Be real for a second: if a government targets you, you have no way of escaping it. If you're targeted by a small country, with not much power, so your only real options are kidnapping you if you are ever in said country. So, moving away does keep you safe. Should be, say, a Chilean journalist reporting on wrong deeds in your own country, you can safely assume that ProtonMail is safe for you. (That is, unless the government knows who you are).
But a first world country ? They have laws, they have international influence, they have technical means and the ability to intervene wherever you are.
"Basically, you’re either dealing with Mossad or not-Mossad. If your adversary is not-Mossad, then you’ll probably be fine if you pick a good password and don’t respond to emails from ChEaPestPAiNPi11s@virus-basket.biz.ru. If your adversary is the Mossad, YOU’RE GONNA DIE AND THERE’S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. The Mossad is not intimidated by the fact that you employ https://. If the Mossad wants your data, they’re going to use a drone to replace your cellphone with a piece of uranium that’s shaped like a cellphone, and when you die of tumors filled with tumors, they’re going to hold a press conference and say “It wasn’t us” as they wear t-shirts that say “IT WAS DEFINITELY US,” and then they’re going to buy all of your stuff at your estate sale so that they can directly look at the photos of your vacation instead of reading your insipid emails about them. In summary, https:// and two dollars will get you a bus ticket to nowhere. Also, SANTA CLAUS ISN’T REAL. When it rains, it pours." - https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/08/mickens_on_se...
This applies to ProtonMail too. What do you think happened with Lavabit ? They were pretending full security too, and we all know what happened.
Stop thinking this is a problem technology can fix.
Basically, you’re either dealing with Mossad or not-Mossad. If your adversary is not-Mossad, then you’ll probably be fine if you pick a good password and don’t respond to emails from ChEaPestPAiNPi11s@ virus-basket.biz.ru. If your adversary is the Mossad, YOU’RE GONNA DIE AND THERE’S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. The Mossad is not intimidated by the fact that you employ https://. If the Mossad wants your data, they’re going to use a drone to replace your cellphone with a piece of uranium that’s shaped like a cellphone, and when you die of tumors filled with tumors, they’re going to hold a press conference and say “It wasn’t us” as they wear t-shirts that say “IT WAS DEFINITELY US,” and then they’re going to buy all of your stuff
at your estate sale so that they can directly look at the photos of your vacation instead of reading your insipid emails about them. In summary, https:// and two dollars will get you a bus ticket to nowhere. Also, SANTA CLAUS ISN’T REAL. When it rains, it pours.
While I do agree with you generally, I'm not sure there is much you can do if a governmental body wants you for some reason. I always find Mickens to have the best explanation here:
Threat: The Mossad doing Mossad things with your email account
Solution: Magical amulets? Fake your own death, move into a submarine? YOU’RE STILL GONNA BE MOSSAD’ED UPON
Yeah. If you've come to the attention of the wrong sort of "the cops", you're fucked.
"Basically, you’re either dealing with Mossad or not-Mossad. If your adversary is not-Mossad, then you’ll probably be fine if you pick a good password and don’t respond to emails from ChEaPestPAiNPi11s@ virus-basket.biz.ru. If your adversary is the Mossad, YOU’RE GONNA DIE AND THERE’S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT." -- https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf
There's a lot of humour in that article, but some cold hard truth as well.
It's Michens' MOSSAD/not-MOSSAD question[1]. Any half-decent encryption will protect you from bulk collection and monitoring, but if you're targeted, you lose.
You generally don’t. It all depends on your attack hypothesis. Are you a Mossad target or a non-Mossad target? The best you can do if you are a non-Mossad target is to anonymously/pseudonymously periodically purchase new hardware and do a fresh OS install. Be minimalistic. If you can’t trust your wifi-enabled printer, disable its wifi connectivity and use it only over USB. If you still can’t trust it, don’t use printers to begin with.
> In the real world, threat models are much simpler (see Figure 1). Basically, you’re either dealing with Mossad or not-Mossad. If your adversary is not-Mossad, then you’ll probably be fine if you pick a good password and don’t respond to emails from ChEaPestPAiNPi11s@virus-basket.biz.ru. If your adversary is the Mossad, YOU’RE GONNA DIE AND THERE’S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. The Mossad is not intimidated by the fact that you employ https://. If the Mossad wants your data, they’re going to use a drone to replace your cellphone with a piece of uranium that’s shaped like a cellphone, and when you die of tumors filled with tumors, they’re going to hold a press conference and say “It wasn’t us” as they wear t-shirts that say “IT WAS DEFINITELY US"
> Threat:
Organized criminals breaking into your email account and sending spam using your identity
Solution:
Strong passwords + common sense (don’t click on unsolicited herbal Viagra ads that result in keyloggers and sorrow)
> Threat: The Mossad doing Mossad things with your email account
I think my favourite Usenix paper is appropriate here:
"Basically, you’re either dealing with Mossad or not-Mossad. If your adversary is not-Mossad, then you’ll probably be fine if you pick a good password and don’t respond to emails from ChEaPestPAiNPi11s@virus-basket.biz.ru. If your adversary is the Mossad, YOU’RE GONNA DIE AND THERE’S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT." -- https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf
Good passwords and biometrics help if your adversary is not-Mossad.
Anybody who thinks biometrics or encryption or anything short of "Magical amulets? Fake your own death, move into a submarine?" is going to protect them again a nation state level adversary is kidding themselves.
There are no shades of grey here - state actors have access to every internet node, fibre optic cables, operating systems and hardware.
So unless you take your time to build your own CPU, main board and modem and only use our own private direct fibre connection, you're a potential target for being spied on.
It's as simple as that. You can make things harder by encrypting your traffic, but that's possible regardless of were your Tor relay is located at. And even then some crypto algos are known to have been deliberately weakened by intelligence agencies so you best be a crypto expert as well if you're really that paranoid.
The irony is that most (not all!) people who are ever so concerned about these things still use their smartphones (even though EVERY GSM/UMTS/4G protocol has been hacked at this point and is thus insecure), use cloud computing (either directly or indirectly via 3rd party services like Uber) and post on social networks.
The only computer that is safe from attacks is not connected to any network and only ever used in a windowless room surrounded by reinforced concrete walls.
The only information that is truly private is information you don't share in the first place.
If you think all that data is going to be used for is ads, you're probably mistaken.
All that data is stored. They know all your contacts, how you write, what your interests are, where you go every day. What if suddenly the country your in makes it illegal to do X, or feel Z. They decide to arrest everyone who meets the criteria, and there's nothing you can do.
Although, you are correct now, it is ads. But the risk is SO great I really don't understand not taking precautions
My personal perspective is that if a Three Letter Agency becomes specifically “interested” in me, I’m fucked. No matter what I do. Even if I fake my own death and live in a submarine...
What I can do, however, is take measures to protect myself against less powerful or sophisticated attackers.
Where I come from, “communications metadata” is required to be kept by all telcos and isps. This metadata is them “available to law enforcement” - which is not just investigations into child abuse and drug running, as the proponents of the laws made out when advocating for them, but includes agencies such as the Taxi commission, various local councils, and state fisheries departments.
Using (trusted) vpns and e2e encrypted messaging will reduce the chance of a local council or a fisheries inspector being able to get as much information from my metadata as they might from non VPN and secure messaging using people.
(Of course, it might backfire and just paint a big target on my back... One potential privacy advantage of COVID and widespread wfh is that many many more people are using VPN tunnels for ordinary and mundane purposes. Adding extra hay to the haystack my needle is trying to hide in is a good thing. So long as it’s not Mossad looking for my specific needle...)
The advice I've heard is that if you're concerned about being compelled to release passwords or encyption keys you should cross borders with no personal/work data on your devices. This avoids any 'half-truths' that could still get you into trouble. Once you have safely crosed, download what you need from during your trip from your server (and consider using it as a VPN for all your internet browsing).
If the authorities take your device out of your sight, and you're sufficiently paranoid, then discard it and buy fresh hardware.
PGP and Luks could get you tortured.
Leave this hellhole or do nothing "incriminating".
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