> Germany sent their best generals to the east and they knew they had no hope but to delay the inevitable, and no alternative but to listen to Hitler. They continued to fight because to deny Hitler's madness often meant less than favorable outcomes for these commanders
That's not entirely true, though. Modern WW2 historiography acknowledges that this vision of WW2, that "Hitler was mad and his generals were afraid to contradict him", is mostly the version the surviving German generals gave in their self-serving memories, as a way to save face and paint themselves as more useful to the West during the Cold War.
More recent assessments contradict this version and show many German generals were enthusiastic about war with the Soviet Union, they fully expected to win, and in many cases goaded Hitler into making fatal mistakes he himself wasn't as sure about (an example: Operation Citadel, the battle of Kursk). The ones who knew the enterprise was doomed? The logistics guys, who did the calculations and predicted when the Wehrmacht would overextend itself and run out of supplies -- not the generals!
Professor Jonathan House, an American military historian specializing on WW2's Eastern Front, has a whole lecture about this, available on YouTube.
That's not entirely true, though. Modern WW2 historiography acknowledges that this vision of WW2, that "Hitler was mad and his generals were afraid to contradict him", is mostly the version the surviving German generals gave in their self-serving memories, as a way to save face and paint themselves as more useful to the West during the Cold War.
More recent assessments contradict this version and show many German generals were enthusiastic about war with the Soviet Union, they fully expected to win, and in many cases goaded Hitler into making fatal mistakes he himself wasn't as sure about (an example: Operation Citadel, the battle of Kursk). The ones who knew the enterprise was doomed? The logistics guys, who did the calculations and predicted when the Wehrmacht would overextend itself and run out of supplies -- not the generals!
Professor Jonathan House, an American military historian specializing on WW2's Eastern Front, has a whole lecture about this, available on YouTube.
reply