> That is probably based on the idea that any local attack is going to end up being a complete compromise of the end point ... which is not an unreasonable assumption.
It's absolutely unreasonable.
If my endpoint is compromised, should I assume my key is potentially violated, and so change it? Yes
But should I assume that everything in my life is tainted and therefore pre-emptively expose all my secrets to attackers immediately? Of course not.
> I'd bet it's secure enough against anything that is not the NSA / equivalent foreign agencies. Now would I bet against those big players? Certainly not.
Which is another shortcut that boils down to saying "nothing is secure".
> Surely those who need that level of security should take the responsibility to enable it
That implies two code paths, one that enables the security and one that doesn't. That is more complicated (and less testable!) than either code-path on its own.
Security costs more than insecurity, but sometimes-security is the worst of all worlds.
Right so as I said elsewhere I'll be dropping all packets for incoming connections at the firewall. I was heavily downvoted for that comment... I guess a lot of folk will leave insecure devices open to the world.
> Modern day internet architecture is very secure.
Seriously? That doesn't seem to match the outcomes of regular breeches, 0-days, etc. - many reported right here. The state of security is often considered terrible and unrepairable; experts advise assuming you have been breeched.
Maybe naively, I wish this assumption became universal.
reply