On the contrary, they have a very strong incentive to do so: it shows the market that they not only trust their own long term position but that they are able to act in concert to take care of a competitor in trouble exactly without the government forcing them to do so, in effect doing an end run around those that are now asking for more regulation.
Could you please stop posting unsubstantive comments and flamebait? You've unfortunately been doing it repeatedly. It's not what this site is for, and destroys what it is for.
This is like saying a bunch of nodes behind a load balancer are "colluding to keep a failing system alive" when one of them fails over; it's technically correct but .. you don't actually want the system to fail? Because people are using it?
But a possibly better and more optimized implementation can't be put in place until the current one fails, that's the core issue here. Many people want reforms to the banking system, bit the system is defended fiercely until it's un-ignorable. This is a defense of god awful ways of doing things so the general public can ignore it.
Banks directly acting to help their competition? Why? Isn't that how competition is supposed to work?
What we're seeing is yet another version of capital and capitalism in decline, and rich financiers are still claiming the empire is wearing a wonderful robe. News flash! he's wearing nothing at all.
> But a possibly better and more optimized implementation can't be put in place until the current one fails
That's like saying we can't implement renewable energy until the grid goes dark, and the best way to get reform is to go round blowing up some power stations. People are depending on this infrastructure to work! Advocating for bank failures without regard to the consequences to the users is the sort of accelerationism that you normally only hear from revolutionary Communists.
What is the acceptable level of collateral damage from bank failures to you?
Let's be real, banking is a public-private partnership. While it IS significant that the banks themselves are doing this, and not the Fed/FDIC, it would also seem quite possible (likely?) to be some nudging from the Fed/Treasury. Some form of "hey, we did our part (the new emergency backstop), you guys need to show you're worth this effort".
While the top-tier of banking is obviously in competition with each other, they're also bound together by their shared interest in the status quo, and then doubling bound together by the Fed/USG also being very interested in the status quo. So it's cartel-like, but it would be a mistake to only include the banks as members of the cartel.
So why didn't these same banks band together and buy out SVB / its assets instead of letting it file chapter 11? Wouldn't have preventing the 2nd and 3rd biggest bank failures in U.S. history happen within a few days of each other been a much better way of preventing future regulation?
SVB's fall happened in less than 48 hours and nobody actually thought they'd fail until they did - with FRB, people took the risk seriously because of the precedent.
SVB's liquidity problems were known for months because they were a function of interest rates and failure to manage interest rate risk on their part - besides, the CEO was on the board of the SF Fed. It's not like they weren't in communication with other banks about what's going on with the markets and the Fed itself.
But SVB was solvent and basically fine long-term. If VCs hadn't panicked at herd-mentality stampeded $40,000,000,000 out of the bank in a day, forcing it to sell 10 year treasuries at depressed market rates, it would have been fine.
SVB isn't like the 2008 banks that held mortgage-backed securities that turned out to be full of people who lied about their income and assets and would never get repaid. SVB had treasuries that absolutely would have been repaid.
SVB was trying to do an equity raise to solve their short-term liquidity issues. If they'd done so quietly, and gotten money from a big institution before going public, they'd probably have been fine. Instead, the public equity raise spooked people, caused a bank run, and made their liquidity go from "risky" to broken.
> If VCs hadn't panicked at herd-mentality stampeded $40,000,000,000 out of the bank in a day, forcing it to sell 10 year treasuries at depressed market rates, it would have been fine.
Is there any (publicly viewable) analysis of the extent to which this is - or isn't - true?
It certainly would have survived longer, and for all I know maybe they would have been fine for the 6-7 (iirc) years remaining on those 10yr assets.
But at the same time, with money no longer as cheap as it had been for a long time, it's likely that had they not had the immediate run they would have seen money gradually leaving the bank as less new money gets put into VC and as their startup customers gradually spent down their investment lump sums without raising any new money. Would that gradual trickle out have been strong enough to push them under in the following months or years even without a bank run?
The liquidity problems caused the flight - why else would they take a $1.8b haircut on a securities portfolio and then try a bone-headed cap raise to cover the difference?
However, just because the link can be drawn, doesn’t mean it was the ultimate underlying cause. If the depositors weren’t so heavily coordinated and concentrated together, there’s no way the money would have come out that fast, if at all. Regardless of the loss on the bond sale.
As various Financial Twitter people have been arguing, why didn't the venture capitalists, who by definition have lots of capital, and often were banking with SVB and encouraging their invested companies to do so as well, buy out SVB?
That's a common misconception: because it is not their money to do so as they wish with. It comes with strings attached in the form of agreements tied to multiple LPs (Limited Partners) dictating own that money can, and cannot be invested.
> venture capitalists, who by definition have lots of capital
Actually VC funds don't have much capital. If I agree to put $10MM into a $50MM fund as an LP, I don't send them $10MM. What I agree to do is that when they make an investment in Startup X, they can call me and ask for a fifth of that investment.
LPs invest in venture firms on the theory that the firms can pick good startups. I want the use of my money until they ask for it.
(This explanation ignores the annual management fee and the fact that some VCs have made a lot of money in the past).
And that is all the incentive they need.
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