I would suggest the procedure for war goes something like this:
- Incompatible aims of the parties (in wars of aggression this may be expansion vs sovereignty)
- Miscalculation (failure to understand and accommodate the incompatible aims, if such compromise could even be found, and failure to appreciate the other's resolve to make those aims)
- Momentum (war has it's own terrible escalatory logic)
I believe the original contention as a doctrine of international relations is that democracies don't go to war with one another
But yeah, I agree, selection bias, the particular post WWII era of history, etc.
I was thinking about this in the context of the multi-polar world order emerging, and Russia, Gulf Arab Countries, and China pursuing common geopolitical interests. Kind of tangential to war per se, but still touches upon the whole "democracies tend to align and buy into the neoliberal world order"
A lot of people would paint this as a bunch of right-wing autocratic regimes grouping up together and see that as one of the more salient things about such alignment. But really, if the Gulf Arab countries were more democratic, they would only be acting more independently of the Western geopolitical sphere. And I think China would also be pursuing a similar course if it were a democracy. The more those populations view themselves as sovereign peoples, the more they wouldn't want to play nice with a world order whose agenda isn't always aligned with what they want or think is right, or which they feel doesn't accord them sufficient respect, etc.
For example, they are now all using the current stage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to call out Western hypocrisy, etc. (For China and Russia, this is just trollish behavior, because of course Russia is doing something similar in Ukraine, and China is doing something similar to the Uighurs, and they know it, and everyone knows it). For the Gulf Arab countries, this is hypocritical in the sense that they are beneficiaries of American foreign policy hypocrisy (see, e.g., Yemen) Certainly, as far as the Arabs go here, it is difficult to imagine they would be somehow less interested in doing so were they democracies (though I don't think they'd be doing what they are doing in Yemen if they were)
I think the above makes me come across as having some kind of really left view of foreign policy or something lol. But I have mostly liked the neoliberal world order, and I don't think that a multipolar world where Russia/Gulf/China are more powerful is good. I have reasons I dislike all of those countries. Anyone who thinks they are somehow better than the US and that the Western portrayal of their evils is merely propaganda is pretty naive, IMO.
However, I do wish the Palestinians and others weren't considered disposable or worse. On that issue, American foreign policy is quite nakedly immoral and senseless, and I do feel it undermines the credibility of the country to the point where I and others are willing to shrug at the American world order's slow collapse.
Ukraine made me rethink some of my Iraq and Afghanistan era views, only to have the GOP change stance without reason. Where I thought there was actually room for coming to a common understanding, even that had become divisive. Meanwhile everyone on the right and left has lost any semblance of nuance on isreal-gaza.
The polarization we've seen over the last 20 years is only getting worse, and will be fueled be worsening global economics. It's hard to see what will reverse this trend short of a world war.
Until a couple centuries ago there were wars economically beneficial for an aggressor. In the modern world cooperation if more beneficial and this is what most democratic countries choose. A dictator can start a war even knowing that it would have a huge cost because he personally would not suffer from this.
Their analysis seems to grossly ignore the reality of the situation in Ukraine (their primary example) which calls into question the whole argument.
1. Russian views invasion over its relatively indefensible borders as an existential threat, with the most recent example of such an invasion still in living memory, and thus maintaining border states is its number one priority.
2. Russian control of a warm water port on the black sea has been a primary foreign policy goal for 300 years.
3. With the Euromaiden ouster of the previous pro-russian government, Ukraine's shift to the West was all but a certainty barring exceptional circumstances, which would not only create a large indefensible border directly with NATO, but also place Russia's most important naval port in NATO territory.
3. Russia has had consistent success stopping countries from joining NATO by starting low level conflicts in break-away regions within those countries (see Georgia in 2008).
4. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Russian land forces were considered first rate, with western analysts predicting they Kyiv would fall within hours if Russia invaded.
5. Russian demographics are terrible, like absolutely fucked, with a massive birthrate crash in the early 90s after the fall of the soviet union compounding pre-existing problems. The late 2010s/early 2020s are the last time in the next few decades that Russia's military, which relies on numbers, would be able to conduct an offensive operation.
6. Europe was reliant on Russian natural gas and mineral exports, and generally at a weak point in its relationship with the US which was strongly focused on China.
Based on these givens, it makes perfect sense that in 2014 Russia would try to seize Crimea and support separatists in the east - it prevents Ukraine from joining NATO, it secures Sevastopol, it drives a wedge between Europe and the US, it demonstrates Russian military capability inexpensively, and it does all this while it still has the manpower to spare. This action was popular in Russia and reasonably successful from their perspective. If you ignore respect for international law, it was a rational decision.
But between water being cut off to Crimea, stalemate along the Donbass, and persistent western sanctions, the conflict was bleeding Russia white. It could handle this at first, but with impending demographic collapse it needed to wrap things up quickly. With a full scale invasion it could replace the Ukrainian government with a friendly puppet, guaranteeing its long term status as a border state, and legitimizing Russia's previous gains; Russia would demonstrate western division and impotence, once and for all convincing the remaining border states to remain neutral; Russia would demonstrate its military might to make its subsequent bluff as convincing as possible, and it would open the flood gates for China to make moves that would take the US's focus away; and finally Putin would see a surge in popularity at home just as he had seen in 2014. While all of this was of course wrong, it was not the fantasy of an isolated despot, but rather it was the prevailing fear in the West. And frankly despite not being true, it's unclear that Russia really had a better option (from its perspective) - letting the separatists crumble and NATO expand while its demographics collapsed would herald the end of Russia as a great power, and leave it as an untrusted, junior partner in orbit around either Europe or China.
Make Putin accountable, the war still happens, as the people he would be accountable to supported the decision. Ideology may have been used as an excuse but it played no role in the actual decision making. Bias, uncertainty, and unreliability, which all seem to be rehashing the same point - that we don't know ahead of time how a decision will play out - doesn't really have any explanative power. Maybe if we lived in a world where everyone was omniscient and brutally rational we wouldn't have war, but I wouldn't describe that as the reason war happens.
He wanted to be the one what got Ukraine. He wanted it to be his legacy. Putin's legacy instead will be the man who made Russia poorer, weaker, more isolated, and more dependent on China.
> it makes perfect sense that in 2014 Russia would try to seize Crimea and support separatists in the east - it prevents Ukraine from joining NATO, it secures Sevastopol, it drives a wedge between Europe and the US
Putin's actions have had the direct consequence of strengthening and expanding NATO. It has also guaranteed that Ukraine will join the EU and eventually NATO.
The only "wedge" that exists between the US and Europe is someone like Donald Trump. If Trump is reelected he will do everything he can think of to leave NATO:
> The primary driver for Russia's invasion of Ukraine is Putin's fantasy of a restored Russian empire:
That's the kind of thesis a 10 year old comes up with for a history paper the night before its due. It does not stand up to the slightest scrutiny.
> Putin's actions have had the direct consequence of strengthening and expanding NATO. It has also guaranteed that Ukraine will join the EU and eventually NATO.
I was very clearly presenting the thought process prior to the war, it's only in hindsight that we know NATO came out ahead from all this. All indications immediately before the invasion were that Ukraine would get steam rolled and NATO would look impotent.
> The only "wedge" that exists between the US and Europe is someone like Donald Trump.
Again, laughably false. This may come as a surprise but there's more to geopolitics than just American presidential elections.
It's the practical reality. Putin has said Ukraine is not a real country and Ukrainians are not a real people. Ukraine has spent nearly two years now explaining to him that he is wrong.
In what way does practical reality support the argument? This is the real world and the real world has real consequences. In the real world practical realities are all that matter.
Putin thinks Ukraine "is an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space."
Putin thinks "Ukraine's ruling circles decided to justify their country's independence through the denial of its past, however, except for border issues. They began to mythologize and rewrite history, edit out everything that united us, and refer to the period when Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as an occupation."
Putin thinks "Ukraine has never had its own authentic statehood. There has never been a sustainable statehood in Ukraine."
Putin thinks "that true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia."
Putin thinks Ukrainians and Russians "are one people"
But, to Putin's bafflement, somehow, mysteriously, Ukrainians don't seem to understand that.
Putin's advisors advise “forcing coercion into fraternal relations is the only method that has historically proven effective towards Ukraine.”
No, in what way does any of that support the argument that the war was motivated by Putin's personal desire for conquest.
It is in fact not practical reality, it is a fiction created by the Kremlin. Claiming Ukraine isn't a sovereign state is Russian propaganda to obfuscate the obvious breach of international law, it is neither a genuinely held belief nor a reason for the war.
No, you have it exactly backwards. Claiming Ukraine is run by neo-Nazis and that NATO is an existential threat to Russia is Putin's propaganda to justify his dream of the restoration of the Russian Empire.
> That's the kind of thesis a 10 year old comes up with for a history paper the night before its due.
Putin has fairly literally said that, including in his speech immediately after the commencement of the 2022 escalation. Oh, sure, he also stated all the other justifications that his propaganda drones rotate between about NATO expansion in its neighborhood (which is really only a problem because it is a barrier to the expansionist fantasy), and Ukraine not being a real country (which is ultimately just a different spin on the imperial dream, when you think about it).
> All indications immediately before the invasion were that Ukraine would get steam rolled and NATO would look impotent.
I assume you mean the 2022 escalation, and not the invasion starting the war in 2014, but in any case Russia steamrolling Ukraine would have been worse for Ukrained, clearly, but it would have even more vividly demonstrated the threat to Russia's near neighbors of not having a strong alliance with deployed forces and strong commitment.
> Putin has fairly literally said that, including in his speech immediately after the commencement of the 2022 escalation.
If you can show me the quote where Putin said "I disregarded geopolitics and launched this invasion to satisfy my fantasy of conquest" I'll eat my hat. Again, this has been the standard Russian playbook since the 1700s. I find it awfully difficult to believe that Catherine the Great was making decisions to stroke the ego of a man who wouldn't come to power until 200 years after her death.
> I assume you mean the 2022 escalation, and not the invasion starting the war in 2014
I'm pretty sure if you could only label one of those two events as "the invasion" it would unambiguously be the one in 2022. That being said, the idea that Russia would handily defeat Ukraine in a conventional war was widely believed in 2014 as well, hence the long struggle to avoid the conflict escalating.
These kinds of phenomena are why I wish there was a better scientific understanding of societal functioning. I tire a bit of public intellectuals arguing about whether or not we should feel optimistic or not instead of how to measure whether or not we do, who "we" are, and what it means.
> It's Not Just Ukraine and Gaza: War Is on the Rise Everywhere
To quote a line from a nice movie: "The decline of the American empire, continues".
The American empire expanded too much in the last 30 years and, just like the Roman empire, it ignores its citizens. The greed and the lust for glory already started to take their toll.
The funiest part is, that it is the US which is pushing hard for those wars, like they learned nothing from Vietnam, Irak or Afganistan.
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-five-reasons-wars-happen/
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