Community service, ten days in jail, and losing his law license. For wilfully sending an innocent man to jail for twenty five years - having resigned anyway. That's a fucking joke.
"What's newsworthy and novel about today's plea is that a prosecutor was actually punished in a meaningful way for his transgressions."
I'm sure we'd all like to be so 'meaningfully' punished for serious crimes. It's better than nothing - which seems to be the usual state of affairs - but it's clearly one law for the rich and one law for the poor.
> Community service, ten days in jail, and losing his law license.
500 hours of community service. In the US what does that mean, 3 months of picking litter by the road in an orange jumpsuit? Or does it mean that he can work for the prosecutors office for free for that time (obviously, he has a lot of experience there)
He also lost his law licence. What does that mean, how old was the guy? I don't know how it works in the US but if it effectively means forced retirement then he will be on a reduced pension, and moreover can't go for any cushy positions normally available for a retired prosecutor.
This also showed that judges ought to be asking this question of prosecutors.. I wonder if the defence can ask this question in the court and ask for similar sanctions if it were proved later that the prosecutor knew something they didn't disclose.
I wonder what has he been doing in the two years since this article was written?
I'm not an expert on the UK legal system but one thing I enjoyed about the Serial podcast was getting an insight into just how crazy the US system can be.
Anyway 10 days is obviously nothing, especially when he's cost a man 25 years, but at least it's an attempt to hold someone responsible for a despicable act.
If you found that interesting, there's an excellent episode of This American Life called "The Arms Trader" which is another example of how messed up the law can be over the pond. The FBI (or another TLA agency) basically played both buyer and seller in a bogus arms deal, and managed to stitch up a bumbling old man for facilitating the transaction. It's almost comical how much handholding they needed to do with this guy to coax him into this situation, until you realise they then came down on him like a ton of bricks.
Ta will definitely give it a look, one nice thing about Serial is it put me onto This American Life which I'm enjoying (in parts, some of it puts my teeth on edge).
The depressing bit about the system is even when it's clear there's been a potential miscarriage of justice, and some poor sod has spent years behind bars on very shaky grounds, the system still tries its best to keep them there without retrial.
People should also definitely check out "The Convert." The FBI sent some guy into a mosque to act like a Muslim radical and to try to get members of the mosque to plant a terrorist attack. He befriended some guys and hung out with them, and then tried to get them in trouble by telling them they should plan a terrorist attack. The guys from the mosque promptly called the FBI to turn over the FBI plant (not knowing he was an FBI plant). The FBI responded by pressing charges against one of the guys from the mosque because of some youtube videos he shared.
American justice is bizarre. It seems so dependent on the prosecutor doing the "right thing" it makes you wonder why they bother with a defense team, judge or jury at all. Just let the prosecutor decide who's guilty!
Statistically the rich don't do any better than anyone who can afford a lawyer. The people who get screwed are the ones relying on court-appointed counsel. They do significantly worse.
Most people who own a house or have savings or have family can scrape together enough money to engage a lawyer. How much that actually costs depends on the charge.
So many cases are pled out these days (98% at the federal level), I doubt more than a tiny percentage of defendants are spending anything like $100k.
Guessing this is conditional on getting brought to trial right? A prosecutor is going to bring a murder charge no matter who the suspect is, but that Senator's son's DUI? Or that four star general sharing classified information with his mistress? Might get pled for chump change or charges mgbt get dropped.
It's possible that white collar crime is just hard to prosecute in general, but poor people have less opportunity to commit white collar crime. So what we really need to do is make white collar crime more accessible. /s?
In this case, the prosecutor was clearly wrong. But what is the flip side of this? If the client admits to the defense that he's guilty, are they bound to defend him, knowing that they're already in the wrong?
Interesting point - although it's not really symmetrical. For example, Blackstone's formulation - "It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer".
In addition, prosecutors are presumably held to a higher standard than defense lawyers, since they are state employees and are bound to act in the public interest.
Who is the defense attorney to judge the client guilty or innocent? Maybe the client's insane, maybe the damning evidence the attorney's seen is compelling but incomplete or misleading.
We defer to the process for a reason. And human nature being what it is, that process is built on a presumption of innocence.
I'm curious if there is a startup opportunity here to bring defense law to the masses. There is legal zoom for paperwork type issues, but could better knowledge of the law in the hands of a common man be a way to go?
There have been various attempts to apply software to law, none of which were very convincing.
The biggest impact has been on legal discovery. Often the evidence one side or another needs is buried in massive quantities of documents, e.g. corporate memos. It used to involve people manually going through every document. Now computers can build a search engine just for that case, based on the documents either being originally electronic, or scanned. So it's easier to find the evidence you need to either prosecute or exonerate.
There have been attempts at legal 'expert systems'. Expert systems were an offshoot of early AI where people were put through computerised interviews that tried to automate otherwise skilled investigative procedures. I have not heard of legal expert systems being in use anywhere, but I am not in the legal industry so if they were, I wouldn't know about them. I suspect they're easier to apply to things like routine property law than complex criminal cases.
There's also the Hammurabi project. That is very interesting, though again, not relevant here. It tries to encode law in a custom programming language to automatically build expert systems based on it. It's more useful for things like navigating the absurdly complicated US tax code than criminal defence (of course the two may sometimes overlap).
It's the first time it's ever happened. While it may not be justice to the man who served 25 years for a crime he didn't commit, it is a step forward and will serve as a ruling for future trials with similar circumstance.
I agree that 10 days is very short for what he did. But the other part of your comment, "He should serve at least 25 years too", does not sound right to me either.
I think that the primary goal of court scentences should not be revenge, but "justice". Whatever that means. The possibility of punishment should be there to deter people from committing crimes. And they should be there so that after a crime, society can say: "See, we are serious about this. We do not want people to do those things".
So, the "revenge" thinking (with the extreme of "Take one life, and we'll kill you") does not seem right to me. Also, AFAIK, it was not designed into our juridical system - Which was designed to get past the "eye for an eye" system that was there before.
I also think that the primary goal of our prisons should be to re-integrate people into society, not punish them, but this is a completely different topic...
Edit: Clarified "The possibility of punishment should be there to deter"
And I think many studies have shown that it's the probability of getting caught that dissuades from a crime, much more than the severity of the punishment.
How many prosecutors would hide evidence if they had even a 10% chance of getting caught, going to jail for 10 days and loose their career, like it happened in this case? That's what's important in my opinion.
Another aspect that I haven't seen much discussion of, is: punishment is there partly to stop other people from exacting it.
Situation one: A kills B, B's brother kills A, A's brother kills B's brother... and eventually A's family and friends and B's family and friends are just killing other all the time.
Situation two: A kills B, the state kills A. Done. B's family has nobody left to kill, and A's family isn't likely to try to fight the state.
This suggests that the state can't make punishments too lenient, or people will take matters into their own hands again. It's not stable.
Yes, in exchange for giving the state a monopoly on violence, people need reassuring that the state is going to dispense an appropriate amount of it when required.
How about holding the prosecutor responsible for the 1988 murder by Mark Norwood[0]. Norwood's DNA was found at the scene. Maybe some more investigation in the Morton case(opposed to sitting on evidence) would have put Norwood in jail before he committed the 1988 crime.
But certainly, if Michael Morton was never wrongfully convicted, that DNA would have been matched to the Morton murder and this would have been solved decades ago.
> I agree that 10 days is very short for what he did. But the other part of your comment, "He should serve at least 25 years too", does not sound right to me either.
That prosecutor murdered 25 years of a man's life.
If murder deserves life in prison, then murdering 25 years of a man's life deserves 25 years of prison.
He should be required to assist the innocent man to get back on his feet, find him a job, house him and set him up for success for what life he has left. If the innocent was close to enough to retirement that he wouldn't be able to retire, he should be required to pay into a pension plan that would have seen the man comfortably through retirement and restore everything that this man would have had the opportunity to provide for himself had he been free. Only then would 10 days and 500 hours of community service seem to be even marginally in the ball park of justice.
If that were the law of the land, then a lot of prosecutors would quit and go into private practice.
That said, I'm not saying that this behaviour should not go unpunished, an attorney should be disbarred for this type of behaviour, and serve jail time for a felony (i.e. 1-5 years in State prison) . I think the State and the taxpayers should be made to pay the tab like a previous poster said because in my opinion, they are just as guilty as the prosecutor for setting up the environment in which this was allowed to happen.
> If that were the law of the land, then a lot of prosecutors would quit and go into private practice.
That's an interesting situation. If a lot of prosecutors quit, then there's less bandwidth to prosecute, resulting in less demand for (I presume) defense lawyers.
No, it's just that attorneys won't take such a risk if the penalties are too harsh. Also, the State and the electorate are just as complicit as the prosecutors what it comes to sending innocent people to prison, and they should be punished as well (Having to pay for restoring the person's life in the free world after 10's of years in prison.)
Americans are bloodthirsty: lock 'em up and throw away the key. When the elected district attorneys have pictures of handcuffs and leg irons on their election posters, what does that tell you? (Said election poster seen in Fresno County, California).
It should be a matter of formality that they do pursue every item of required compensation from the lawyer/judge. If it became more of a fear to withhold or manipulate the evidence or the charges/plea to prevent prosecutors gaming the system (which is exactly what this is), then prosecutors would be reasonably held to higher moral standards - for fear of not only losing their jobs/licence, but also having done to them what they're unfairly threatening those that are being charged.
I think it's very worthwhile to let those who corrupt the justice system experience in person just what they're doing to other people. 10 days is meaningless.
I totally agree that the primary goal of prison should be to re-integrate people into society, but one of the prerequisites for that is that the prisoner understands that what they did was wrong and why it's wrong.
As I understand, Americans vote for their local prosecutors or at least judges (this guy ended up as a judge). So keep in mind that the blame ultimately lies with the people of that locality who let such things happen even when they're discovered.
He also lost his license to practice law and this case now serves as a sentencing precedent for such crimes committed in the future. Anderson, being in his 60's, probably wouldn't be practicing for too much longer anyway. The next important step is to get judges to issue standing 'ethical rule orders' as mentioned in the article. That way other malicious prosecutors can be help accountable and removed from practicing much earlier.
Also, I'd be shocked if this didn't open Anderson up to civil liability. That's where Morton can seek damages; not in criminal court.
> Also, I'd be shocked if this didn't open Anderson up to civil liability. That's where Morton can seek damages; not in criminal court.
Interesting Anderson took a large part of Morton's life. Maybe justice would be served if Morton took a large part of Anderson's money... Something feels uncomfortable about this but I can't quite place it.
Perhaps because it sounds like blood money. Which has the unfortunate affect of being useful for those with wealth to avoid punishment, but useless for those without, who will still end up in prison.
I don't know the answer to that. Perhaps some more research is in order, I imagine that countries and societies that have this actually codified may already have implemented something like this.
Not the same thing but somewhat related. Some European countries have fines for e.g. traffic offences that are proportional to you income for the year the offence is committed in. I think that this works quite well in terms of meaning that rich and poor have the same disincentive not to speed.
If you want me to cite the other rulings, that's fine.
Here's another for you: In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976), the Court held that prosecutors performing core prosecutorial functions are entitled to absolute immunity.
In this case, it was a core advocative function that was performed. It does not matter if they do it in bad faith, illegally, whatever. They will be given absolute immunity.
The only cases you will find otherwise will be around non-core functions, or about the specific act of things like "being bribed around filing criminal charges", and not things part of the core function.
You don't have to take my word for it, of course. Look at the decisions of literally every circuit.
Or any of the myriad of law review papers detailing the history, etc.
And this emotional reaction is the root of the problem. When that original crime happened, the public demanded someone jailed, it didn't matter that it wasn't the criminal. Society is hung up on the retribution, so long as that's the case, prosecutors don't need criminals, just patsies that can't properly defend themselves or exhibit social flaws.
Losing your license and job are (should be) standard for malpractice. I think you can cancel that bit out. I'm talking about the bit where he knowingly sent innocent people to jail and abused his position.
I was contemplating about this in the context of many similar posts on HN (Aaron Swartz [1] being a prime one). And I realized the power that lawyers/prosecutors wield over accused is enormous. To win a case they can design outrageous plea bargains - plead guilty and get 5 years, don't plead and face death if convicted. Even if lawyers representing accused try to educate him that the chances of conviction are less than 1% the fear of facing death penalty is so enormous that accused typically end up pleading guilty. And not without a reason. Loss aversion plays a big role when a human arrives at a decision. And just like that the prosecutor who initially had a very little chance of winning the case ends up winning it.
I know that I'm sort of oversimplifying here but the key take away here is that prosecutor has absolutely nothing to lose! Well OK, he could end up losing the case but that's nothing compared to what accused stand to lose. There needs to be a counterbalance to the power wielded by prosecutors, and this is a good start!
Just FYI, in the 25 years and hundreds of cases my father saw in criminal court, only one was _not_ convicted: If you end up in front of a criminal judge (at least in California) you are essentially guaranteed of being convinced.
There was one death penalty case he saw in that time and while conviction was, as always a certainty, a separate hearing decides "special circumstances" (execution) or just life in prison. To "help the judge make the right decision" the court room was packed to overflowing with a silent audience who obviously universally wanted the death penalty. So two defendants were sentenced to death for a single murder that day.
By the way, the single case that did not end in conviction was of a black preacher accused of child molestation who had an all black jury.
And I'll bet most people reading this, trained by tv media's spectacular "everyone is guilty", are instantly and irreversibly convinced he actually was guilty just based on that one above sentence.
But if you don't believe me (as you obviously do not) please do take 5 minutes to call a random criminal defense attorney in LA and ask the conviction rate once the defendant enters a not guilty plea.
Last time I sat on a jury, before the evidence was all presented and before the judge even read the law (happens after all the evidence is presented, where the judge reads what the law actually is and explains things like how sure you need to be to find in favor of one party or the other), I heard jurors mention they already had their mind made up.
They literally didn't even know what the crime actually was and were already ready to convict.
It made me realize I never want to go before a jury if I'm innocent (not sure if a judge is better or not, haven't experience on that end).
I'll do you one better. I was a former criminal defense attorney in LA and the conviction rate once a defendant entered a not guilty plea was roughly 60% (and took it to trial) at the time I practiced criminal defense.
Most people actually are guilty of the crimes they are charged with, and simply want to do their time and move on. A few are innocent, and most of them successfully defeat the charges against them, though it's not a popular topic online because it shatters the prevailing narrative. A very small portion of defendants that are innocent get convicted, usually because of their lawyer's incompetence and not because of overwhelming prosecutorial misconduct. The innocent defendants who plead guilty have themselves to blame--either they hired bad counsel, or they made the choice to plead despite the advice of counsel.
This is not to say that prosecutorial misconduct does not occur -- it happens quite frequently. But it's not something that most prosecutors engage in and it's very rarely something that affects the outcome of a case.
It could indicate that judges are overeager to convict, or it could indicate that prosecutors are unwilling to try someone they aren't really damn sure of. Or a combination of the two, or probably a bunch of other reasons.
Note that blind belief in the latter causes the former to happen: almost everyone in the courtroom including the jury (most criminal trials are jury trials) assumes the defendant is guilty otherwise he wouldn't be in court. The notion of assumed innocent until proven guilty does not actually exist in practice.
Additionally, many prosecutors, police and people in the criminal justice system believe that, even if the defendant is ambiguously guilty of the crime they are on trail for currently, they are certainly guilty of other crimes they are not currently on trial for. Thus shading information to get a conviction in an ambiguous case is sometimes viewed as a public service. Interestingly this part of problem is not the result of malice or even ambitious DAs.
Are all US (criminal) court cases jury cases? Must be noted that this is only true for the US and other common law states, a lot of countries do not have or have only very limited notions of juries.
In the US, if either the prosecution or defendant want a jury then there is a jury trial. In practice this means almost all criminal trials are jury trials. As an added note, juries are perceived to be dull witted and easily deceived compared to a judge with years of experience. On the other hand, many judges are elected so they may worry about how their decisions will look to the public, the public generally hates judges who do not convict (because tv tells them everyone is guilty). Other judges can be political appointees with strong opinions.
So each party in a case decides whether or not to have a jury based on these points.
To a limited extent, attorneys can ask to change judges. Judges are embarrassed when they are "papered" this way so this provides pressure not too be absurdly biased.
And finally, there are a few differences in laws and huge differences in both judges and jury around the US both in opinions and education level. Dare I say this is why patent cases all end up in East Texas.
On the other hand, many judges are elected so they may worry about how their decisions will look to the public, the public generally hates judges who do not convict (because tv tells them everyone is guilty).
I noticed this about 20 years ago. Campaign ads for judges usually focused on how "tough on crime" they were as opposed to how "fair and trustworthy" they were.
I lost what little respect I had for the legal system when I watched a prosecutor argue that two convicted men should remain in prison and one should remain on death row despite newly discovered exculpatory DNA evidence and new evidence of police and jury misconduct because "The system" needed finality.
>Plea bargaining in the United States is very common; the vast majority of criminal cases in the United States are settled by plea bargain rather than by a jury trial.[1][2] They have also been increasing in frequency—they rose from 84% of federal cases in 1984 to 94% by 2001.[3]
Also note judges don't have to accept plea bargains.
Judges set the jury instructions, which define how the jury should interpret the evidence presented at trial. Much like "push" polls and leading questions, the instructions can be written in a way that all but guarantees a finding of innocence or guilt.
This is assuming your case goes to trial. I'd assume 99% cases don't ever reach that stage. Plea bargains are also marketed as a way to save resources and keep the justice system from getting backed up. Most people take a plea bargain if their charges aren't dropped.
If it came to that, a trial by judge versus a trial by jury might have a better outcome than relying on a group of laymen who just want to go home to decide your fate.
I'm looking at page 47 (72 in the pdf). ~13% of felonies that make it to court result in acquittal, dismissal or transfer.
There are a lot of caveats, including but not limited to: this is only felony cases (there are about 4x as many misdemeanours as felonies, but I can't immediately see statistics for them); I don't know what transfer means.
But even with those caveats, my current guess is that your father didn't see a representative sample.
That's interesting. Yes my information is, in the end, anecdotal. It's good to get a concrete numbers (but note that transfer is not acquittal). Thanks for the adjustment.
I believe transfer means that the case goes to another court, so depending on the percentage of cases transferred the actual conviction rate could still be quite high.
Caveat: this study is for federal courts (which tend to see more serious crimes) but the data on acquittal rates is nowhere near what you are suggesting.
55% conviction rates when tried in front of a judge, 84% conviction rates when tried in front of a jury.
Acquittal rates will also tend fall as the gravity of the charges/court falls--but a lot of that is explained by the prosecution being far more ready to drop charges (or choose not to charge at all) in close cases when the crime is seen as less serious. A marginal murder case, for example, might be pursued even though a just as marginal shoplifting case would not be.
Sure, but again "conviction rate" is too coarse of a metric to make any meaningful conclusions about guilt/innocence or why the rate is so high.
Japan, for example, has a 99% conviction rate but Ramseyer attributes much of that to the fact that prosecution offices are so understaffed and under-resourced there that they can manage to bring only the strongest of cases.[1] So you're much better off in a place like that because if you have a marginal case you won't even have to go to trial to be acquitted--the charges will be dropped beforehand.
Very true. It alone tells us nothing except that, not knowing the cause of this conviction rate, you must accept any plea bargain whatever it is.
To get a better understanding we would have to ask whether persons convicted under even the most careful trials (death penalty cases) are later exonerated eg https://www.aclu.org/dna-testing-and-death-penalty
We might also ask whether jurors enter the courtroom convinced the defendant is guilty before the trial even starts. Even here it might a coincidence: the defendants are always guilty anyway so the prejudice of the juries is irrelevant. Or we have to convince ourselves that prejudiced jurors always become open minded somewhere between voir dire and jury instruction. I suggest the later is not too believable and the former outright disturbing.
We would have to explain why federal courts have significantly lower conviction rates than lower courts by saying something like lower court prosecutors prepare their cases better or federal judges are significantly more lenient. Intuitively neither explanation seems very satisfying.
Finally we'd have to explain how charges that a DA is willing to drop during a plea bargain are then proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial and explain how such a system, however money saving, has anything to do with justice.
Ideally, given that the number of innocent people jailed is not zero, we'd determine objectively and openly what the number is and whether we are satisfied with that rate.
1. It doesn't tell you at all that you "must" accept a plea bargain. It very well may tell you that you should bluff and proceed to trial so the prosecutor will drop your case in order to preserve his conviction rate.
2. Again, the metric is too coarse. It's not a random representative sampling of all accused criminals who make it through a full trial - the prosecution is like a football team that has the power to call off the match at any point up until the last minute if it looks like they might lose. We shouldn't be surprised that they tend to win when they choose not to do so.
3. This is well-studied and very intuitive: the more serious (and newsworthy) the charges, the more personal and political pressure to pursue a case, even a marginal one. You don't consider this possibility when speculating why federal courts have lower conviction rates.
4. A bargain requires both sides to give something up - if the prosecutor would only let you plea to the charge/punishment he thinks you'd get at trial no ones would ever plead out!
1. DA's do not drop cases after the defendant refuses a plea bargain, it is so rare as to be effectively nonexistent. Not only that, defense attorneys almost always advise their clients to take the plea bargain because they too know the chances at trial are effectively nil (and because public defenders have far smaller budgets than prosecutors). So to reject a plea bargain the defendant will also almost always be going against the advice of counsel.
And even if there was no possibly of conviction at trial, then how is it just to try to jail the accused anyway with a bluff and threat? Presumably the DA alone has decided the defendant is guilty but believes the trial system is broken so has taken it on himself to try to incarcerate the accused.
Yet all other western nations have far greater restrictions on plea bargains, the UK disallows plea bargains all together. Yet their societies have not collapsed nor become overrun with violent crime.
2. The DNA testing of death row inmates is indeed biased but not in direction you imagine. Many states simply do not allow DNA tests of convicted persons solely because it would reopen too many cases. Likewise is is also necessarily limited to those for which DNA evidence exists.
But even if the aclu testing were 100% biased toward exoneration and even if every single innocent person has now been exonerated by it, both of which are impossibly unlikely, it still means at least 17 innocent people were on death row. Even at that rate there is a far higher percentage of innocent people on death row than citizens murdered in the street. By orders of magnitude.
Even if it were just 17, it means there were more innocent Americans on death row than have died in terrorist attacks this entire decade. If we know there are terrorists in the world then we should at least be aware there is something wrong with parts of the trail system.
4.>if the prosecutor would only let you plea to the charge/punishment he thinks you'd get at trial no ones would ever plead out!
This is why it is done not why it is a good thing to do. We would never justify torture on the grounds it gets more defendants to plead out. So the question is, where is the line of too much coercion and is it currently crossed. I'd suggest where one draws that line is influenced buy whether you're already convinced every accused person is guilty and all the expense of trials is really just a waste of money.
I think we also need to put this in historical context.
I remember a few years ago an Australia jailed for drugs in Indonesia explaining that she pleaded guilty while maintaining innocence in Australian media because "this is how it works here." IE, the system expects you to admit guilt and apologize, else face a much worse outcome. I thought "That's how it works everywhere."
This is not just across countries, it's across time. Confession has almost always been a part of the legal process. It's been necessary for mercy (plea bargain) and it's been extracted through torture, manipulation and any other means possible. Nearly every witch during the English witch hunts pleaded guilty and grassed on other witches.
I suspect that the same thing was going in the squares of Jericho 400 generations ago.
The concept of a trial where the accused defends, prosecutors accuse and the juries or judges decide is an idealization and/or a back-up plan. Even if we wanted to do this in all cases, we couldn't afford to. Modern judicial processes are too expenses to be used in all but a minority of cases.
I don't think we can fix this wholesale at this point.
> I don't think we can fix this wholesale at this point
Fix: Put me on the jury. E.g., the OP
mentions that at the start of a trial,
the judge can issue an "ethical rule order"
which says that the prosecutor and police
must provide to the defense all
evidence that might help the accused.
No ethical rule order? With me on the
jury, tough to get a conviction.
Prosecutor offered the accused a
plea bargain but now wants to
convict of a much more serious
crime? Nope: On the jury, I won't
convict of anything more serious
than the plea bargain offer.
Prosecutor presents evidence from the
police lab? I will have to work really
hard not to LOL.
Prosecutor presents DNA evidence? Just
shake my head and know that the chances
of that evidence being correct are
zip, zilch, and zero.
Prosecutor talks about probabilities?
Accused goes free. Even if 20 million
people have jaywalked, even if
from a simple random sample 99 44/100% of
people have jaywalked, that still is
zip, zilch, and zero evidence that the
accused jaywalked.
Police give testimony? Ha! In practice
the police are perfectly free to lie
under oath without any risk of being accused
of perjury. Ignore all testimony of police.
E.g., police found drugs in the accused
car? Might have been planted by the
police. Maybe the situation is just that
the accused had some cash and the
police just wanted to steal it. Can't
trust the police.
Accused is poor? Police love to go
after poor people, guilty or not.
Not everywhere, and only recently. Brady violations are unfortunately still too common. Probably because the only punishment for it (before Ken Anderson) is that the DA might have a conviction overturned, later, if caught.
That's basically why we have juries.
I'm basically just saying that I would
perform the role of a juror, maybe
even a relatively skeptical juror.
I know very well that the
police, prosecutor,
and judges like
to get convictions. Well,
instead,
as a citizen and juror,
I like to get justice.
E.g., if the system is
unjust, I may be its next victim.
I don't like to see injustices.
I know well that the police,
prosecutor, and judge are pursuing
their careers and are getting paid
to do that. In particular, they
are getting paid, getting publicity,
promotions, progress in politics, etc.
from getting convictions that indicate
that they are solving crimes.
And I know that they get paid the
same whether the defendant is
really guilty or innocent with
essentially never any negative consequences
for convicting an innocent person.
And I know enough about human
nature in a system to know
that such people will sleep just
fine convicting an innocent person
because they can blame that on
the system. Where such people
can get into trouble is with
an acquital, again, the same
whether the defendant was guilty
or innocent. So, net, those people
want to convict and are ready,
willing, able, and eager to
lie, cheat, suppress or manufacture
evidence, cut deals with convicted
persons to get testimony, etc.
to get convictions.
It's adversarial, that is, a
fight, right?
In particular,
no way do I want some
non-objective people
out to rack up convictions, get headlines,
promotions, reelections,
votes for the mayor from being "tough
on crime", have an easy way to
claim that a case is "solved", etc.
convict an innocent person.
I'm arriving at the court room
with no preconceived notions
about the guilt or innocence of the
defendant but with a lot of
strong notions about the adversarial
nature of the mud wrestling match
I'm about to view.
So, to get a conviction, the police
and prosecutor will have to
make a solid case and where I
know that they are not objective,
fair, honest, or interested in
justice.
That the police and prosecutor
brought the case cuts no ice with
me, doesn't for a second make
me suspect that the defendant
is guilty.
And for a conviction, emotional
appeals will seriously hurt
the case of the police and prosecutor.
My career is in math, with theorems
and proofs, and computing: I long
since concluded that emotional
screaming does not a math proof make
or a software bug fix.
E.g., there's the line in The
Social Network where the lawyer
tells Zuck that with some little
remark he has "already lost the jury".
Well, not with me. I don't care
what the heck emotional this,
gut twisting that, subtle some other
thing, passion, pathos, poignancy,
drama, etc.: I'm no more emotional
than that granite column out front.
I can work hard not to be emotional
until there's a chance of convicting
an innocent person.
Or, the prosecutor claims
that the defendant
has a rap sheet a mile long and has
had various convictions before. But in this
trial the question is what did the defendant
do this time. To bring in the past of
the defendant is clearly an attempt to
bring emotion, maybe vengeance,
retaliation, or retribution, into the
case. Okay, prosecutor: I'm not
convicting based on emotion,
and you just lost your trust from me
for objectivity, fairness, and rationality.
Sure, the judge can tell the jury
this and that,
but as a juror I'm still free to ignore
what the judge says and obligated
to vote as I
see fit and not give reasons. The decision
just is not up to the police,
prosecutor, and
judge.
Instead, the decision is up to the
jury. However important the police,
prosecutor, and judge believe they
are, the real responsibility is
in the hands of the jury.
The Founding Fathers no doubt
expected that 12 disinterested citizens
would come to better decisions than
hardly objective
people interested in publicity, politics,
promotions, etc.
With a juror, even the letter of
the law doesn't have to count: If
a juror believes that the law is absurd,
then the juror is free to vote to acquit.
It's called the jury system. If I
have to serve, I'll try to be a good
juror.
Pattern jury instructions exist in most states to prevent arbitrary and unjustified decisions made by jurors. I don't agree with how they can be used in some cases, but you might be explicitly barred from making such decisions.
IANAL but my understanding is that
on a jury there are deliberations
and then votes. A juror gets to
vote; doesn't have to explain
the vote but just casts a vote.
If the judge can tell a juror
how they must vote, then we don't
need a jury. Else we have a jury,
and the jurors get to vote.
Maybe the judge instructs the jurors
to consider this, ignore that,
on and on. But still a juror
gets to vote and for reasons they
don't have to explain.
It's our jury system. Maybe some
lawyers, judges, etc. have had lots
of biggie ideas about this and that
legal detail about what would, could,
should be the case for juries,
instructions to the jurors, all sorts
of this and that. Still a juror
gets to sit in the jury box, watch
the trial, think, think for themselves,
and then vote and not explain their vote.
Suggests that either most witches didn't confess or that those proven by confession to be witches were not executed. It gives ~5000 in UK and America brought to trial and ~1500-2000 executed. In the case of the trials I can find easy documentation for - Pendle and North Berwick - it seems all who confessed were executed but that some of those executed maintained their innocence. Not all of them implicated others. At least one maintained innocence under torture and apparently to death.
Anecdotal contradiction of your assertion but it does put some doubt about it; could you cite your source then for this?
Plea bargaining should be illegal. It creates a situation where the sentence isn't connected to one's guilt or danger to society, but rather to one's ability to judge their chances in court and get a good deal for themselves. If someone is a genuine threat to society, then shouldn't get out of prison while they're still a danger just because they saw a deal as beneficial and decided to take it. If someone's innocent, they shouldn't be given an incentive (threatened) to say they're guilty.
We also wouldn't have the situation where prosecutors let wealthy and influential people off the hook and then later claim, "hey, it was the best plea deal we could get."
Not only do the accused have to face the possible penalty of a conviction, they also have to face the penalty of mounting a defense. Public defenders are so swamped that the cost of a competent defense would almost surely ruin the average family.
In other words, if you don't take the plea deal, you're punished whether you're guilty or innocent.
i agree. i just wanted to raise the imagery of being a prosecutor in jail. if they're hostile to child molesters, imagine what they do to prosecutors! yowza.
I don't get the point of discussing a two-year-old article about an event that also occurred two years ago. Can someone enlighten me? Has something changed?
It's really past time to get rid of the qualified immunity doctrine. It's yet another "law" made up by the supreme court from whole cloth.
Prosecutors should be fully liable for illegal actions they take even when they're performing official duties. This guy should be serving a sentence years long, not days.
> It's really past time to get rid of the qualified immunity doctrine. It's yet another "law" made up by the supreme court from whole cloth.
This is where every system that polices others plus themselves falls down. You can think of qualified immunity as professional courtesy between lawyers.
In Wisconsin the Republican legislature and Republican governor (the recently failed presidential candidate Walker) passed and signed a law limiting political corruption investigations, because they were annoyed at all the investigations and convictions of themselves.
That's a terrible example. Those John Doe investigations were a great example of prosecutorial abuse. If I had been Walker I would have had the state AG indict the prosecutors involved for corruption.
There's a libertarian argument that I've always found interesting. If you convict someone you are liable to receive X% (usually X>=100) of the exact punishment if it somehow turns out the conviction was wrong. I couldn't see this working on a large scale but it's an interesting thought experiment (would there be a death penalty, would there be any convictions at all etc.). It's usually linked to the idea that only victims should be able to sue and that there is no such thing as a victimless crime.
I've always thought that a probabilistic justice system of sorts would be interesting. Something along the lines of "the default punishment for this is 10 years however we are only 60% certain about the conviction thus the verdict is X years (maybe something logarithmic, certainly not 6 years)"
Your 2nd idea is a fascinating one. The legal system has a weird binary concept of "proof" that doesn't exist anywhere else except perhaps maths. It might still need some threshold of certainty to stop harassment or gaming the system with a lot of low-probability cases that are easy to fabricate.
Your first idea would have a problem in that people who's job is to convict people will accumulate that risk the longer they work. By chance, they're bound to get it wrong from time to time so it would unfairly punish those with the longest careers.
This, right here, is the heart of the matter for me. If we have people whose job is to convict people then they'll do whatever it takes, not necessarily serve justice or do the right thing, to convict anyone coming their way.
However, if you change the job goal to "reduce crime rate", or some such metric, then they would at least try to do what's fair.
> The legal system has a weird binary concept of "proof" that doesn't exist anywhere else except perhaps maths.
This is not true at all, at least in the US. One of the core differences between criminal and civil cases is the burden of proof; the former requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt", while for the latter it is "the preponderance of the evidence" or "clear and convincing" depending on the case. The definitions of these terms are not laser precise (I'm not sure how they could be), but there is at least a recognized role that the non-binary degree to which the evidence is convincing plays.
The high bar of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is incre4dibly important, and a lot of people end up being distracted by concepts like efficiency, when the very basis of our legal system is that it isn't supposed to be efficient or "unbiased". It is intended to be explicitly biased against the state, so any of these probabilistic "gray" are a burden the state must overcome.
Yes, this means we sometimes let some truly despicable people walk away without being punished. That's the point.
While the devil is in the details, "reasonable" is a decent bar. We don't have to entertain every possibility. If your defense is that space-aliens made you do it, nobody is going to find that "reasonable". On the other hand, if you defense is at least a plausible alternative interpretation of the facts, I would consider that a "reasonable doubt".
As we will always have a margin of error in complex human interactions, we have to decide if we want to err on the side of vengeance even when it affects innocent people, or if we want to protect the innocent even when it also involves giving protection to the guilty. It is at these boundary cases where concepts like "freedom" is tested. If we only give the protections of a "free" society to the people that don't need it while ignoring rights and due process when it is convenient (trials are expensive), then any claim about being a civilized are merely dishonest marketing.
Meanwhile ... the government is hard at work reducing the available time a judge has to consider a case. It's down to hours on average, for complex cases, minutes (not even tens of minutes) for "simple" cases (ie. < 2 weeks jail).
This forces judges to have an attitude along the lines of first offence -> warning plus fine if more than 1 week jail time, second offence -> same, but rescind driver license for a time as well, offence during driver license rescinded -> jail time. It is simply not possible to consider subtlety like ... oh, say, the actual case the government has under those rules.
But of course, because the government has been so successful in reducing time spent per case, at this point, giving judges an hour per case minimum would involve increasing the size of the justice system tenfold, maybe more.
Since the roles of plaintiff and defendant in civil cases are somewhat arbitrary (they mostly depend on procedural and strategic issues) and could just as easily be reversed, it's easy to see that a burden of proof that is too onerous would simultaneously be much too light.
They still result in an outcome of "completely guilty" or "completely innocent". There's no "we'll give him a lighter sentence because we're only slightly convinced there's no reasonable doubt". There may be lighter sentences because the crime seems less bad to a judge, but not because the guilt seems less likely.
There's a difference between (1) securing a conviction on the basis of evidence which was compelling at the time of the trial but was, perhaps many years later, proven to be faulty, and (2) doing something improper to secure a conviction you know is wrongful.
Prosecutors should not be punished for (1) but should be punished for (2), in proportion to the seriousness of their misdeed and the sentence handed down (or served if they own up before the prisoner is released).
"Let the punishment fit the crime" - works both ways. Putting an innocent man in prison is far far worse than than letting a guilty man basically go free as is the case here. An important precedent but far far from ideal or whats necessary.
Does anyone know if the wrongfully convicted victim has the right to sue the former prosecutor in civil court? I'd have thought so, but there's no mention of this possibility in the article. If so, there would be a difference between the criminal offence of withholding evidence versus the civil offence of selling the victim down the river.
In a system where people win trials for milions if the coffee you sell them is too hot, I would be surprised if that victim can't literally crucify the Ken Anderson guy in court for all that he has, in terms of years and money.
The coffee trial is one of my pet peeves. The lady had severe burns on her legs, genitals and torso. She had to go to the icu, and then to a burn clinic, and then later went through at least one round of surgery. The location that served the coffee had been written up for the temperature being way too high, but no one ever acted on it. IIRC that penalty was appealed, and I think they settled on a lesser amount later.
Also, part of having a healthy justice system is having the ability to sue for literally any, or no reason. In an ideal world a flagrant lawsuit would just get thrown out without any harm to either party. Unfortunately we've built a system where a suit can bankrupt either party, so it turns into a war of attrition.
The men exonerated by the Innocence Project (99% proven wrongfully convicted are men) serve an average of thirteen years before exoneration, sometimes years after the exoneration happens.
The documentary shows prosecutors keeping people in prison, and therefore guilty people free, with impunity.
Did I miss a bit in this article - the innocently convicted man did 25 years. The prosecutor, knowing his innocence, withheld the evidence that allowed this conviction to pass but only did 500 hours (approx. 3 months) of community service and 10 days in prison.
An innocent man lost 25 years of his life and the man who caused this eventually, after a reasonably successful career lost what may as well equate to some vacation time...
Am I the only one who is horrified at this? Okay, so he got more than a slap on the wrist, but what the fuck is this?! That's bullshit! Pardon my linguistics, but my horror at this injustice leaves me short for words.
The only restitution that would make this even marginally okay is if the prosecutor/judge had been required to:
- House the convicted man.
- Set him up with training that would allow the convicted to re-integrate meaningfully into today's society.
- Assist the man to find meaningful and gainful employment.
- Set him up with a pension plan that would have been equivalent to see him through retirement.
- Set him up for success in the manner in which he would have been able to provide for himself had he been a free man.
- Feed him, clothe him and pay his utility bills until such a time as his income would allow him to successfully stand on his own two feet.
Even then, he owes this man 25 years of his service to make up for what was taken from him. If that bankrupts his accuser, so be it.
I "love" how Huffpost frames this as "meaningful punishment" as if saying so makes that farce acceptable. I'm with the OP of this thread, that judge owes this man 25 years.
Anderson is a real piece of work. He tried everything to fight Morton's appeals, his own sanction. It is also a huge embarrassment for the State Bar; since they previously awarded him "Prosecutor of the Year".
> I "love" how Huffpost frames this as "meaningful punishment"
The author frames it as meaningful punishment, and is the director of the Ohio Innocence Project. I'm not sure I totally agree, but compared to zero punishment in the past, this is a major improvement.
There is context here the article doesn't disclose. The prosecutor didn't "know" Morton was innocent. He failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, namely the fact that Morton's three year old son was at the scene and said his father wasn't home at the time of the murder.[1] It was undoubtedly unethical to withhold that. If there were doubts about the reliability of the child's testimony, that was the jury's call to make, not his. But not disclosing that statement is a far cry from prosecuting someone despite "knowing his innocence."
[1] http://www.innocenceproject.org/news-events-exonerations/pre... ("Anderson did not turn over a transcript of the victim’s mother telling an investigator that Morton’s 3-year-old son Eric had told her that Morton was not the attacker and other evidence pointing to a third party assailant.")
You are both ignoring the threats he made to extract a plea bargain, and the lack of serious consequences for prosecutorial misconduct. He acted like a thug, and should be sentenced like one. He ought to die in prison and see his family impoverished to compensate his victim.
Again, a man - and his son - lost 25 years of their lives because he failed to disclose evidence he had. The personal destruction he caused is unfathomable - imagine yourself, after having your spouse killed, thrown in jail for a crime you know you didn't commit, pleading guilty because you were convinced this would be the best for you and your child you'll most likely never see again. This is way beyond unethical.
The original post said that Andersen prosecuted someone "knowing his innocence." But was that really Andersen's intent?
Sometimes the exculpatory evidence can be clear-cut and you can conclude that the prosecutor knew the defendant was innocent and still went forward with the prosecution. Those cases merit very severe punishment. But here, the main piece of withheld evidence was a statement by the victim's mother about a statement by the victim's three-year old child. The statement itself was inadmissible hearsay.
It should have been disclosed, but does failure to do so really rise to the level of malicious intent to prosecute someone Andersen "knew" to be innocent?
> Sometimes the exculpatory evidence can be clear-cut and you can conclude that the prosecutor knew the defendant was innocent and still went forward with the prosecution. Those cases merit very severe punishment.
The article claims this is the first time a prosecutor has been incarcerated.
There are lots of really terrible cases where prosecutors assisted in manufacturing evidence to wrongfully convict people, and received no punishment: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/supreme_cour.... The system needs to be overhauled to hold those people accountable. But I'm not sure this case is the poster-child for ones where the prosecutors need to do long prison sentences. Brady violations should carry some punishments. But I don't think a strict liability "eye-for-eye regardless of the prosecutor's state of mind" approach like people are advocating here is the way to go.
The premise of the court system is that we don't have some infallible technology to tell us whether someone is guilty so we go through this whole process to try to figure it out. If a prosecutor wrongly does something that can change the outcome of a case, the severity of the act is measured by the years taken from an innocent man.
You can reasonably argue that there is a difference in severity between e.g. withholding evidence and manufacturing evidence, but that difference is only worth so much when they both predictably cause the same outcome. And a term of incarceration of five days... it could be twenty times that long and still be overly lenient.
> Sometimes the exculpatory evidence can be clear-cut
That's irrelevant. The prosecutor chose to withhold the evidence to further his case. Even if he wasn't sure the suspect was innocent, he cannot claim he acted in good faith when he knowingly withholds evidence. As a prosecutor he knows very well he should present all the evidence he has. It is not his job to judge what's relevant and what's not.
His failure notwithstanding, is there some reason why the defense didn't call the son to testify as a witness in court? Not trying to defend Anderson, but genuinely curious.
Also, I think this thread seems to be overly focused on eye-for-an-eye justice and laying the blame solely on the prosecutor (e.g. comments that he should be personally liable for compensation), but it seems to me that the entire justice system failed Morton, not just this one transgression. Morton received a lump sum for every year served, a lifetime annuity of $80k, job training, and educational aid.
Nothing in the world is going to give him those 25 years back, including bankrupting or imprisoning the prosecutor, but at least he was compensated in some way.
However, I will admit I was fairly disgusted by Anderson's plea bargain, not just because he deserved a harsher punishment but because it's not exactly a strong deterrent to prevent this sort of thing in the future (though perhaps the Michael Morton Act may help in that regard).
It's not an eye for an eye, it is holding the prosecutor accountable for his bad behavior and making him make it right. Making him do time doesn't make it right [besides the fact that the amount of time he was made to do was a slap in the face to the victim]... that's revenge or eye-for-an-eye punishment. It doesn't help the victim recover his life in any way shape or form. All it does is avenge what was lost - at the taxpayer's cost. Not the cost of the guilty party.
I don't know about anyone else, but if I'm murdered, avenging my death isn't going to help my family. I wouldn't want him to see a day of jail time. Make my murderer go to the lengths I do to take care of my family every single day for the rest of his life, just as I would have had I not been murdered. This man lost 25 years of his life. The judge guilty of that should be responsible for fixing that. The system may be partially to blame here, but you cannot tell me that a man smart enough to be a public prosecutor couldn't discern that he was exploiting the weaknesses of that system for his own gain without regard for the human cost to this man and his family - and his wife's family?
If you do something bad that fucks up someone's life, it should be on you to help fix that as best it can be fixed. This isn't an eye for an eye, this is doing what's right.
Just as companies are responsible for the conduct of their employees, the state is responsible for the conduct of government officials. It's the responsibility of the state to fix things as best it can be fixed.
Just because 'that is the way things are done' doesn't make it right.
You (the hypothetical you, not the real you) are responsible for your own actions. The company doesn't control how you act, you do. It's fair enough that the company is held accountable, but you should be equally held accountable for willful negligence, gross misconduct, unprofessional conduct etc. etc. That's on you.
Just because this prosecutor is a Government official, doesn't immediately remove his culpability, nor his accountability. He was wilfully negligent and ruined an innocent man's life. The Government didn't do that, he did that. It should be on him to fix it. He should be held accountable to the extent of his means to make it right. If it is beyond his means to make it right, it should then fall to the Government to provide the shortfall.
There is ample psychological research that people essentially surrender there sense of self when acting as part of a larger organization. The incentives and pressures imposed by the organization are generally far more relevant to behavior than any individual motives.
Think about this individual case. Did Ken Anderson end up in this prison because the prosecutor was personally out to get him? I don't think so. I think he ended up in prison because of a system that is "tough on crime" and is designed to heavily incentivize high conviction rates sometimes to the extent that it produces wrongful convictions.
If you are "incentivized" to do something you otherwise wouldn't by an undercover cop, you're still considered guilty of the crime, and doubly so because you were caught red handed in the act, unless of course you can prove entrapment, which is extremely difficult ... when you are doing something wrong, and you know it, even if you are being pressured by those above you to do that, you still know it's wrong. This is why we have whistleblower protection and this is also why soldiers can be court-marshalled for following orders that they know to be illegal.
Did he convict an innocent man due to his own wrongdoing and did he knowingly withhold evidence? Clearly.
Did he prove that he was coerced into this behavior in some way, thus proving entrapment and absolving himself of any guilt in this matter? If he had, it's doubtful he would've been fined and sentenced to jail time and community service, ergo, I'd say he did not.
So he did something wrong, he did so knowingly, even if he had "surrendered his sense of self" to the institution, he is still guilty of wrongdoing that destroyed another mans life - by the very same argument that the entrapped would have to prove that the entrapment led him to behave this way.
A prosecutor is part of an institution for years that, by default, it's reasonable to assume has some culpability for the crime.
Someone caught by an undercover cop is interacting with that cop for the first time. For this reason, by default, the cop is not assumed to have culpability.
> His failure notwithstanding, is there some reason why the defense didn't call the son to testify as a witness in court? Not trying to defend Anderson, but genuinely curious.
He pleaded guilty, so it presumably wasn't an option. I doubt he had much contact with his son whilst under arrest on suspicion of murder so probably didn't know what his son had seen when making the plea, and three year old's memories fade pretty quickly (the son apparently had no recollection of the incident whatsoever later in life and grew up believing the father was guilty and not having the slightest interest in the appeal process). Even if the son had been able to testify at the time I suspect most judges would advise the jury not to take a denial that Daddy was there from an infant at face value.
According to articles linked from this one - there was also a lot of other evidence withheld:
* a strange van lurking in the neighborhood
* the wife's credit card turning up in a different city after the events
* dna evidence from semen in the bed
* dna evidence from a bloody bandana
(both things with dna point to the same person who wasn't morton)
And from the article you linked:
The investigator also received evidence that the attack was committed by a third party intruder -- a neighbor reported that she observed what appeared to be someone staking out the house and someone attempted to use the victim’s credit card in San Antonio. - See more at: http://www.innocenceproject.org/news-events-exonerations/pre...
That Anderson had all of that is enough to point to a reasonably strong suspicion of knowning, if not stricly knowing of Morton's innocence.
Here is the Innocence Project's original habeas petition: http://www.innocenceproject.org/files/imported/morton_writ_f.... It does not mention either the bandana nor the semen in its list (at 8-9) of evidence withheld by the prosecution in violation of Brady. The semen had been introduced at trial to support the prosecution's theory that Morton had masturbated over his wife's dead body (see 13). Morton requested a DNA test in 1990 that showed the semen was his.
Also note that the investigation and trial were in 1986-87. The first use of DNA testing in a criminal was in 1987, and testing would not be routine until many years later.
DNA testing which ultimately exonerated Morton wasn't available in the US in 1987; a single lab in the UK had pioneered the techniques but they weren't widely available. Arguably a bigger factor than the prosecutor's misconduct in Morton spending so long in jail is whatever procedural rule or individual prevented the DNA evidence from the bandana being brought up and tested until 2011. That was about 23 or so years too late.
The semen in the bed could instead actually have been a core part of the prosecution's crime of passion narrative if it had gone to trial: woman is killed in her own bed in act of brutal sexual violence a day after husband leaves her a note complaining about her unwillingness to have intercourse with him. Reports of unrecognised vans being parked in residential streets might be a police lead but are certainly not exculpatory evidence, and the credit card claims were apparently inaccurate (the police had her not-stolen credit card in their possession)[1].
Overall Anderson's actions are pretty consistent with someone certain he'd got the right man and willing to breach regulations to avoid him taking it to trial and getting off on the basis the evidence against him was as circumstantial as it was compelling. Misconduct which undoubtedly influenced Morton's plea, but it's still likely the judge would (reasonably) have ruled hearsay attributed to the accused's three year old son inadmissible and green vans irrelevant, leaving him highly likely to be convicted unless his defence team were able to successfully lobby for newfangled DNA fingerprinting techniques to be explored. There was, after all, a clear imputed motive consistent with the evidence, no sign of any break-in and no alternative suspects. Even conviction at trial might still have significantly improved Morton's chances of getting the bandana DNA raised at a much earlier appeal but one can't fix the failings of America's judicial system by levying probably unwarranted accusations of malice at one rule-bending prosecutor.
Anderson should get life without parole. A message needs to be sent to government officials that abuse there powers.
Taking 25 years from this innocent man is just the tip of the iceberg. He also took 25 years from his relatives. And this is probably not an isolated incident for him.
I think we need to punish prosecutorial misconduct more aggressively. That said, you can better understand the status quo if you think of the criminal justice system in terms of interconnected problems.
First problem: making sure prosecutors are held personally liable for the X% of convictions that are wrongful and arise from prosecutorial misconduct.
Second problem: ensuring that people are freed for the Y% of convictions that are wrongful and don't result from misconduct.
Third problem: ensuring that the system can function to uphold the (100 - Y - X)% of convictions that are not wrongful.
The fact of the matter is that Y is a small number. And X is a much smaller number than that. Yet, the (100 - Y - X)% of convicts who are really guilty have no less incentive to appeal or sue for misconduct than the X% of people who have a valid case. Consequently, the justice system is awash in frivolous appeals and habeas petitions.
If it was just an issue of holding prosecutors liable in X% of cases, then this would be a much easier problem. But you have to do that without giving the (100 - Y - X)% of the justly-convicted a powerful tool to harass and abuse prosecutors who engaged in no wrongdoing. That makes the problem much harder.
The system doesn't have enough capacity to deal with the frivolous appeals and habeas corpus petitions? Gee, that's too bad.
If only there was something the justice system could do to reduce the number of people going into this pipeline!
Well, I'll let you go, Justice System -- I see you found a dude with a few grams of acid paper, which I think we can all agree makes him basically El Chapo.
The justice system can and does handle all those appeals and habeas petitions. But there is a difference between giving people a chance to prove their innocence, and making it easier for them to try and have prosecutors imprisoned for misconduct.
And reducing the number of cases would not change the calculus. If you had fewer convicts you'd need fewer prosecutors, but the ratios for each prosecutor would not change. The basic problem is that if you make it easier for 1 person to hold the prosecutor accountable for actual misconduct, you make it easier for 20-30 validly convicted people to harass prosecutors who did nothing wrong.
Fewer convicts == fewer prosecutors is irrelevant. Why?
Because the number of prosecutors isn't the limiting factor in whether or not we can safely do a better job of punishing bad prosecutors!
As you yourself stated, it's the legal apparatus of the justice system. Punishing bad prosecutors without allowing abuse and harassment would take a lot of resources, yes?
I was just pointing out that, with a smaller prison population, it wouldn't be necessary to turn judges out into the streets. Freed-up legal resources could be used to thoughtfully tackle the very real problems in the justice system.
> As you yourself stated, it's the legal apparatus of the justice system. Punishing bad prosecutors without allowing abuse and harassment would take a lot of resources, yes?
You'd be subjecting individual prosecutors to a deluge of frivolous lawsuits, each carrying the risk of criminal prosecution. The issue isn't whether the system has the capacity to process those lawsuits, it's whether prosecutors could still do their jobs while dealing with them.
You provided that solution -- "lawsuits with a risk of criminal prosecution."
That's your invention, so feel free to knock it down.
I'm simply observing a truth, and was in the original comment: the enormous legal resources being wasted dealing with unnecessarily incarcerated people would be useful in dealing with prosecutorial misconduct.
I won't claim it's a profound or useful insight. :)
And the justice system could stand to spend more on limiting the amount of injustice it causes, an amount which the general population is starting to realize is not trivial.
(Also, I notice that you've amended your original comment to be a bit more sympathetic).
Anything less than the harshest possible punishment is being lenient.
This isn't a case where a man is desperate for money or undereducated or is in a fit of rage or has a mental condition. This prosecutor has years of professional training which includes ethics courses. He knew exactly what he was doing. He wanted the conviction to appear tough, and damn the consequences.
I'd throw him in solitary for a year and never allow him access to a clock or calendar.
I don't understand why the punishment is not much tougher. People like prosecutors, cops and judges are entrusted by society with power over people's lives. Illegal behavior in such a role should be viewed much more severely. A government can't work if it doesn't operate to the highest standards.
10 days in jail? How about start with 25 years and then work your way up from there? That'd be justice, but in the US that won't happen. We can always hope he gets murdered in jail though, but they'll probably put him in solitary. I'm still hoping though ...
Not sure if this has been raised somewhere else in this thread, but if prosecutor didn't disclose evidence, did the defense also not know about the evidence, considering it was the child of the accused. Is the balance of power in favor of prosecution?
Also, now that the the accused in the case has been declared not guilty, will there be an investigation into who actually committed the murder?
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