Lets remember most of the fighting and devastation was outside Germany's borders. Even during the Hundred Days, the allies hadn't reached Germany just yet. Also, France was bled white. Also, Germany had already reached its strategic goal in the East and took out the Russian Empire. The dissolution of Austro-Hungary took out a player that could balance them to the south.
So the continental balance was Germany vs France and whatever minnows France could gather, USSR as wild card. Germany being potentially much stronger than France when it rearms (In the road to WW2, Germany managed to woo USSR and weaken/divide the minnows further).
The Versailles treaty was enough to piss off Germany but didn't offset its strategic gains to the East. France wasn't strong enough to enforce alone.
So what were the alternatives to Versailles? There were two other options (A/B) and a useful extra (C):
A. Be way meaner to Germany so the balance of power on the continent shift and let France enforce this.
B. Pull in France to an alliance system and have UK/US as enforces.
C. Somehow create a balancing force to the East/South of Germany rather than bickering minnows.
France wanted A and was fine with C. This was consistent leaving aside moral debates. Perhaps it could have been convinced to get B instead of A if UK/US actually made decent assurances.
UK strategic thought always sought to divide the continent, which means post-WW1 relations with France cooled (it mistakenly viewed Germany as weaker). This was an impediment to A and the background to Keynes' outbursts of nonsense. It didn't like alliances (B) but would have have C.
The US couldn't abide with any version of C (fourteen points etc.) and was pulled by UK regarding A. B really needed something much stronger than League of Nations which US opinion could not abide.
Result was a strategically incoherent treaty, which France/UK/US pushing in different directions, but it wasn't actually a punishing treaty but rather a mild treaty.
P.S. The late Sally Marks had a lot of excellent writing on these issues.
"France couldn't rely on as strong allies next time"
On the other hand Austria-Hungary wasn't there either.
But okay, what would've motivated German people to go along with the elites and "seek revision and likely its [Germany's] original WW1 aims" if the Versailles treaty were softer on the country and the economic situation were better?
That's a bad trade if the alternative is the Russian Empire. Besides, in the lead to WW2, Germany also got Italy, Austria and Czechoslovakia, an assist from the USSR - while France got Poland.
>what would've motivated German people to go along with the elites
It's not that hard for elites to motivate their own people. WW1 was itself insane after all.
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There isn't that much disagreement. Everyone agrees that the treaty left Germany dissatisfied. What the 'be softer on Germany' people miss is that the German elite didn't change by that much and that Germany wasn't so weak. By 1922 you had memos with ideas like "Poland's existence is intolerable". The problem with Versailles was the bad strategic architecture more than its not-quiet-hardness.
What do you mean?
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