unlike many of my peers I actually had been building microcomputer systems for 6 years already (I soldered together my own Digital Group Z-80 system in high school). As was their policy at the time, Intel started new college grads (they even had a term NCG) on projects which gave them an opportunity to demonstrate their strengths and weaknesses in a relatively 'safe' way. I was handed the 80186 to deal with but there were other, sexier, projects using the 80286 and 80287 at the time. I thought at the time it was 'unfair' and possibly a 'popularity contest' that other engineers had the opportunity to work on those projects in the spotlight when I was 'forced' to work on what was, even then, a 'loser' CPU.

It was later, through a period of some introspection, that I came to realize that it wasn't any of these things, it was simply time. Just like a finance person is loathe to predict a trend based on a small number of data points, or a scientist to come to a conclusion with a small number of samples, engineers and entrepreneurs need 'run time hours' where they have encountered a variety of situations and come away making good and bad decisions and adjusting themselves appropriately. Better test scores, having the 'right' answer now which is validated some time in the future, and being able to reason clearly, are not a substitute for run-time when it comes to evaluating an investment in people.

My conclusion was that what I characterized as a 'popularity contest' was actually the 'understanding my strengths/weaknesses' relative to other folks who might do the same job. The people who had a longer track record were 'lower risk' because the decision maker felt more confident in their evaluation. So lets bring that back to the VC community.

So some times it looks like the VC community is a 'boys club' or a 'walled garden' where if you don't know the right people or go to the right social events you can't 'break in'. And when you do get the introduction but don't get the investment, and that investment goes to someone who has worked with the VC before, it doesn't feel all that great. And yet, from the VC's perspective something completely different is going on.

So a VC or Angel sees your pitch, they pass, but generally they remember that you pitched them something. If the person who did fund it, or if you boot strapped it into existence, and they see that success they get a data point so that the next time they talk to you, rather than being a 'new' thing, you have some run time where they have a data point (your original pitch). So now the discussion can be 'well we passed when you pitched Foobar tell us the story between then and now.' That experience or outcome lets them evaluate your capabilities in a much more objective light. Once you are a 'known' quantity the whole tone of the conversation changes and it becomes relatively easier both to get a meeting and to close a round of funding.

"But it's a chicken and egg conundrum!" is a common retort to this. It does seem that way, but its not. Working in a startup (which is easy to do, just apply) gives you visibility to entrepreneurs who got funding, and depending on scale, to the people who funded them. Excelling in that environment will give you a better understanding of what makes startups successful (or not) and can give you insights into what you would do the same, or differently. While there are always stories of people who turn a dorm room project into a big success, the much more common story is someone who works for an established company and invests in understanding how that works, then works for a smaller company to get a grasp of how all of it fits together, and then perhaps co-founds or bootstraps a company to see what they can do when they have more control over the life and death decisions that startups face every month.

Now if you want to commiserate that it takes 3, 5, or even 10 years of 'minor league' play before someone will trust you with their money in your own venture. I hear ya. I would love to find ways to reliably evaluate the long term success potential of someone with less historical data. Picking entreprenuers who can execute their visions successfully is at least as hard as picking out ideas which will be successful when executed well.


It's also interesting that Intel made some specific bad technical choices.

(ie, not investing in EUV, assuming SAQP would work forever, ignoring the consequences of everything being power-limited...)

This kind of decision is hard, because it's a technical-economic tradeoff, and the latter is more voodoo than math. And that's not even addressing whether you get surprised by things like the LLM boom...

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