I think most attempts to support mysticism using quantum mechanics are made by people who know very little about either, but know quite a bit about what people want and how to make money from it.
You can skip most of this but the bit about the Afshar experiment looks important. According to Wikipedia it's still controversial. Does anyone know more about it?
Yes, but it's hard to explain succinctly. TL;DR: the Afshar experiment does not actually show what it purports to show. It's a bit of rhetorical sleight-of-hand. The reason is the presence of the lens, which supposedly creates an image of the two slits, but in fact does not. What it really does (which can be demonstrated mathematically) is create an interference pattern that looks like an image of the two slits but really isn't. So it is not the case that because it looks like a photon went through one slit or the other at the end of the experiment that it did in fact go through one slit or the other.
If you're interested in the details, Feynman has a good explanation in "QED: The strange theory of light and matter" using a mirror rather than a lens but amounting to the same thing.
Its a redefinition game. Notice how vital it is for proponents to describe the path of an (admittedly very fast) bit of light as "at the same time" when it obviously is not.
By analogy, my coworker and I superficially drove home "at the same time" starting and stopping in about the same place, but it would be highly misguided to say we actually were coincident at any given instant, the commute was instantaneous, in some metaphysical sense we are the same we just look different sometimes, or there are not two coworkers but an infinity of coworkers in a multiverse commute. (edited to add, I'm not implying a hidden variable analogy which is obviously not how the real world works, more of a GIGO data analysis leads to weird conclusions analogy)
Light can behave like a wave or a particle. Nothing can directly detect both ways at the same time. Its perfectly acceptable to pipe the output of a gadget that sees "waves" to the input of a tester that sees "particles". Unsurprisingly, light, not having any hidden variables, doesn't know its own history very well and will happily be detected however you'd like to test it.
I think the author aims at the wrong target. The biggest problem with "quantum mystics" is TV grade technobabble and scam artists. Merely taking a fairy tale and saying its not fake anymore because "quantum" was sprinkled on it doesn't make it any less ridiculous. As we all here know, its like saying "security" is merely a checkbox, perhaps an include file setting, not something that has to be baked into the cake from the beginning.
For me, a simple litmus test for a quantum phenomenon is: Can it be turned into a proposal for an experimental determination of Planck's constant? It doesn't have to be a great experiment -- determining h to within an order of magnitude would satisfy.
Seems like the author is falling into his own trap by having a bias for determinacy. For the same reason he states that observing a blurry photograph does not make the thing blurry, observing classical mechanics as deterministic does not make the world deterministic. Yet he has a bias for determinism simply because it is what he sees, comprehends, and is familiar with.
First, he brushes away the many world's interpretation, which I believe has superceeded the CI in popularity now. It addresses pretty much all of the issues he has with CI including collapse, obersvation mysticism. It even addresses Einstein's issues with CI in that God no longer plays dice.
Second, they've experimentally disproven local hidden variable theory in a quantum interaction like entanglement via disproving bells inequality. In other words scientists have already considered there might be hidden particles and properties at play affecting quantum interactions and they have disproven their existence.
If quantum-entangled particles exist (they do) you can use them to coordinate in a way that's impossible within a "hidden variable" model of the universe. You can dig into this by searching for "bell's inequality" or "bell test experiments", there are a few different experiments that have been done many, many times. There's a pretty good Veritasium video that explains one such experiment in non-physicist terms: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZuvK-od647c
The popularized/simplified version is http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will_theorem . It's logically impossible for local hidden variables to produce results consistent with this experiment; either the hidden variable must be nonlocal (able to affect two spatially separated experimenters at exactly the same time), or the experimenters' actions must be determined ahead of time (and it's not a hidden variable so much as a hidden constant).
You can definitely disprove negative statements - any positive statement can be expressed as its negation (and vice versa), so to the extent that you can prove positive statements, you can disprove their negations.
The keyword is "local". Non-local hidden variables is trivial (Bohm's theory) in that we just posit the particles have positions and are guided by the wave function. Hence, particle and wave properties. Simple, clean, clear, mathematically proven to agree with all results, no problem with spin and it leads to insightful derivation of identical particle behavior and even Dirac's equation.
It is a bit embarrassing that the "hidden" part of the theory is particle position seeing that is what we see, after all. The wave is the more hidden part of things, gleaned only via many particle observations of similar states.
Bell's inequality is theory agnostic except for demanding that experiments have results when performed. Thus, the experiments show that either reality is nonlocal or reality is not definite. Many worlds opts for the latter and it can be perfectly well-formulated (think of fuzzy videos overlaid on each other; any particular instance is not discernible, but through evolution you can distinguish which is which). Most presentations of many worlds I have seen is not understandable, but there are versions that are perfectly well-defined and fits the data.
Finally, the issue why people objected to CI is not determinism, but wanting a well-defined theory. Bohm's theory and other interpretations give us that.
Hey there - author here. Somebody emailed me this thread. I'll just make a couple points:
1. Yes, I am biased toward determinism in this case. But that's largely because of the methodology used by proponents of indeterminism (I don't believe their conclusion necessarily follows from their data. In fact, I think it's an entirely unnecessary conclusion). Determinism is my default, unless a more convincing argument prevents itself.
That being said, if indeterminism is true, I'm fine with that - so long as "superposition" doesn't include mutually exclusive states. If the theory can avoid logical contradiction, then it's possible.
2. I'm fine with the MWI. However, I think it's unnecessary and have difficulty getting around Occam's razor in this situation. If the choice is between a) believing a practically-infinite set of real-universes exist (all requiring explanations) or b) remain skeptical for a more compelling theory preserving the simplicity of one universe, I'll take the latter. (Given enough time, the highest levels of abstraction about reality seem to be universally simple, so I'll hold out a bit longer)
3. I also have a difficult time accepting that there's logical proof that hidden variables don't exist. Mathematical proof (satisfying a particular, non-necessary set of mathematical theories) does not sufficiently qualify as logical proof. And, indeed, Bell's theorem has likely already been proven invalid.
Many of the people arguing that quantum physics undermines logic are physicists who understand QM as well as anyone. For example, Lawrence Krauss often suggests that theistic arguments based on classical logic are undermined by QM (which shows that reality isn't "logical").
The idea that QM is deeply weird, counterintuitive, challenging, profound, etc., is one that's relentlessly pumped out by the physics PR machine. In other words, physicists are fine with physicists making wild philosophical speculations about QM; they just don't want anyone else to join the party. Well, it doesn't work like that. Either this stuff has philosophical implications or it doesn't. And if it does, those are fair game for philosophers to comment on. (And sure, some of these philosophers don't always know as much about the physics as they should, but their ignorance in this respect is usually nothing in comparison to modern physicists' ignorance of philosophy.)
Many of the great physicists of the first half of the 20th century did. There was a lot of interchange between logical positivism (the Vienna Circle etc.) and physics.
When a physicist speculates, and someone points out that implies a sign reversal in ohms law, "oh well, I'll try again later". There's an immense collection of constraints based on experimental results that they try to respect.
When a philosopher speculates, and someone points out a problem with the theory, welcome to the wonderful world of sophistry and logical fallacy, would you like your ad hominem attack flame merely well done or extra crispy? Usually with a trendy side dish of political correctness and authoritarianism. Not to mention the typical attitude of "experimental results, who needs em?"
Of course it has philosophical implications. The problem is that philosophers largely don't understand QM well enough to talk about them. To be fair, many physicists don't either.
Could you give a specific example of such a philosopher? Or some kind of justification of the "largely"? How carefully have you examined that body of work?
>How carefully have you examined that body of work?
Don't be ridiculous. Very few professors of philosophy would have even had enough math to read the basic expressions necessary for such understanding. I don't need to survey the literature to be confident that the significant majority of philosophers don't understand quantum mechanics, cannot explain the chemical or electrical mechanisms by which brains work, and don't understand statistics well enough to interpret experimental data.
Those things require a deal of training and experience that a philosophy education is not likely to provide. There are plenty of philosophers out there that do understand any or all of those things, obviously. Did you think I was trying to claim that there are none?
Have you read any bad papers about quantum mechanics by philosophers? You're playing the hard-headed empiricist here, so don't just speculate -- show us the data.
The philosophers who write about physics usually have some training in it besides their philosophy education.
> (And sure, some of these philosophers don't always know as much about the physics as they should, but their ignorance in this respect is usually nothing in comparison to modern physicists' ignorance of philosophy.)
I realize you're just debate-baiting, but this isn't anywhere near a symmetric situation. For the philosopher physics is a bridge to reality, it's a source of invaluable information. I've seen no evidence philosophy has anything to offer the physicist that's of equal importance.
>For the philosopher physics is a bridge to reality,
The claim that physics plays that special role within philosophy is itself a philosophical claim. If you want to justify it you'll have to study some philosophy!
More generally, your attitude is one that's typical of physicists these days, who tend to approach the philosophical literature with a huge superiority complex. That's not an attitude that was shared by the 20th century's greatest physicists.
I appreciate your point about the historical precedent of interdisciplinary respectfulness by great physicists. However, it's worth noting that this respectfulness was far from unanimous. For example, no less an eminence than John Wheeler is on video saying, "Philosophy is too important to be left to the philosophers." [0]
Also, physics _is_ special, and does "play a special role" in all topics pertaining to reality, because it is by definition falsifiable by experiment. Many disciplines (including but obviously not limited to philosophy) lack that falsifiability, and are therefore lower on the epistemological totem pole.
In these sorts of debates, it's sometimes helpful to see if claims become ridiculous when you replace "philosophy" with some known-silly ideology.
>>"The claim that physics plays that special role within scientology is itself a scientological claim. If you want to justify it you'll have to study Dianetics and get audited by Tom Cruise!"
That sounds as ridiculous as it is, because it's broadly circular. And the core logic there doesn't get any better when we switch back to "philosophy."
>and are therefore lower on the epistemological totem pole.
Again, that is a philosophical position (logical positivism, basically) that would have to be justified by philosophical argument. It's actually a position that's very difficult to justify, as we found out in the first half of the 20th century.
>"The claim that physics plays that special role within scientology is itself a scientological claim. If you want to justify it you'll have to study Dianetics and get audited by Tom Cruise!"
Surely if you wanted to show that physics played a special role within scientology, then you would indeed have to study scientology. I feel like you didn't even bother to read through that example after you'd constructed it.
In any case, your weird example does nothing to demonstrate any circularity in my original claim. The point is simply that if you take a philosophical position -- as you have on the epistemological role of physics -- then you have to justify it. I don't know of any way of justifying philosophical positions without making philosophical arguments. If you think that you have one, then let's see it.
> no less an eminence than John Wheeler is on video saying, "Philosophy is too important to be left to the philosophers."
Who should be doing philosophy is a separate question. Wheeler, as you note, agrees that philosophy is very important.
> The claim that physics plays that special role within philosophy is itself a philosophical claim. If you want to justify it you'll have to study some philosophy!
Only if I want to justify it to philosophers, but since I'm more interested in understanding the world I live in I'll just continue in my ignorance.
> More generally, your attitude is one that's typical of physicists these days, who tend to approach the philosophical literature with a huge superiority complex.
That's a bit rich. It is funny how the "other side" always looks a little ridiculous.
> With enough time science washes all of those things away. That's not an attitude that was shared by the 20th century's greatest physicists.
Even if that wasn't an exaggeration, so what? Newton was an alchemist. Maxwell was a Christian. Oppenheimer and Schroedinger studied eastern philosophy. A lot of physicists have liked western philosophy. What I haven't seen is evidence that makes me think wow, studying philosophy really payed off for those guys I should do that too! Instead it looks like another idiosyncracy.
I think your views on philosophy are, for reasons that I don't entirely understand, too strong to be changed. If you're not willing to give the subject a chance, then of course you will never see any value in it. But simply dismissing the subject while knowing nothing about it does reflect a superiority complex of a certain sort. One that modern physicists constantly feel the need to reinforce by pissing all over "lesser" disciplines.
Are you really unaware of how rude philosophers are to pretty much everybody? Just because the insults are often shrouded in intellectualism it doesn't make it any less disrespectful. Science has some jerks, too, but I'd take them over philosophy's jerks any day of the week. And I do call out the science jerks because of how unproductive it is.
Take reddit for example. Look at the ratio of r/badphilosophy subscribers to r/philosophy (8,800/2,300,000 = .0038) vs. the ratio or r/badscience to r/science (5,600/7,500,000 = .00075). A given subscriber to r/philosophy is 20x as likely as their r/science counterpart to dedicate a portion of their time to chastising and bullying their "inferiors."
Worse, 10 of 13 r/philosophy moderators are also mods of r/badphilosophy so the two are intimately connected. Zero of the r/science mods are mods of r/badscience. At least on reddit it's philosophers who are the bullies. Clearly there are problems of selection bias here, but these are also communities measured in the millions. If this isn't representative of the field of philosophy as a whole I don't know what to say because they are representing you to the 15+ million people who visit the site each month.
(edit: really gonna downvote this literally before it's even a minute old? Par for the course I suppose...)
> And sure, some of these philosophers don't always know as much about the physics as they should, but their ignorance in this respect is usually nothing in comparison to modern physicists' ignorance of philosophy.
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> "More generally, your attitude is one that's typical of physicists these days, who tend to approach the philosophical literature with a huge superiority complex. "
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> But simply dismissing the subject while knowing nothing about it does reflect a superiority complex of a certain sort. One that modern physicists constantly feel the need to reinforce by pissing all over "lesser" disciplines.
You asserted physicists in general are intellectual bullies and I took the time to grab a sample of science and philosophy enthusiasts (that measures in the millions) for my retort: that's the pot calling the kettle black.
This is why it's so frustrating to deal with philosophers: you already set a precedent that Krauss' random musings on philosophy are enough to base arguments on but when the tables are turned you want to change the rules. When Krauss is getting in fights with philosophers that isn't his "academic work in physics" and you know it. If anything you're attacking the culture of physics but it seems you're only willing to compare it to the academic output of philosophy. The way I see it, compare culture to culture and academic work to academic work. I recognize that within the culture of physics philosophy gets little respect, I'll even argue as to why that should be the case. But in general I think philosophers are more disrespectful of other fields than physicists.
There's a difference between science and philosophy enthusiasts and scientists and philosophers. People on reddit are rude to each other all the time; that doesn't show anything.
Actually you won't find many philosophers who are disrespectful of physics even outside their academic work. The sneering goes mostly in the other direction (due to the aforementioned superiority complex).
Well, r/science and r/askscience are filled with "real" scientists and in general they're two of the calmest and most respectful communities on the site. You may not want to admit it but that shows a lot. That's the joy of empiricism, winning arguments is no longer what it's all about.
You've mentioned the "superiority complex" four times now? So lets look at it. Physicists show deep respect for many fields: chemistry, mathematics, computer science, earth science, materials science, biology, astronomy, engineering, etc. Even Feynman who was famously irreverent joked about how much top level physicists have to ingratiate themselves to mathematicians. I think your feelings are hurt because philosophy isn't in this group.
> Actually you won't find many philosophers who are disrespectful of physics even outside their academic work.
Oh, you want to restrict the conversation to academics insulting academic work? That's strange but OK. Scientists absolutely should be dismissive of the Philosophy of Science because when the field gets something right it tends to be 10-100 years behind and, probably because of the egos of the philosophers writing the books, it misdefines science to exaggerate the importance of philosophy. People who learn what science is from the Philosophy of Science get a picture in their head of a caricature of science and they become not just wrong, but aggressively and arrogantly wrong about what science is. Of course the scientific community pushes back, why should philosophy be allowed to teach people wrong ideas just to beef up their own self-importance?
> I think your feelings are hurt because philosophy isn't in this group.
Not really. I'm not a philosopher. Nor do I particularly need or desire the respect of physicists.
Now, if you're going to criticize work within the philosophy of science, it's impossible for me to respond unless you point to something specific. Instead of doing that you've just, again, dismissed an entire field which you know very little about. See what I mean about that superiority complex? Perhaps you can point me to an example of a philosopher of science who (a) dismisses all of physics and (b) has never studied any physics.
As far as who is "100 years behind", I'd say it's the other way round. Most modern scientists routinely characterize the scientific method using philosophical ideas from the first half of the 20th century.
> Now, if you're going to criticize work within the philosophy of science, it's impossible for me to respond unless you point to something specific.
I did. The quality of the students the philosophy of science produces.
> Perhaps you can point me to an example of a philosopher of science who (a) dismisses all of physics and (b) has never studied any physics.
I'm not sure why you're making this request. I've never claimed there's even one philosopher of science who has "dismissed all of physics" nor have I claimed there's one who has never studied any physics.
> Most modern scientists routinely characterize the scientific method using philosophical ideas from the first half of the 20th century.
You do realize that nobody really talks or cares about the scientific method, right? It's something that kids are taught in junior high, it's there mostly to give the scientifically illiterate a ballpark idea of what's going on. Yes, people generally make fools of themselves when they talk about it because they're philosophizing. It's usually only philosophers who think a precise definition of it is at all important.
This brings us back to philosophers defining science in a way that the field of philosophy is important to it, but if a scientific idea depends upon a strict definition of "the scientific method" (or any other philosophical idea) it's probably a shitty scientific idea and it's probably wrong.
>I did. The quality of the students the philosophy of science produces.
I mean a specific reference to work in the philosophy of science. As far as I can tell you haven't read any, which is why I'm kind of baffled that you object to it so much.
>I'm not sure why you're making this request.
Because you are doing (a) and (b) with regard to the philosophy of science. I'm pointing out that you are being far more arrogant and dismissive with regard to the philosophy of science than any philosopher of science would be with regard to physics.
>You do realize that nobody really talks or cares about the scientific method, right?
That is largely the case within the philosophy of science, yes, since the demarcation problem is generally thought to be insoluble these days. But of course, given that science usually claims to have a special epistemological status, there is a genuine question as where this comes from. Working scientists' ideas about this tend to be very naive, and drawn largely from the philosophy of science of the first half of the 20th century.
The author initially sets up this piece to be a criticism of quantum mysticism. However, as the post goes on, it seems to become a dismissal of quantum mechanics all together -- based on an obvious bias for determinacy.
You don't need QM for paradoxes... they come up in all kinds of classical systems with feedback loops. You also don't need QM to do a number on determinism. Look up the work of Ilya Prigogine.
Undoubtedly.
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