This presumes there's any amount US can spend to allow UKR to strategically defeat RU by proxy, and thereby have PRC fear it. UKR as proxy is as much limited by quality/quantity of it's human capita as it is by external support. What happens to US credibilty / desire to be US proxy in IndoPac to fight for US security interests when partners see UKR decimated to the last man despite full US assistance? The western wunderwaffles delivered to UKR have underdelivered, meanwhile US failing to guarantee red sea shipping against Houthis that US armed Saudis have failed to contain for over a decade. Single digit salvos of shit tier RU and Houthi missiles successfully penetrating Patriots in UKR and Flight2/3 DDGs in Red Sea has basically affirmed PRC the vulnerability of US hardware and validated their doctorine to deliver 1000x more fires. If anything the more US commits/show hand, and the more she reveals her (in)capability, the less her adversaries fear it. Sometimes better to commit half heartly and be thought incompetent (or indifferent) than go all in an remove all doubt. Nothing worse for US credibility than trying and failing.
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