>agents were not allowed to download or read any messages sent from AN0M accounts in the United States because of privacy laws.
"Privacy laws" being the Fourth Amendment, which the article still makes it sound like they violated by downloading all the messages three times a week.
The US is explicitly not getting data on US citizens from foreign spying according to this article? And the article implies that no loophole was needed for Australia to get data on Australians, there was a legal warrant for that in Australia.
>It notes while Australia's judicial order "did not allow for the sharing of the content with foreign partners" the AFP "shared generally" with the FBI the nature of the conversations occurring over AN0M.
It was accidentally leaked that the UK GCHQ had provided intelligence about the US perpetrators of the Times Square 2010 car bomb attack, so it probably does happen.
Although the US ANOM data wasn't sent to the FBI, presumably a foreign agency could see that data and tell the FBI which US citizens might be involved in illegal activity so they can be monitored/investigated in other ways.
In New Zealand, immigration send details of selected individuals to US Homeland Security for further analysis. The reason it goes to the US is because we (NZ) don't have the resources to do what the US does.
Homeland Security specifically promises to delete any data once they've finished, but it doesn't say anything about the agencies that they presumably share it with.
Basically if the US wants data on particular people from the Five Eyes network, it can be arranged. And once it's in Langley, it can go anywhere.
That is what it sounds like, but it doesn't actually say that. Additionally, I don't know how this other country could even be expected to sift out American data, even their soft claim only rules out phones in America.
> Those exceptions included approximately 15 AN0M users in the United States.
> The affidavit noted that if any other AN0M handsets "landed in the US" the AFP agreed to monitor them "for any threats to life".
The FBI might not have been the one peeking in the window but they had friends willing to peek on their behalf. A mild inconvenience they can parallel construct around.
Parallel construction is actually quite difficult; it requires an independent chain of evidence not built upon the illegally-acquired evidence.
We hear about the cases where parallel construction worked because those cases are rare, and thus are news. We don't hear about the vast majority of cases where the police couldn't parallel construct their way around 4th Amendment violations.
If the parallel construction worked then we wouldn't know it had occurred. There are multiple officials on record saying parallel construction is a widespread practice and "used every day".
> The two senior DEA officials, who spoke on behalf of the agency but only on condition of anonymity, said the process is kept secret to protect sources and investigative methods. "Parallel construction is a law enforcement technique we use every day," one official said. "It's decades old, a bedrock concept."
Yes, I don't doubt at the federal level that parallel construction works better than it does at the local level, because the feds have jurisdiction over bigger crimes. Drug crimes, involving multinational criminal organizations, generally involve many participants and transactions, and you only need to break 1 participant in a conspiracy to unravel the whole thing. (And more importantly, due to the many overlapping crimes being committed toward the common end, there are simply more options for pursuing parallel construction or even just pursuing different crimes.)
But at the local level where most crimes occur, parallel construction is a fantasy for the overwhelming majority of cases. Cops would absolutely love if they could just parallel their way around tainted evidence, but in most cases, there's only one crime, and only one trail of evidence, and there's no way to parallel around that.
(And I speak from experience; I was a public defender before I went into tax. I've seen many more failed attempts at parallel construction than successful attempts.)
I am continually amazed at HN's ability to reject reality in favor of some imaginary world that doesn't actually exist.
In the real world parallel construction is not common. The cops simply don't have the resources to pursue it in the vast majority of cases at the local level, and many cases get tossed because of tainted evidence. Hell, plenty of manslaughter and gang cases get tossed because of tainted evidence.
At the federal level, parallel construction is more common, because the feds (a) have more resources to pursue alternative avenues of investigation, and (b) have jurisdiction over the types of crimes which lend themselves to having multiple avenues of investigation, like organized crime.
But on an absolute basis, even at the federal level parallel construction is still rare, because it is invariable easier to just pursue different charges. Al Capone, for example, was brought down by tax fraud. More recently, many federal charges against El Chapo were dropped because the evidence was tainted...but it was irrelevant because they just pursued a dozen different crimes instead.
>I am continually amazed at HN's ability to reject reality in favor of some imaginary world that doesn't actually exist
Your claim is just absurd. In a successful use of parallel construction, the defendant and possibly even the prosecution should be unaware that it even occurred. Your experience as a lawyer is not a good reason to expect it isn't happening.
And though I agree that local use alone is likely rare, one of the common methods is for a federal agency to pass information to a smaller law enforcement agency. Additionally, using illegally collected evidence as a justification to pursue someone for an unrelated crime would still be parallel construction.
While the government probably can't do a parallel construction in these cases it gives them the identity of the bad guys even if they have nothing to take to court. Thus they know who to target.
1. There is a well known adage that goes something like, 'if the service is free, you're the product.' One could easily think the inverse is true ('if you're paying for the product, you're the customer') but obviously in the light of this case it isn't necessarily so. But making users pay for the service likely decreased their level of suspicion.
2. Need to tie a pseudonym to real person? A credit card number, bank account, or even a bitcoin public key get you a long way toward that goal.
IIRC they explicitly used the slogan "Developed by criminals for criminals" or something like that in marketing the device - which has the nice side effect of providing some justification to issue a warrant for all users, that there is some probable cause for reading all data, not just some specific people.
Or is it? I mean, it sounded like an app specifically marketed and used for serious organised crime, so as someone who is pro-encryption, pro-privacy, this seems like entirely reasonable police work.
Every article about this has gone into at least a cursory explanation that these weren't even really phones per se. They were basically hardware devices used to access AN0M. This had the double effect of 1) making the criminals feel like it was more secure because it wasn't "public" and 2) making it easier for the governments involved to make the software do whatever they needed it to do.
Yeah I don't buy this for a second. US agencies are known to violate constitutional rights on a regular basis, usually without any repercussions. Yet in this scenario, where there doesn't even seem to be much innocent bycatch they're Doing It By The Books?
With regards to the US, there was a probably a high risk rich people were involved, and they constitute one of those minorities that America has had some degree of success in protecting the rights of.
That was my first assumption here. I assumed parallel construction and all of the other theories fall flat to occams razor. It's quite likely someone wealthy and connected was involved.
Do they ever violate constitutional rights in cases that involve a huge number of agents and agencies and are front page news all over the world?
This wasn't someone not being read their miranda rights in the back of a police car - it was a huge international operation that got a lot of press and attention.
Exactly. Big operation means senior oversight. Senior oversight means people who care about politics and optics are involved.
Someone at the FBI probably got a verbal briefing from foreign agents about the US users and what they were engaged in and then decided that a dozen mid level drug suppliers wasn't worth yet another political fight over the 4th amendment, international coordination that effectively circumvents it and the legality of drugs themselves.
Remember, federal agents didn't get their shoot first ask questions later reputation from nowhere. Their bosses aren't blind to this. Each one of those fifteen doors you kick in comes with a non-zero risk that you create another Brianna Taylor or Vicky Weaver and in this day and age it might wind up in 1080p on Youtube before you can clamp down. What do you gain by this? Maybe you'll get a drug table photo op but it will be nothing like what CPB or the Coast Guard get when they bust a semi truck or a smuggling boat. You'll get to flaunt the fact that you took part in an international drug bust operation. But the public mostly doesn't care.
From the FBI's perspective the risk reward ratio of skirting the 4A to take part in this operation just just doesn't work out.
They didn't even have to skirt the rules to get the benefit. Even if it wasn't US criminals they still get to turn around and say "look, we made the world a safer place".
Doesn't this imply willful lying of government to its citizens. What's the guarantee that they aren't doing the same with contact tracing apps or other necessary apps?
The app was an inside job. It wasn't marketed. This was an app made for criminals, developed by the FBI and others. It wasn't put on an app store for non-targeted criminal users to use.
I don't think you should be downvoted, but the polio campaign was lying to citizens of other countries, not domestically, which I think is the crucial distinction here.
Eh, how about the reasons for the Iraq war, or the nice brochures the AEC gave the people of Utah about the innocent fairy dust raining down on them from the atmospheric Nuclear Tests in Nevada ?
> Doesn't this imply willful lying of government to its citizens. What's the guarantee that they aren't doing the same with contact tracing apps or other necessary apps?
It should be the default to expect government to be lying to its citizens.
It's time to weaken the legal privacy protections of users, but strengthen the technical protection (encryption) and strengthen the requirement to notify users whose data has been accessed.
I'd like so see police able to access any unencrypted data for any court sanctioned purpose, but within 6 weeks I'd like the owner of that data notified that the police have used their data and the reasons why.
Then people can vote with their feet and use only encrypted services for things...
>It's time to weaken the legal privacy protections ...
I'm sure you do believe that, and that if you lift enough rocks for a long enough time, you will find a couple of weirdos who agree with you.
What you're basically saying is you want to relinquish legal protection in favor of technical protection.
First, you clearly have never been the target of the full force of the government (technical layers will be absolutely no protection), and second, thankfully, you're not a majority.
"Privacy laws" being the Fourth Amendment, which the article still makes it sound like they violated by downloading all the messages three times a week.
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