> what is the purpose of philosophical work such as Bostrom’s?
This is a good question. This paper is popular well in disproportion to its impact, because it's a sexy scifi topic. I don't know Bostrom but I suspect it's popular far in disproportion to his desires also - it's just one small piece of his work on superintelligence, which is in turn only one part of his work on measuring existential risk.
The paper, it should be noted, is not an argument we are living in a simulation (it's often taken as one, but the simulation hypothesis predates Bostrom, the 20th century, etc.). Rather, it's an argument that there is a trilemma of which two options are material, and potentially even testable - so in a sense, it does allow the simulation hypothesis to be tested, if you buy his trilemma and reject the other options. (Based again on his other work, I suspect Bostrom may personally believe #1 - I personally am suspicious of both the validity of the trilemma and independently suspect #2.)
So this plays the kind of role in philosophy that a discovery of some unique way to synthesize a chemical we already have plenty of ways to synthesize in chemistry. It's a workaday paper - interesting if you are interested in the field, but of no great impact to most people's lives.
The result is that there's also not a lot of great ways to engage with the paper, in the same way it's difficult to engage with a refinement of the equivalence between inertial and gravitation mass.
If you want to engage with the simulation hypothesis and metaphysical realism more broadly, I would begin with Putnam's Reason, Truth and History. The philosophical work around the simulation hypothesis is maybe best thought of not as an attempt to actually answer it conclusively, but as particular lens on the relationship between reality, self-perception, and sense-perception. Clarifying those relationships is of immense use to the average person.
This is a good question. This paper is popular well in disproportion to its impact, because it's a sexy scifi topic. I don't know Bostrom but I suspect it's popular far in disproportion to his desires also - it's just one small piece of his work on superintelligence, which is in turn only one part of his work on measuring existential risk.
The paper, it should be noted, is not an argument we are living in a simulation (it's often taken as one, but the simulation hypothesis predates Bostrom, the 20th century, etc.). Rather, it's an argument that there is a trilemma of which two options are material, and potentially even testable - so in a sense, it does allow the simulation hypothesis to be tested, if you buy his trilemma and reject the other options. (Based again on his other work, I suspect Bostrom may personally believe #1 - I personally am suspicious of both the validity of the trilemma and independently suspect #2.)
So this plays the kind of role in philosophy that a discovery of some unique way to synthesize a chemical we already have plenty of ways to synthesize in chemistry. It's a workaday paper - interesting if you are interested in the field, but of no great impact to most people's lives.
The result is that there's also not a lot of great ways to engage with the paper, in the same way it's difficult to engage with a refinement of the equivalence between inertial and gravitation mass.
If you want to engage with the simulation hypothesis and metaphysical realism more broadly, I would begin with Putnam's Reason, Truth and History. The philosophical work around the simulation hypothesis is maybe best thought of not as an attempt to actually answer it conclusively, but as particular lens on the relationship between reality, self-perception, and sense-perception. Clarifying those relationships is of immense use to the average person.
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