there's a problem regarding false positives though. A portion of those may be guilty of other things.
There was this interesting article on this idea of terahertz lasers in airports. I think these machines are great because they are programmable and specific. You can program them to look just for explosives and this reduces the search issues significantly. But what of the fact that they would mean the TSA might be Constitutionally barred from looking for drugs? Would this retard adoption?
I think if you want to show you are doing a great job at law enforcement and minimize the warrant requirement, you want to have as many false positives as the courts will let you get away with. "Yeah they only found a few oz of pot, but they had probable cause to believe he was a sexual predator, so the evidence is admissible."
To be honest, I don't think that's a big deal - 'false positives', whatever those might be in the case of backscatter machines, can be easily caught at the second stage - a pat-down. The bigger issue is blindly forcing everyone to effectively strip naked for the authorities before they are allowed to board a plane.
The TSA scanners are presented to the public as a tool for detecting weapons and other contraband, but I think this is actually a secondary goal and a bit of misdirection. Think about what those scans actually are.
They're biometrics. They take precise measurements of a person's shape, which is sufficient to detect if someone is traveling under a false name, and they're building a database of those biometrics to have available for use elsewhere. If the scan's result is ambiguous, they swab your hands and stick the swab in a machine, supposedly to detect residue from explosives but with the nice side-effect of producing a stored DNA sample for later use. They've proven pretty useless for controlling the flow of contraband, but they're quite useful for catching fugitives. While the people staffing the checkpoints aren't particularly smart, it's reasonable to assume that the people at the top are pretty clever, and their policies are consistent with this having been the real goal all along.
If they tried collecting fingerprints from travelers, they would get a very strong backlash. This way, they get a weaker backlash and some jokes about how stupid they are for using machines that can't reliably detect guns.
I'm not talking about the millimeter wave scanners TSA has where they make you take off your shoes and take out all your stuff. We're talking 1-2 officers who quickly glance inside your bag and maybe a metal detector you walk through, similar to the security at a football game. It's more intended as security theatre by the presence of officers to discourage petty crime than to catch terrorists.
Forcing criminals to move to the streets makes public transportation more appealing, I think that's obvious enough.
You're already getting strip searched before you board planes; they're just using millimeter wave scans to do it. People really need to start calling these things what they are: electronic strip search machines.
But couldn't it be argued that the use of body-scanners functions as a form of strong deterrent for potential plots?
No, because there have been attempts that the scanners have not caught, and were thwarted not by the TSA, nor any government agency, but by other passengers. Know thy history, I'm not even accounting for the white-hat tests that the TSA has soundly failed.
My problem with these (except the last one) is that they are invasive. Sorry, but I'm not willing to be treated as a potential criminal quite to that degree when all I want to do is travel from point A to point B.
As others have pointed out, the mm-wave scans amount to strip searches. A full pat-down just has too many associations with a criminal arrest. Eliminating carry-on luggage is probably more under the "inconvenience" category, but it is, as you somewhat note, an inconvenience that would be a significant problem for a lot of people.
Bomb sniffers -- especially if they're machines that are used passively -- sound like a good idea. Better scanning equipment that doesn't violate my privacy, but is able to do an adequate scan of both me and my belongings, without the need to take off my shoes or remove things (laptop, bag of liquids, etc.) from my luggage, or to limit the quantity of liquids I can carry... we need all these things.
With the amount of money supposedly being thrown at "making us safer" on airplanes, why have these scanners not been invented and mass-produced yet? It's been over 8 years since 9/11, and, technology-wise, we just have a few poorly-deployed pieces of technology (the air-puffer things, whatever they do, and the mm-wave scanners that have been a PR nightmare) and no actual universally-deployed solutions. I've been seeing signs at airports for a while now claiming that they're "working on" a solution that will let us keep our shoes on... but this solution hasn't materialized. Gimme a break...
As I alluded to in my other post, I could only imagine the TSA getting a hold of this and integrating it into the scanners. I mean, that would be a great use for catching fleeing criminals, but of course, it's all too easy to use against normal people too as they've shown with less-advanced technologies.
If I'm not mistaken I believe the question the author is posing here is "Isn't it better to have a passive device that can, from 50 meters away, spectroscopically determine what substances you've been around than one that takes pictures of you naked?"
I don't know how to answer that. Is that better?
More to the point, it's not going to be an either-or choice. What'll happen is that these devices, if they are useful, will simply be added to the armada of devices already present. And, more importantly, just like all this other tech being developed for DHS, it'll end up with local law enforcement. In the history of the republic there's probably been about ten situations where something like this could have saved lives but now we'll end up with it everywhere.
When I say the TSA needs to be abolished its not simply because they are ineffective, expensive, intrusive into my personal affairs, and represent everything that's gone wrong with the security state. A bigger problem, it seems, is that they're creating huge markets for people to invent and commercialize things with really bad applications to my freedom.
A Star Trek tricorder would be awesome, but have we really thought about that? Do we really want everybody walking around with a device that could see through your clothes, tell what chemicals you've been around, diagnose your medical conditions, and so on?
Multiple checks are not stupid at all. The screening is not 100% reliable and an independent repeat is a reasonable way to improve detections of weapons, which have been shown to get through sometimes in TSA and third-party experiments.
I don't understand why people are OK with electronic strip searches. When they make these useless machines mandatory, I'll consent to being scanned in them. Until then, a $15/hour TSA employee who wants to invade my privacy on the pretense of securing an airplane can at least look me in the eyes while he does so.
It may be my intimate familiarity with crappy data management and retention regimes, both in DHS and outside of it, but regardless of how I've acquired this perception: I have zero faith that TSA can/will protect the data they're collecting from abuse, misuse, and inadvertent disclosure. The people manning these checkpoints are simply not adequately trained. Real law enforcement officers can't handle privacy and data retention. It is unreasonable to suggest that the TSA could do a better job with more sensitive material.
Congress directed the TSA to "give a high priority to developing, testing, improving, and deploying" at airport screening checkpoints a new technology "that detects nonmetallic, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, and explosives, in all forms." The TSA responded by contracting to develop the scanner in two forms: one that uses millimeter wave technology and another that uses backscatter technology. Each technology is designed to produce a crude image of an unclothed person. No passenger is ever required to submit to an AIT scan, and signs at security checkpoints notify passengers that they may instead opt for a pat down. Each image produced by the scanner passes through filters that obscure facial features and is viewable on a computer screen only bay an officer sitting in a remote and secure room. After the passenger is cleared, the image is deleted.
In April 2010, the EPIC argued that the use of the AIT for primary screening violates the Privacy Act, the Fourth Amendment, a provision of the Homeland Security Act, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Here, the court focused mostly on the procedural argument that the TSA should have engaged in notice-and-comment rulemaking.
The petitioners argued that the TSA refused to process and effectively ignored their 2010 letter that putatively "petitioned" for rulemaking; the TSA claimed that this letter did not "petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of the rule," because the relief actually sought was the immediate suspension of the AIT program. This court didn't buy that argument.
The TSA anticipated the court would feel this way, so they next argued that they appropriately responded to the petition by denying it. The court can only set aside the TSA's denial if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Moreover, the court is compelled (by Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez) to give a high level of deference to an agency action under 'arbitrary and capricious' review. Here, the TSA denied the petition on the ground that the TSA is not required to initiate rulemaking procedures each time the agency develops and implements improved passenger screening procedures.
So why didn't there TSA publish notice of a proposed rule in the Federal Register and solicit and consider public comments upon its proposal at the outset? They figured they didn't have to. The 'notice and comments' requirement of the APA does not apply "to interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice." The TSA argued its decision to use the scanners for primary screening comes within all three listed categories. The court notes that procedural rules do not themselves "alter the rights or interests of parties, although it may alter the manner in which the parties present themselves or their viewpoints to the agency. A rule with "substantial impact" upon the persons subject to it is not necessarily a substantive rule, however. The new rule imposes no new "substantive" obligations upon airline passengers: they're still required to pass through a security checkpoint, and they're still prohibited from carrying weapons and explosives on board.
However, the court notes that it is "clear" that producing a picture of an unclothed passenger affects the public in a substantively different manner than the beep from a metal detector, and echoes the policy interests served through notice-and-comment rulemaking. The TSA tried to justify its decision to forego notice-and-comment rulemaking by claiming that it announced only an interpretive rule. The petitioners contended that the rule is legislative, rather than interpretive, because it "effectively amends a prior legislative rule." But, because the TSA's policy substantially changes the experience of airline passengers, it's not merely interpretive. The court notes, however, that the purpose of notice-and-comment rulemaking would be "disserved" if an agency with a broad statutory command (like detecting weapons) could avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking simply by promulgating a comparably broad regulation (like requiring passengers to clear a checkpoint) and then using its power to create a strict and specific set of obligations.
The court held that the "TSA has advanced no justification for having failed to conduct a notice-and-comment rulemaking" and accordingly remanded the matter back to them for further consideration. The reason they decided not to vacate the present rule was because it would "severely disrupt an essential security operation," and the rule is otherwise lawful.
Turning to the substantive claims, the first one (concerning a violation of the VPPA) failed, because it actually requires a rulemaking proceeding to have occurred and for any objection to have first been made there. Of course, that's the same proceeding at issue in this case, so that claim failed. The second substantive claim was that the scanners violate the Privacy Act, but because the TSA doesn't keep any "system of records" linked to names or any other personal identifier. The third claim was actually more viable: it focused on religious opposition to being viewed naked, but that claim failed because none of the litigants have standing to assert a religious injury. Finally, the petitioners argued a Fourth Amendment violation, because the scanners are more invasive than is necessary to detect weapons or explosives. Because this is an administrative search serving a very important social function, the court concluded that there was no violation.
No, this case I've cited specifically says that magnetometer wanding and a pat-down over a duration of 18 minutes in search of a suspected weapon is a constitutionally reasonable administrative search.
My beef is with mandatory -custody- searches, which are implemented as either electronic/radioactivity scans of the entire flesh and/or full physical inspections of the body. These were not in use prior to the TSA's inception and nobody has ruled on whether they are constitutionally reasonable or not.
I used to build a detector for explosives in academia that is now being marketed to the TSA. To get funding for these projects, its pretty standard to rip another technology apart, point out all of its flaws, then argue why yours is better. But every technology has their drawbacks and ways of skirting around it. Today, most technology deployed is more as a deterrent and less as a counter-measure.
You want to know another way to hide illicit items in those body scanners? Surround the items in water.
There are also certain materials that give off false positives and most likely the software will scan the image response against a bank of known materials. I wrote pattern detection software that did just this. Oddly enough, cheese is one of them. So stick your knife in a nice big piece of cheddar and you might make it through just fine.
Or perhaps there was some intel, or some cases where luggage was searched post scanner that came up with items that should have been caught. That might trigger a revision in procedures to prevent or reduce future cases, which is how I would expect and want a program that was actually meant to reduce danger to operate.
You're mistaken in practically every assertion you make above.
Without going over a point-by-point of the various ways your post is incorrect (e.g. regarding the scope of administrative searches; the ability of the SCOTUS to regulate searches at jails; the actual lawsuits which have resulted in most jails being much more limited in the scope of their searches absent reasonable suspicion; the TSA's inability to detect shoe bombs with the normal x-ray machines and underwear powder bombs with the new scanners; people who HAVE been refused an opt-out (reports at FlyerTalk.com); "voting out" the people who approved them, when a primary mover behind them is the Chertoff group, headed by former DHS head Michael Chertoff, who stand to gain financially from their lobbying thanks to ties to Rapiscan; and so forth), I am going to repost something from the other day which bears repeating.
There are multiple problems with TSA screening in general, and backscatter machines in particular, which are listed below.
As these machines are ill-advised, you currently have the option to "opt out" and receive a pat-down instead.
PAT-DOWNS:
New guidelines just instituted for the pat-down procedure include groping of breasts, buttocks, and crotches. [8][15]
Even for minors. [13] [14]
"My wife tells me that they grabbed my [10-year-old] son's privates and he was crying the whole time and all she could do was stand there and tell him it was going to be OK." [16]
Due to this, the ACLU is now taking reports of pat-down abuse:
Note that going through a scan does NOT exempt you from a pat-down grope. You may be groped if you trigger a metal detector, or if your backscatter shows an "anomaly", or for any other reason or no reason at all. There are also gate screenings, where you will be pulled aside at the gate, and since there are no machines, you will be patted down / groped.
IMPACT
About 1 in 5 people are sexually assaulted by age 18. [1]
This means that even "normal" pat-downs are extremely distressing or damaging to a significant percentage of the population, and these new procedures are simply sexual assault under color of authority, which can be traumatic. Victims of sexual assault, molestation, and rape often feel like they are re-living their experiences, and even those who don't have such a background may experience emotional damage from the procedure.
I defy anyone to belittle the experience of victims of sexual abuse, who do not want any unwanted touching forced upon them, least of all groping of private areas.
BACKSCATTER SCANS
All the official images have been redacted. Here is what it REALLY looks like, scaled down:
This is an artist's self-portrait using a Rapiscan Secure 1000 security scanner [17]. In addition to clearly seeing his genitals, note the penetration into his kneecaps, shin bones, and feet. Then consider the unprotected areas, such as face, neck, and eyes. Look more closely and you can see the bones in his forearms (radius, ulna), part of his humerus, and his hands.
Then consider the findings of people like David Brenner, the head of Columbia University’s Center for Radiological Research, who explains that the dose is actually 20 times higher than the official estimate. [2] [3] [4] [5]
The energy is absorbed mostly in the skin, NOT throughout the volume of the entire body as with other types of ionizing radiation. Also, the dosage is delivered in a few (under 30) seconds. You have to consider dose per unit time; the figures often mentioned for long flights mention the total dose, which is distributed over a period of HOURS.
PRIVACY
The TSA originally claimed that these machines were simply INCAPABLE of storing images. That wasn't true:
"The documents, released by the Department of Homeland Security, reveal that Whole Body Imaging machines can record, store, and transmit digital strip search images of Americans" [6]
This also goes for MMW (millimeter wave) machines used by courthouses:
"Feds admit storing checkpoint body scan images" [7]
ANONYMITY
Some locations are now using a full-color video camera in addition to the backscatter / MMW imager. This means your full-body color portrait and unclothed image can be linked; and if they scan your boarding pass or other identifying information, they can link your images to your name and other personal information (phone number, address, BIRTH DATE). [12]
SLIPPERY SLOPE
Originally the TSA claimed the backscatter machines were optional and there was no penalty for declining (no groping); that they had no capability to store images; that they would NEVER be used as primary screening instead of metal detectors (now they ARE being used as primary screening in some airports with plans for the rest -- see [9] [10]).
The supposed motivation for storing images would be in case of another attempt like the underwear bomber, to go back and "check the tapes" to see what they missed.
You should probably assume that if you are scanned, your full-color and naked images along with personal identifying information will be stored by Federal agencies in perpetuity.
EVEN DHS HEAD REFUSES BODY SCANNER
"Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano yesterday hailed them as an important breakthrough for airport security and the fight against terrorism."
"Yet when it came to testing the devices - which produce chalky, naked X-ray images of passengers - she turned the floor over to some brave volunteers." [11]
OPT-OUTS MAY NOT LAST
In the U.K., whole-body scanners have been mandatory for some time. This may well come to the U.S.
So, you will be forced to be scanned, after which you may be groped anyway, then groped again at the gate, and your images both clothed and naked will be in the bowels of a government database, which then gets turned over to various private industry bidders, who all will have a copy of all your information.
Some scanners take images in real-time at a decent framerate, which means your 3D biometric information of every part of your body will soon be recorded forever and used in any number of ways.
...will be used to remove porno-scanners and grope-checks from standard security.
Has this ever happened? Has the TSA ever given up on a security screening practice that had become a widespread routine?
If 70% of people are passing through security without being hassled, their PR problems nosedive.
If 70% of passengers walk through the screening point without removing their shoes, without walking through a metal detector, without having their bags x-rayed, etc., and the other 30% are singled out for special treatment, won't that 30% feel extra persecuted? The TSA's PR problems are mainly related to rarer-that-30% outrages like selecting comely young women for pornoscanning, interfering with uncommon medical equipment, etc.
The TSA is good for a variety of business interests. One specific example is the manufacturers of back-scatter X-Ray machines. They're hideously expensive and pure security theater but, in large part thanks to the TSA, they're in most U.S. airports now. How would you like to own a company that makes a product that doesn't actually have to work in order for you to gross billions?
Now, if this bothers you, you should probably pay attention to the fact that the market for these toys is expanding. Rapidly.
You know when you're about to step through one of these scanners at an airport, but now one can drive right past you in your car without your knowledge! Despite their lack of concrete results in airports, the back-scatter X-Ray machine market is exploding into new form-factors, and it's all thanks to U.S. taxpayer dollars.
The horrible punch-line to this is that these back-scatter vans face an almost impossible task. It's hard enough to tell bombs from batteries in the controlled setting of a an airport security check-stop. Imagine trying to distinguish bombs from the random things people keep in their cars! The crews operating these vans must generate so many false-positives that, in order to reach the point where they can actually provide some real measure of security, they would need to be supremely competent, supremely dedicated, and entrusted with extraordinary powers to search suspicious vehicles. All of the above are improbable. I will eat my shorts the first time one of these back-scatter vans actually finds a real car-bomb.
There was this interesting article on this idea of terahertz lasers in airports. I think these machines are great because they are programmable and specific. You can program them to look just for explosives and this reduces the search issues significantly. But what of the fact that they would mean the TSA might be Constitutionally barred from looking for drugs? Would this retard adoption?
I think if you want to show you are doing a great job at law enforcement and minimize the warrant requirement, you want to have as many false positives as the courts will let you get away with. "Yeah they only found a few oz of pot, but they had probable cause to believe he was a sexual predator, so the evidence is admissible."
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