If consciousness is binary like you state, we can hypothetically remove parts of it until we reach some arbitrarily small part after the removal of which the remainder is no longer conscious. This seems like a very weak argument to me, implying the opposite conclusion that consciousness must be on a sliding scale.
(measuring the level of consciousness is left as an exercise to the reader)
Hmmm. You seem to be talking about progressive removal of parts of the brain, until consciousness is no longer manifested.
But that experiment is founded on the assumption that the root of consciousness is the brain; and that consequently, consciousness can be subdivided, like the brain, until there's very little left.
But I contend that that begs the question: it assumes that the root of consciousness is material, and it assumes that consciousness is divisible. So you have made assumptions that are incompatible with consciousness being fundamental and indivisible.
That is: it's not surprising that you disagree with me, because you've assumed that I'm wrong.
The thinking in this article is shockingly lazy.
Saying that if you take a particle away from a conscious structure it ceases to be conscious is like saying if I take a particle away from a chicken it ceases to be a chicken.
It might alter the degree of consciousness but surely consciousness lies on a continuum and the point at which we transition from conscious to unconscious is decided by the humans considering the issue. Just like the distinction between a chicken and an egg.
It doesn't make sense to have a scale of consciousness. The argument that consciousness is a manifestation of a complex brain is rather weak. Either an organism knows about self, and therefore tries to preserve self. Or it doesn't. I don't see how an in between exists.
I think a lot discussion around consciousness focuses too much on the binary (e.g. either you have it or you don't), but I like to think of consciousness as a spectrum, with organisms falling into various points along that spectrum. Your take fits nicely into that picture I think.
Consciousness cannot be measured, the only concious being we can know for certain is ourself. It's not an observable property (or we haven't figured out how to observe it). You could remove the wheels from a car and observe the engine running and the axels turning but it wouldn't go forward.
Do you see the difference to your analogy? Forward movement can be measured. And if you removed parts of the car you would eventually get down to the bare minimum required for forward movement because you could observe it. You cannot do this with conciousness.
We currently don't have a definition of consciousness on which people agree and which allows you to determine whether something is conscious or not. It is therefore not surprising that you don't believe that scaling simple systems produces "consciousness", but unless you think that consciousness is some kind of magic that does not follow from the laws of physics, there must be some kind of reductionist thinking can explain the phenomenon, given sufficient computational power to do the math.
Parsimony leads to wrangling about which is the simplest explanation, yes.
Consciousness is ill-defined, also.
It does however seem to stop when the brain is destroyed, which makes it unlikely to be present in fundamental particles, or in parts of a disintegrated brain.
I think the problem with both of your arguments is that neither of you will be able to actually define consciousness in a way that is satisfactory to the other party.
Which is cool. Because we don't really fundamentally understand what it actually is. We have a rough feeling, but any definition we put forth will either also be satisfied by something you both agree is not conscious or not be satisfied by something you both agree is conscious.
So we can't really say if it is emergent or fundamental. And it may even be a property of purely mechanical elements.
That's an interesting point! I suppose the definition of 'consciousness' implies a certain timescale in my internally unexamined definition but there's no reason that need be the case!
I don't think quantum physics is the correct level of abstraction to think about consciousness. Consciousness, if anything, is a process at macro level, not atomic level.
I get a kick off how consciousness is simultaneously fungible, able to react to stimuli without a nervous system, and ephemeral, with no ability to quantify any of that at all
Even the unorganized religions rely on this trichotomy without any explanation or coherence
I would be open to any outcome, just quantify the rules and mechanisms
Firstly, if this was the most ridiculous thing I'd ever put on the internet I'd be pretty happy.
Secondly, I agree that consciousness is predicated on emergent properties arising from the complexity that simple machines can produce (e.g. a biological brain which is composed of relatively well understood components, but who's observed operation can still baffle us). Consciousness does not seem to be a property of the components or even small groups of those components, but it seems to "fade in" as operational complexity increases (and fade out again during e.g. anaesthesia).
Then how can you make a statement to the effect that we may one day know how to measure consciousness, which you have just agreed is fundamentally unmeasurable?
The obvious counterpoint is that if I followed your argument to absurdity, then I would also have to conclude that if I am conscious, then you can't be, because the atoms of our brains aren't arranged in precisely the same way. It clearly makes more sense from a monist point of view to consider consciousness an emergent property of complex systems, rather than one particular process.
(measuring the level of consciousness is left as an exercise to the reader)
reply