Well when your job is to interpret the constitution, it should be grounded on the text. That's why there are textualist who disagree with your interpretation of the role of the court. It is supposed to be the foundation.

That's why people who think Textualism is a check on the judicial power are mistaken, IMO. Notwithstanding that the first and usually only step in traditional statutory interpretation is to apply the text of a statute according to its facial meaning, the underlying principle is to give effect to the intention of the legislature or the purpose of the law. (Most scholars will tell you those--intention vs purpose--are distinct philosophies, but I personally think it's a distinction without a difference.) Textualism doesn't care about intention or purpose and will gladly apply an interpretation that would have seemed absurd to anyone who drafted or voted for the law before the implications (i.e. the insanity of the world) laid bare the ambiguity. And because no self-professed textualist applies this method with perfect consistency (including and, especially IMO, Scalia), expressions of partisan bias can be even greater as the fiction of textualism provides an effective cover, both for the judge and his critics; discretion is disguised because nobody cares when you apply a meaning with which everybody agrees--or at least which seems reasonably consonant with the application of intent or purpose--yet which is nonetheless at odds with the text on its face. Recognizing one's own inconsistencies in this regard, or proving the inconsistencies of others, is far more work than identifying and calling out specific instances of obvious partisanship--especially when the latter are admitted, like during the Warren Court years.

[1] In Western legal philosophy it's usually considered a violation of separation of powers and of justice more generally for a legislature to directly overturn the result of a particular case, as distinguished from changing the law for future cases. Because the buck stops with the courts, of course they get all the flak for disagreeable decisions, and it's convenient to attribute subversive or even malicious motivations. This dynamic is exaggerated in systems with formal stare decisis because the courts effectively only get one bite at the apple. Without stare decisis courts can apply the law differently in different cases, often in response to partisan or popular reactions, which while lowering the stakes and defusing tension has its own obvious problems regarding consistency and discretion. Indeed, even in civil law countries I think there's a direct correlation between the maturity and strength of the judiciary and de facto application of stare decisis--pretense of a lack of discretion. In terms of obeyance to precedent, French or Italian courts are far more consistent than, e.g., Russian courts. Discretion invites corruption. It's no coincidence you never hear stories about how a Russian judicial opinion substantially frustrated the government or legislature. Likewise for Chinese courts, though in the commercial sphere they're far more independent than in Russia, AFAIU. Similar criticisms have been leveled at Japanese courts--e.g. the Supreme Court of Japan has only once or twice overturned a law even though it nominally has the same power as in the U.S. and there's a strong academic consensus it should have done so in many more instances. Though, the peculiarity of Japanese culture makes it difficult to ascribe it to corruption.

That is incorrect.

>No, it's logic that mandates you interpret the meaning of the words on the page by what they would've meant to those who wrote the words.

Only if you think the original meaning is what governs today. Obviously many others do not, hence the mix of people you see on the Supreme Court today. Arguing that there is one and only one correct way (because "logic dictates" or whatever else) is an ideological argument on theories of constitutional interpretation. It's an ongoing and lively debate if you're into constitutional law.

By only looking at the text of the statute, the Court—which consists of unelected officials with lifetime terms—is trying to limit its power. If the text is unclear, they feel it should fall on elected officials to clarify it.

This court seems determined to overturn Chevron [1], which is the basis for deference given to administrative bodies empowered by Congress, the so-called "administrative state" (or "deep state" depending on how far down the rabbit hole you are).

It's the same politics behind the major questions doctrine [2]. This was an approach invented by this court that basically says in matters of statutory interpretation if the issue is sufficiently large, which is subjective, then Congress needs to be absolutely explicit in the powers granted. This was used to deny student loan forgiveness because even though the exeuctive was granted this power, the Court decided the amount was large enough that Congress had to be more explicit.

Put another way: the legislative branch is overruling both the legislative branch that drafted a law and the executive branch that signed it into law. It's quite literally legislating from the bench.

Chevron is another prong in the attack on executive authority. Instead of deferring to experts in the various departments, Congress would need to decide every matter. So if the law isn't explicit enough (according to SCOTUS) then Congress would need to decide every little thing with new laws.

This is untenable. Congress doesn't have the bandwidth to, say, decide fish quotas or hunting seasons or, more importantly, things like what constitutes "clean water" and the allowed actions to enforce that.

This is a very deliberate attack on government itself. It's a form of deregulation to transfer even more wealth to the hands of the very few. Why? Complying with regulations costs money. That's what this is about.

[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevron_U.S.A.,_Inc._v._Natura....

[2]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Major_questions_doctrine

You may be right or you may be wrong, anyone can do it, and anyone who does will mostly come to their conclusion based upon their personal political beliefs. Hence, a reason the Supreme Court has so many partisan split rulings.

Textualism is pure nonsense, used to present a false sense of rationality to an opinion. Any self-proclaimed textualist is either deceiving themselves or attempting to deceive others.

Isn’t that an argument against “originalism” the dominant judicial theory of “conservatives”? I find it odd how “originalists” suddenly become very interpretive of the Constitution when it suits their political needs (see also: Heller).

This is an activist action by the entire court.

Wisconsin Law Review, No. 5, 2022

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4141535

They argue the theory is subterfuge. It actually results in enhanced power of the federal judiciary, empowered to apply textualism on state constitutions.

And more articles on the subject here:

https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/guid...

There is no such thing as textualism, there is just (1) a belief that your are doing a thing you labeled textualism but is philosophically incompatible with the concept of the law or (2) lying. Anything from the right in the us as it relates to the constitution is (2).

Courts have historically always considered the intent of law (constitution) in addition to the word of law (constitution). Why isn't this one?

It feels like this SC intends to use pedantry to hobble the federal government. But... why? Because they can?

The constitution does not mandate all good things, does not forbid all bad things, but VERY NOTABLY includes the 9th amendment. They put that one in for a reason.

This is actually a modern take that was essentially created by Justice Scalia. I like the take ("textualism") in many ways but, to be clear, the SCOTUS has no such mandate.