I think you may have missed the point (of course, it could be me that missed the point :-)
The argument was that for a physical system to be a computer, an element of intent or interpretation is needed; otherwise it's just a bunch of stuff doing what stuff does naturally. Perhaps the (horribly flawed) iron bar example is making the point that whether some configuration of magnetic dipoles is a computer depends on your choice of mappings from that configuration to some state of some Turing machine - which is equivalent to an interpretation.
You're just re-stating (1). I understood (1) fine and addressed it directly.
Observation isn't required for Turing machines to exist. A computer is still a computer even if it has no user or doesn't compute anything deemed useful.
i.e., Whether something is a computer or not doesn't depend on interpretation or observation. (Directly saying 1 is wrong)
Yes, I'm restating (1). That's why my remark was introduced with the phrase "The argument was [...]". In particular, I was trying to rationalise the dumb "iron bar" example as a justification for (1).
I don't think you addressed anything; you just flatly denied (1), without offering any reasoning. In particular, you don't seem to have tried to understand the author's attempt to justify (1) using iron bars.
For my part, I'm not sure about (1). As far as I can see, there's a steady flow of people discovering that some X is a Turing-complete language, when X wasn't actually even meant to be a language at all. So it seems that some configuration of stuff is a computer IFF (a) it is capable of doing computation, and (b) someone is willing to consider it as a computer. Four odd socks could be considered a computer, by someone who was using them as a 4-bit adder.
No. Some things are Turing machines and some are not. Human interaction and interpretation are not involved.
This applies to any model of computation. Cellular autonoma for instance. A mind is not required to interact with the system for computation to take place.
Take a living cell. No mind is in the loop when the cell computes the manufacture of organelles from stored data.
> Four odd socks could be considered a computer, by someone who was using them as a 4-bit adder.
No. A group of 4 socks is not a computational system. That's just MEMORY. Same with iron bars. It doesn't compute on it's own because it's not a full computer.
The fact that memory doesn't compute by itself isn't evidence that a mind needs to be involved for computation to take place. The argument is really stupid.
> No. A group of 4 socks is not a computational system. That's just MEMORY. Same with iron bars. It doesn't compute on it's own because it's not a full computer.
Agreed; that was a rather throwaway rhetorical remark. But if you concede that four socks can be a memory, then it's not a huge jump to see that a bunch of arbitrary objects can in principle compose a computer.
My contention is that whether that arrangement of objects is in fact a computer is subjective; it depends on whether anyone conceives of it as a computer, or uses it to obtain computational results.
Again, no, not anything can a computer. If you like Turing machines, there are specific requirements for what makes a Turing machine. None of these things are ingredients of a Turing machine:
* Observation
* Measurement
* Interpretation
* Intent
* A mind
> My contention is that whether that arrangement of objects is in fact a computer is subjective
You are wrong. It is discretely defined. Read about the requirements for a Turing machine.
* When the requirements are *not* met,
subjectivity can not turn something
into a computer.
* When the requirements *are* met,
subjectivity can not change the fact
that it is computer.
It's obvious that subjectivity has no effect -- either in the matter of classifying computers, or allowing computation to take place.
> it depends on whether anyone conceives of it as a computer, or uses it to obtain computational results.
Again, refuted, in so many different ways. Here's an obvious one which I will restate:
* Cells inarguably perform computation.
They pre-date minds by billions of years.
Put a different way, if a Turing Machine computes in the woods and there's no one around to see it, computation will still have taken place. The burden of proof would be on you to say otherwise. I only see two very messy and wrong arguments:
A) Iron bars don't compute by themselves --> A mind is needed to "map" iron bars to "states of an arbitrary Turing machine"
It doesn't follow. Iron bars don't compute on their own because they are just the memory component. What is missing is MACHINERY WITH SPECIFIC PROPERTIES to complete a Turing machine. If the machinery is present, computation is possible. No mind necessary.
B) Socks are a computer if I decide they are --> arbitrary objects can in principle compose a computer --> deciding is necessary to make computers.
It doesn't follow. While computers could be made of just about anything, fully arbitrary objects cannot be computers. Only specific systems yield computation. Decision has nothing to do with it. Not even observation is required.
> there's a steady flow of people discovering that some X is a Turing-complete language, when X wasn't actually even meant to be a language at all.
You're arguing my point. "discovering" Turing machines ... meaning some things are already Turing machines before a mind became involved.
> So it seems that some configuration of stuff is a computer IFF (a) it is capable of doing computation, and (b) someone is willing to consider it as a computer.
You say "So it seems" and "IFF" but it does not follow at all. (b) is not supported. Computation can happen without "someone".
At best, you're arguing that trees falling in the forrest make no sound.
It’s silly because it’s obvious. If you understand cells, you understand that computation in the absence of subjectivity has been happening on Earth for billions of years.
> I showed you that subjectivity doesn’t effect whether computation occurs.
You didn't "show" it; you simply asserted it. You also made a number of appeals to (uncited) authority concerning the nature of computers.
You made an argument from cells; I presume that was to do with the way that DNA and so on works. Although not all cells have DNA...
Anyway. I concede that was an argument, and not a bald assertion. But it's a circular argument; if your definition of "computer" includes the operation of DNA, then the conclusion that a computer can exist without interpretation or intent is unavoidable. You're definition begs the question.
> Please imagine that my response is "I said good day sir!"
That sounds a lot like "Anyway, why do I think I have time for this ... "
It's clear to me that "stuff" can be arranged to work as a Turing Machine (or some other kind of computer) without design or intent. Whether it is such a thing or not depends on how it is used; a Turing Machine that is given random inputs, or whose outputs don't mean anything to anyone, is a computer only in a formal sense. If nobody knows that some thing is a computer, I'm not sure that it's computer-ness is meaningful.
So that's why I think intent and interpretation are relevant.
> computer, an element of intent or interpretation is needed; otherwise it's just a bunch of stuff doing what stuff does naturall
I mean this violates nothing and I am completely confused why it is a concern.
AI face recognizing cameras are outdoors and run 24/7, and you are trying to say that things like it is not computing and unable to carry out computation?
> and you are trying to say that things like it is not computing
On the contrary.
The AI-powered camera obviously has intent behind it. It's a computer.
A random collection of stuff, on the other hand, could happen to be arranged in such a way that it computes something; but if it wasn't designed that way, and if nobody is trying to give it inputs and interpret the outputs, then it's not a computer, it's just a bag of stuff.
For example, consider the orbiting bodies of the solar system. I expect their motions can be used to compute various functions, although I don't know what functions. But they weren't arranged deliberately to perform computations, and AFAIAA nobody's intepreting them as a computer. Ergo, they are just a "bag of stuff", doing what stuff does naturally.
The argument was that for a physical system to be a computer, an element of intent or interpretation is needed; otherwise it's just a bunch of stuff doing what stuff does naturally. Perhaps the (horribly flawed) iron bar example is making the point that whether some configuration of magnetic dipoles is a computer depends on your choice of mappings from that configuration to some state of some Turing machine - which is equivalent to an interpretation.
reply