My point was, that in my opinion the large opposition parties will agree to special budgets, securing the 2/3 majority, mostly to be consistent and maybe also out of a feeling of responsibility.
It doesn't matter how many votes they had (1 would be enough). They were necessary for forming the coalition, therefore they could extort other larger coalition parties to give in to their demands.
> unstable minority governments resolve to a more stable majority after a few election calls.
And before that time you get parties that have to work together to keep things moving, forcing compromise, and giving the less represented groups more power for a time.
Doesn't the game theory for this sort of always point to the last, smallest member to join the coalition gets to make the most demands relative to it's size?
If it's get my party with it's 4 seats on board or fail and hold new elections, I can make demands way in excess of what those 4 seats should get me, right? And then once the government's installed, why not just hold them hostage again?
I mean, assuming your parliamentarians have no sense of shame. Maybe that's my bias from watching American legislators.
That's not the opposition's fault, or the adverserial system's. It's infighting. And to be honest they could still get a fair bit done with a majority of 80, should they feel inclined.
A simple majority may not be enough in certain cases.
Let's imagine a parliament with parties with these shares of seats (proportional to electoral votes): A = 50%, B = 33%, C = 15%, D = 2%. (Note: Not an actual Israeli parliament!)
Even for cases where a simple majority is sufficient, A would be able to overpower all other parties combined, had it one more representative. But with precisely 50% (or, funnier yet, something like 49.75%), it has to seek a coalition with at least one other party, even if every A representative is going to vote the same way (which is not a given). The smallest party, D, voting in an agreement with A, can turn tables with a guarantee; D's representatives will be courted by every other party, but by A's most of all.
For cases where a qualified majority, like 2/3, is required, a coalition is a must. A + C would narrowly miss it, and again D has an outsized influence. A + B would definitely make it, but usually A and B are opposed to each other. Thus the votes of C are worth more than their modest 15% of electorate represented.
OTOH B + C + D is enough to block any bill requiring a simple majority.
So C and D, which collectively represent 17% of electorate, will be able to command serious concessions from both A and B, which collectively represent 83%, but are usually opposed to each other.
(And no, something like A = 87% may be even worse.)
You can confirm what ptpttptp said? But you contradict him. He said the coalition with the most votes will rule (which seems to be the left-wing coalition), whereas you claim the party with the most votes will form the government, even if they have less than 50% of the votes (which would be really odd if there's a majority coalition willing to govern).
It sounds like the losing side is stealing government despite losing the election here. Unless of course that largest party can form a majority coalition with a moderate left-wing party. Then everything would be fine. But forming a minority government against the wishes of the parliament, should not be possible.
Doesn't that also follow from the voting method? A faction will make the political compromises it needs to reliably get past 50% in order to active power, but won't go much past that because it would be an unnecessary political sacrifice.
> If a party has fewer than 50%, they form what's called a minority government.
No, that's when a political party _or_ a coalition of parties does not have the majority. Netherlands often/always has a coalition / combination of parties. They're never considered a minority government unless the combination is <50%.
That's not relevant. You are talking about coalition governments, in which the ensuing coalition government still represents the will of the majority. Each ~20% segment of the population represented by the 20% participant in the coalition government pushing forth ~20% supported issues and passing them does not mean that those are the will if the minority. It means that only 20% want to pass it now, but the rest do NOT object to its passing. That's still a majority government.
For a democratic majority-minority situation to occur, you must have 20% of the population wanting to pass something, but at least 20% of the population opposing it.
The Swedish tradition is that you cannot vote to stop a budget, you can only vote for another proposal. That is, if there is only one proposal, you only allow 'yes' or 'abstain' votes, and if there are several, you do a series of votes to eliminate the lesser proposals until only one stands, and then only allow 'yes' or 'abstain' again.
I hope that explains why I find it so strange.
Another peculiarity we use to avoid stand-offs (it has always worked up until last election) is negative parliamentarism, where the prime minister is tolerated, not elected by the parliament. What it means is that a majority of MPs have to vote "no" to not elect a prime minister, which means that a lot of parties vote "abstain" (we had such a vote yesterday where the PM was tolerated with the numbers yes: 115, no: 153, abstain: 77, absent:4). This has historically meant that minority governments have been able to flourish.
Looking from outside the USA: If they don't cooperate then the budget won't be approved at all, no? It's all good and well not to want to cooperate with people that don't act in good faith, but since the other party has almost half the seats in the senate and a majority in the house of reps then how do you govern at all?
> In other words, small parties with little to no support can't just dictate their will onto the majority.
No, exactly the opposite: a minority that is structurally favored by the biases in the system of representation, can dictate their will over the objections of the majority.
Civic understanding is just much different; the 7 seats aren't actually allocated proportionally through a legal mechanism, the parliament just voluntarily chooses to keep the balance in the executive. If they were willing to violate that they could form a coalition in the parliment and actually take all 7 seats of the executive.
Alright, in a normal state, there is either a majority of democrats or a majority of republicans in the legislature. Either way, the state is able to use typical party based agreement to get a budget passed. This works well in these states: If taxes get too high, fiscally conservative, tax cutting republicans get office. If services get too incomplete, public policy creating, program creating democrats are put in office, in the majority, and their party can make a budget, and taxation to go with it to support their plans.
The people get control over this process by booting state legislators of the wrong party when the state runs to excess in one or the other area.
Now in California, with this bonehead 2/3 rule, one party can get a majority (50% +1) for sure, but rarely a supermajority. That's where horsetrading comes in. People have to give things to the other side of the isle to get them to vote for this. And one of the things they can give to the other side of the isle would be votes to stay in office and money to run for re-election. And that's where the magic of special interests come in. They can cause their interested members to vote for these people who only will vote for the budget if they get something out of it. They're now getting votes/campaign contributions, so they get to keep their legislator job longer.
If you got rid of the 2/3rds requirement, when repubs got in office, they'd cut services, when dems got in office, you'd get new ones, and you'd match the rest of the states in the union.
While it turns out voter amendments turn out to often be hijacked by the special interest groups as well, that is not the huge problem. The property tax freeze is not the problem.
The fact that 1/2 the legislature has to give away the farm to get the remaining 1/6 of the legislature to pass a budget is the issue. Get rid of that, and public unions, and every other special interest in California will feel its powers go down greatly.
Good points, thanks for that. I guess I have thought about the minority government a little too much when it is an anomaly.
I have no problems with the senate. I vote for minority parties (Sex Party last election and this one) because I want protection from the government when required.
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