I think the real problem is pretending that the phrase “what it feels like to be something” is going to act like a key in my dict of feelings.
A: You know, the feeling of what it is like to be something.
B: sits quietly, looks at ceiling Right, yeah, that feeling.
From a different angle, if OP wants to define “consciousness” as some feeling it sounds like he’s basically done. He’s labeled one of his feelings with the word “consciousness”. I’m not sure what point of contention remains.
How would we know what it is "like" to be something? It's like asking the fish what is water. We've never not experienced it. There is nothing to compare it to.
But maybe the question you are proposing is the following, “Is it possible to identify a sensation that is always present?”.
Maybe this question is coherent? I’m not sure.
Suppose it isn’t possible to identify a sensation that is always present. Then wouldn’t that mean the state of having no sensations is identical to the state of only having sensations that are always present?
A: You know, the feeling of what it is like to be something.
B: sits quietly, looks at ceiling Right, yeah, that feeling.
From a different angle, if OP wants to define “consciousness” as some feeling it sounds like he’s basically done. He’s labeled one of his feelings with the word “consciousness”. I’m not sure what point of contention remains.
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