"Escalation management" through "slowly boiling the frog" combined with lack of coherent strategy for the war, partially because some western politicians are afraid of Russia's tantrum in case of Ukrainian victory(using nukes if Crimea is lost, for example), and that are balancing aid so it's enough for Ukraine not loosing, but not enough for Ukraine winning. Equipment that would've been sufficient to win the war in 2022(before Russia constructed massive defensive lines) was delivered in 2023, largely in the second half of 2023. And there's not that many signs that it might change.
I see your point and I think you have a reasonable point of view, although I don't share it because I think to have that point of view you have to make assumptions I'm not comfortable making.
I think there's a lot of variables in terms of how the timeline could progress: how Russia is able to draw on other sources (trade) for equipment, how global economic winds enable Russia to deal with its labor shortages, how deep those stockpiles really go (already Western observers have significantly underestimated them), how much materiel is needed to sustain a war of attrition (in which Russia isn't advancing), how much Russian air power plays into a future timeline and how and whether Ukraine can mitigate Russian air power starting from its current air defense deficit.
When I look at these, and other variables and unknown quantities, it's hard for me to draw out that Russia is destined/doomed to lose a war of attrition, if supply just continues a little bit longer. We've witnessed Russia adapting significantly during the war - even avoiding (so far) a general mobilization. Furthermore I can think of several more ways in which Russia could win the war with sustained sponsorship of Ukraine (that never test scalability of equipment manufacture). In short, I respect that you've got that view, just uncomfortable of making the assumptions to get there myself.
It looks at least very reasonable. It's rarely argued that Russia has a severe disadvantage in conventional armaments compared to the West, or even USA alone; even Russian sources periodically admit that openly. It's also rather clear at this point that the war is the war of attrition, so supplies basically determine the results. West doesn't even need to have particular political will - the robust supplies with armaments will do the trick without anything else. No particular sets of sanctions, no diplomatic masterpieces, no boots on the ground are needed - just enough of supplies to Ukrainian army.
This may be more problematic, though, than a combination of approaches. Which we see today. The combination, though, doesn't provide results particularly fast - it still is good, though, but not enough for reducing the war in time to some relatively short periods starting from now. Well, we're in the real world. It's not perfect.
I’d start by saying that the Russians aren’t winning the war, it is in a period of stalemate, like 1915 or 1916. Accepting tens of thousands of casualties for incremental movement of a front line, over time periods that allow the side withdrawing to first build new fortifications to fall back on, is not a recipe for success. The Russians are digging deep into Soviet-era stockpiles, rolling out tanks built in the ‘50s and ‘60s (T-55 and T-62, respectively). Each of these is much less well equipped to face Western-style military hardware than more modern variants. Russia’s ability to replenish its stockpiles is at even more a disadvantage than the West, and meanwhile Ukraine has been tooling up to build shells of their own.
The U.S. has (had?) colossal stockpiles of shells and ammunition. There is a false equivalence between the ability to supply the Ukrainians at a rate of 10,000+ shells a day for years on end and the ability of the United States to engage in a major conflict. The Russians are also having trouble keeping their artillery pieces adequately supplied. The calculus is about the acceptable rate of drawdown of stockpiles in relation to the increase in the likelihood of a near-peer conflict arising due to the support given by the very drawdown of those stockpiles. If we give everything we have to Ukraine, and they lose, for whatever reason, then we have disadvantaged ourselves.
However, any major conflict between the United States and a near-peer adversary wouldn’t be so heavily reliant on artillery as this current war is — the U.S. has spent decades building an Air Force that can dominate the battle space in ways that artillery alone cannot match. As Ukraine is set to receive several squadrons worth of F-16s this year, I believe we will see things change. Planes can interdict resupply and troop movements in ways that are beyond the capability of artillery. SEAD aircraft can target and destroy SAM radars to allow large strike packages to accurately blow bridges and rail lines with a much greater radius and accuracy than any other conventional munition.
It is very cynical realpolitik, but Russia’s armed forces have been gutted with this approach.
I'm very pessimistic about such interpretations. They seem to me to be mostly western wishful thinking so I'm trying to consciously correct for that.
Yes, russians are incompetent, always have been. But most armies are to some degree, and they have been operating under strict darwinian selection for the last 2 years. They adapted to a lot of early tactics that no longer work. And they have time to adapt if the west doesn't help Ukraine finish the job early enough.
What west does is microdosing the antibiotics with pauses between the doses instead of pumping the necessary dose for 2 weeks and solving the problem. It's VERY irresponsible.
As for naval situation - Russian fleets have always been a joke, the only thing that matters is whether they can block the Black See (they can't), and whether they can use the ships to launch missiles (they can, but if they can't - they can just use ground and air launchers). So there's not much potential wins for Ukraine left there, even if they destroy the whole black see fleet. From Russian POV it's just more sunk costs (pardon the pun) and more PR problems. They aren't very sensitive to either.
Ultimately the war will end when Russia can't afford to keep its army in Ukraine or when it loses its army. The first one is easier to achieve, but that takes mass attacks on Russian infrastructure. Not 15 attacks but 100 or 1000. Repeated over and over, so that damage can't be repaired.
The west seems to be very restrictive with how Ukrainians can use the west-provided weapons, and that makes this approach unlikely to work in short term.
So then the last possible strategy is just hoping Russian economy will collapse. Which it will, don't get me wrong - but in Russia it's hard to distinguish collapsed and uncollapsed economy anyway.
Enough to defend. Not enough to win decisively. Timing matters. If EU and USA provided the help that they did but in the first 6 months - Ukraine would have already won. But the help is drip-fed to Ukraine, supposedly to "not escalate". The result is that the war that could be already over is dragging on, and eventually people will stop helping for one reason or another.
If we want a quick win for Ukraine we should send weapons much quicker and without silly distinctions like (offensive vs defensive weapons in 2022 or like long vs short range missiles now).
It's like instead of curing people with antibiotics in 2 weeks you split the pills into 1/64th parts and cured them for 1 year. You're not really curing them - you're growing antibiotic-resistant bacteria at that point.
Hold on. Russia went from invading a neighbouring country less then 5% its own size on 4 fronts, which we all deemed plausible and likely a success within weeks, if not days, to being relegated to engaging in artillery warfare like it's 1922 over a fraction of the initial front line and territory it was 5 months ago. Ukraine who has a fraction of the armed forces and materiel are receiving materiel, yes, but they are unfamiliar with it nor did they have had time training with it.
Russia went through its supply of modern materiel in the first weeks of the war and is fielding old tech and are only able to keep some momentum because of said artillery warfare, because it's both ruthless and destructive as well as low in technical requirements. They are in addition having to reconfigure their economy for total war over what is a fraction of a far smaller neighbouring country which was utterly unprepared and one of Europe's poorest.
The West sending some of it's military surplus is far from doing everything they can.
Russia having some minor gains recently is very much a matter of winning the battle but not the war. The only way they keep that up is total self destruction, which is not winning.
It's just what Putin wants it to be... There is no reason Ukraine can't push Russians back except the willingness of the West to supply Ukraine with heavy artillery, SAM systems, tanks and fighter jets — it's the only limiting factor.
Ukraine has way bigger army than Russian's (up to 1 mln mobilized, vs. 200k) but severely lacks in firepower. And the latter is what could be easily fixed, if only allies allowed it to happen.
Truth is, many Western politicians are secretly scared of the perspective of Ukraine winning over Russia. They don't want Ukraine to actually win (as in to take its territory back), all they want is to just stop Russia from expanding further. That's why the supply of the critical weapons (long-range rocket systems, IFVs, tanks, fighter jets) is abysmally small — just enough to stop Russia from making progress, but not enough for Ukrainians to make any real progress towards ending the war on their own terms.
Ukraine is a cautionary tale in that as much as military technology can change, that conflict is being decided by trenches, minefields, artillery, fixed fortifications, the inability of either side to cross a river and manpower attrition.
At this point, it's basically a World War One conflict, mainly because neither side has air superiority.
Russia's strategy now seems to be to wait out the Western will to provide material aid to Ukraine, at which point it will have gained territory, a vital land bridge to Crimea and a Black Sea port.
In this potential outcome, Ukraine is likely to swing far right, politically, and Russia will face their own draining insurgencies in former Ukrainian territory.
Fuel really isn't a problem there any more, and neither is logistics broadly speaking. They received hundreds of thousands of tons of military support. Supply up to the Ukrainian border of specific weapon systems is, specifically slow political decisions. It seems there is no consensus that Ukraine should decisively win.
And even if they get an Abrams that has half the range they'd take it at this point.
Wars aren't decided by pure manpower/materiel, or the US would have won the Vietnam war. It's all about win conditions.
For instance, if Russia loses e.g. 20% of their population then the economy will utterly tank, and if the economy tanks then Putin will lose support for the war and risk falling out of a window.
Ukraine doesn't actually need to win here, they just need to stall the war out for longer than Russia is willing to stay. Russia doesn't need to wipe out Ukraine, they just need to kill Western support of Ukraine and dry up the flow of military aid.
So if Ukraine just needs to stall then why did they go on a counterattack? Because it brings in more military aid now while Russia still has a materiel shortage. If Ukraine has a harsh materiel advantage over Russia then they can push Russian casualty rates far harder and force Putin into political strife much sooner.
Putin crippled the Russian economy by refusing to sell gas to the EU and by extension hurt Russian materiel production, but the tactic makes sense when you consider his win conditions: break Ukraine's western support, so that Russia has a materiel advantage.
>"Russia will soon attack us" rhetoric
I think that's actually Russian propaganda - Russia wants the West afraid to give Ukraine aid, so they play up the nuclear threat every time new milestones in aid are suggested (e.g. when the first F35 is given to Ukraine), then fold the moment the milestone is reached. Russia does this because slowing western aid to Ukraine is vital for their theory of victory.
Throwing money and war materiel at Ukraine doesn't ensure victory. Clearly the lack of it will ensure failure. But weapons are mostly only as good as the training of the people wielding them.
On top of that, there's fear of nuclear weapons taking the stage. If the US military went head to head with the Russian military, and we didn't have to worry about MAD, I think it's reasonable to assume that the US would win. But is the Ukrainian military, supplied with Western military supplies (and even Western military advisors), a better fighting force than the Russian military, even with a home-field advantage? Unclear.
And on the other hand... when the war started, a lot of people assumed Russia would achieve their objectives within a few weeks, or at most a month or two. Ukraine has turned out to be much more capable than initially expected.
> ...and yet it cannot supply enough shells and bullets for the war
It absolutely can, but politics, as usual, gets in the way. And, as I said, shells and bullets are necessary, but not sufficient.
Oh, does Russia have air superiority now? I hadn't read that.
Logistically they are losing? So the Russians fled Kyiv not due to logistics problems?
Is it true Ukraine is shelling Russian bases in Russia now?
From a strategic position, and that's what logistics is over a war, Russia is almost guaranteed to lose the logistics war.
Because the first pillar of logistics is funding/money/finance.
The West can afford to arm Ukraine in perpetuity, while Russia cannot wage this war forever. They can't even afford to wage it for a half a year I would guess.
Ukraine will only get more experienced, better equipped, and train more soldiers. The West will greenlight more and more weapons systems.
Strategically from the West's standpoint, this is THE opportunity to neuter Putin and Russia. To bring them to their knees of their own stubbornness, delusions, and stupidity. Even a fractured US Senate can recognize the common goal of supplying Ukraine with arms. All they have to do is provide a fraction of the US military budget, greenlight arms shipments to arms makers, and get a metric fuckton of usable intelligence, weapons testing, and tactical information for modern drone warfare.
Ukraine is 44 million people. Russia is 144 million people.
44 Million defenders + Western funding vs 144 million people (the vast majority not invading) and bankruptcy.
How deep are you diving on the situation? Almost every analyst agrees that Russia does not have the manpower to sustain their efforts to date, certainly not to hold the territory they desire. Their progress has been slow and extremely costly.
It's really more of a race to see whose economy collapses first to the point they are willing to negotiate. A stalemate will more likely depend on how much equipment the west can / will give to Ukraine, they have ample manpower (600k aiming for 1M warfighters, most need training and equipping)
Ukraine was supplied with an insignificant amount of weapons before 2022. Their kit was basically USSR kit plus some new things like Stugna, lase guided shells, distributes artillery control app etc
If Ukraine had couple brigades of Lepards, HIMARS and few hundred 777 at the start of the war, this all would have went a lot differently. Alas lesson here is simple under no condition do you give up nukes.
You vastly overestimate the amount of western help to Ukraine. Sure there is some equipment that reached the front but that is mostly handheld weapons (anti tank or short range anti air). These types of weapons usually do not win was but increase amount of attrition to the opposing side.
Russia's "victories" are extremely small and came at a great cost. They cannot win the war by having these type of battles with these losses. It is just not sustainable. Whatever metric you use.
Their plan was to topple the government and expectation was that most Ukrainian army will surrender due to fear of mighty Russian army. Once that failed they have entered into a conflict they cannot win conventionally and that will cause them massive damage for little to no gains. Whole operation in the north of the country is exactly the model how this war is going for Russia.
And the worst thing for Russia is that they are still not "all out". They are not mobilizing hundreds of thousands of conscripts from previous years so it's likely that soon they will be outnumbered on the battlefield. Once Ukraine brings up their reservists and new volunteer units to the battlefield it is to be expected that the tide turns against Russia.
Ukraine right now is trading time and small villages for attrition against Russian forces. It is working very well. Similar game plan was used to great success around Kyiv, Sumy and Chernihiv.
The difference is that their defence works. When the war started, everyone assumed Russia would take over quickly, and things would go back to normal (for western countries, not Ukraine). But no, it did not end quickly, ooops. Now they need help, weapons start to be delivered. Still no-one really believing that they would repel Russia, so just some simple defensive items to show support. 200 days forward, they are actively pushing back, and this is used as a reason to discuss delivery of even more heavy weapons (now MBTs).
It's as if they need to prove that they are worth to be supported, instead of deploying what is needed as early as possible.
If the west keeps supplying when with weapons they might actually hold at least way past the point where Russia can continue the fight.
Bellingcat reports that the orders are to take Kyiv by Monday regardless the losses if Ukraine can hold out for longer they might just be in the clear.
It’s also clear now that the Ukraine is getting direct intelligence from NATO especially from the global hawk drones and the sigint/elint aircraft it’s been flying their ability to avoid Russian offenses, hit key targets and to mount effective counter attack seem to indicate they do have map cheats enabled.
The training they got from NATO forces seem to be paying off in spades too.
Russia seem to be closer and closer to the point where their only winning condition is a Grozny scenario and if that happens then there is no chance that NATO would stand by.
Conventional warfare with limited civilian casualties would be tolerated leveling cities wouldn’t this isn’t Syria.
The EU and NATO knows that even if Russia takes Ukraine they won’t be able to hold it it might take another decade but it eventually would be free again even without major insurgency.
Puppet regimes don’t hold and Ukrainians have been far more interconnected with the EU especially through Poland than say Belarus.
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